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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, which relies on philosophical inquiry, I use the case of rampage
school gun violence to explore democratic education. Drawing a distinction between liberal
foundational democratic education, which aims to educate the individual on how to become an
autonomous rational agent and pragmatic-antifoundational democratic education, which looks to
help individuals understand agency as shared, I argue antifoundational democratic education
teaches individuals how to affect their environment and take responsibility for the renewal of
their democratic society. Rather than allocating blame in the singular individual, antifoundational
democracy teaches citizens how to share the blame, take responsibility for unacceptable
violence, and participate in the renewal of a democratic society. Specifically, I claim
antifoundational democratic education distributes responsibility for rampage school gun violence
to various human and nonhuman actors and teaches individuals how to make sense of each
agent’s actions. In so doing, antifoundational democratic education prepares individuals and
communities to leverage their understanding of complex causal networks to enact changes that
will to stop the rampaging.

v

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Of the challenges facing American education today, none causes more horror among
parents, educators, and citizens than rampage school gun violence. Rampage school gun violence
exploded in the 1990s. Between 1992 and 1999, there were at least 11 instances of rampage
school gun violence, which resulted in the death of 43 students and teachers and the injury of
many more.1 Yet, the phenomenon of rampage school gun violence did not end with the 20th
century; instead, it became a defining feature of 21st century American education. Rampage
school shootings, where a student or former student shoots and kills at least four members of the
school community — often for what they represent, and not who they are — on school grounds,
are significant and defining events that continue to shape education in American schools. In fact,
since Sandy Hook, the rampage that killed 20 first graders and six adults in 2012, there have
been over 150 regular school shootings; although, few have made the news.2 In between regular
school shootings, rampages burst on the scene, like the one in Parkland, Florida on February 14,

Jonathan Fast, Ceremonial Violence: A Psychological Explanation of School Shootings, 1 edition
(Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2008).
1

The tally depends on how one defines rampage school shootings. Priya Krishnakumar, “Mapping school
shootings nationwide since Sandy Hook, LA Times, April 12, 2017, accessed on August 13, 2017,
http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-essential-education-updates-southern-since-sandy-hook-a-gunhas-been-fired-1491953275-htmlstory.html; “A Look At All 11 School Shootings That Took Place In The
First 23 Days Of 2018,” NPR.org, accessed February 12, 2018,
https://www.npr.org/2018/01/24/580433745/a-look-at-all-11-school-shootings-that-took-place-in-thefirst-23-days-of-2018.
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2018 where 17 high school students were killed. The memorial for the thirteen victims of the
1999 Columbine High School rampage school shooting features stones engraved with
proclamations and questions from the school and community. One inscription asks: “It brought a
nation to its knees, but now that we’ve gotten back up how have things changed; what have we
learned?” What have we learned? How have things changed? These questions are the pulse of
any work on rampage school shootings. I am not focusing on rampage school shootings because
they make schools especially unsafe. Schools are still the safest place for children to spend their
time.4 I am focusing on rampage school shootings because these violent incidents have
continued unabated in a society that claims to value social progress.
This dissertation focuses on the case of rampage school gun violence to highlight the
significant limitations liberal democratic education can perpetuate. I contend that rampage school
gun violence puts in sharp relief the limitations of liberal democratic education, which locates
agency exclusively with individual actors and obscures the way in which responsibility and
agentic capacity is distributed among a network of actors. This project is a continuation of work
begun by a group of philosophers of education who contributed to a special issue of Educational
Theory in 2015. As one of the only comprehensive set of essays by philosophers of education on
the issue of rampage school gun violence, these essays foreground my argument in this project.
In particular, I draw on ideas generated by Bryan Warnick and co-authors, Amy Shuffelton,
Harvey Shapiro, Gabriel Keehn and Deron Boyles, and Aislinn O’Donnell. Bryan Warnick and

Jess Bidgood et al., “The Names and Faces of the Florida School Shooting Victims,” The New York
Times, February 15, 2018, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/15/us/florida-schoolvictims.html.
3

Dewey G. Cornell, School Violence: Fears Versus Facts, 1 edition (Mahwah, N.J: Routledge, 2006),
18–23.
4
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his co-authors hone in on the ways in which the meaning of American schools impacts the
likelihood that young people will view schools as appropriate sites for gun violence.5 Amy
Shuffelton examines the making of masculine honor and the importance of receiving recognition
from one’s honor peers, especially for young men.6 Harvey Shapiro suggests that the binary
separation of abnormal rampage school shootings from normal instances of school gun violence
confounds our understanding of, and responses to, mass school shootings.7 Gabriel Keehn and
Deron Boyles, explicitly point to the way the neoliberal, corporate organization of schools
transforms students into consumers and consumables.8 Finally, Aislinn O’Donnell urges
educators to adopt an antiheroic pedagogy that invites the learner to envision gentler responses to
human suffering and violence.9
I do not extend any of these particular arguments; rather, I echo and explore a general
sentiment that resonates throughout the Educational Theory special issue on rampage school gun
violence. Although each writer draws from a different set of literature to make specific claims
about the cultural roots of rampage school gun violence, the articles converge around a web of
complex factors and relationships that contribute to rampage school gun violence. In other
words, each author agrees that rampage school gun violence arises out of some complex and
Bryan R. Warnick, Sang Hyun Kim, and Shannon Robinson, “Gun Violence and the Meaning of
American Schools,” Educational Theory 65, no. 4 (August 1, 2015): 371–86,
https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12122.
5

Amy Shuffelton, “Consider Your Man Card Reissued: Masculine Honor and Gun Violence,”
Educational Theory 65, no. 4 (August 1, 2015): 387–403, https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12123.
7
Harvey Shapiro, “When the Exception Is the Rule: School Shootings, Bare Life, and the Sovereign
Self,” Educational Theory 65, no. 4 (August 2015): 423–40, https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12125.
6

Gabriel Keehn and Deron Boyles, “Sense, Nonsense, and Violence: Levinas and the Internal Logic of
School Shootings,” Educational Theory 65, no. 4 (August 2015): 441–58,
https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12126.
8

Aislinn O’Donnell, “Curriculum as Conversation: Vulnerability, Violence, and Pedagogy in Prison,”
Educational Theory 65, no. 4 (August 2015): 475–90, https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12128.
9
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complicated set of events that has taken place in schools and in the social world of teenagers.
Moreover, there is agreement that rampage school gun violence is correlated to an unwillingness
or inability to understand this kind of violence as normal in a society that privileges war, control,
dominance, individuality, and consumption. Each contributor to the issue, therefore, comes to
say rampage school gun violence is “normal” insofar as one considers factor x, y, and z. For
example, Keehn and Boyles highlight President George W. Bush’s comments at the Virginia
Tech memorial where President Bush suggested that, “It’s impossible to make sense of such
violence and suffering.” Keehn and Boyles go on to argue that “sentiments are even stronger in
cases of school gun violence, where the unquestionable innocence and vulnerability of the
victims, as well as the sanctity of the spaces in which such violence takes place, add yet another
layer of unfathomability to an already baffling act.”10 According to Keehn and Boyles, the story
of the unfathomable school shooting is a myth and claim school shootings are, in fact, a natural
outgrowth of the current climate in public education. To render school shootings intelligible,
Keehn and Boyles argue that we must appreciate a number of factors that make possible and
likely this kind of violence.
Like Keehn and Boyles, I, too, am claiming that rampage school gun violence is entirely
fathomable insofar as one is capable of taking together a number of factors. Whereas Keehn and
Boyles substantiate their claim by turning to a Levinasian ethical framework to address the
“ethical vacuum” created by “hypercorporate” schools, I think it is imperative to begin with
liberal democratic civic education that dissuades citizens from “taking together a number of
factors” in the first place.11 That is, I argue liberal democratic citizens have been taught to locate

10

Keehn and Boyles, “Sense, Nonsense, and Violence,” 441–42.
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Keehn and Boyles, 442.
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intentional rational agency exclusively with individuals and to see one actor, the bad actor, as
solely responsible for his or her actions. To understand one’s peer as a person to whom one must
relate and cooperate in order to respond ethically to a situation, I argue, one must first understand
the nature of relationships, of causal networks, and of associated living.
This dissertation will make the case that one’s civic education contributes to one’s
capacity and willingness to make sense of a nexus of factors that lead to rampage school gun
violence, and it will add to the philosophy of education literature on rampage school gun
violence by focusing on the ways in which democratic civic education affects one’s ability to
address and understand the complex factors that contribute to rampage school gun violence. I am
concerned with a student’s ability to make sense of shared agency, norms, and tools, all of which
intermingle to make possible the shooting event. Hence, I explore the ways in which democratic
education enables or impairs a young person’s capacity to make sense of causal networks and,
thus, to become a democratic citizen. Toward this end, I build on Shapiro’s provocation in
“When the Exception is the Rule: School Shootings, Bare Life, and the Sovereign Self.” He
states, “the pedagogical challenge, then, is to expose and depose the language of
nonresponsibility and exceptionality when it comes to school gun violence and violence’s other
forms and contexts.”12 Hence, I aim to work out the ways in which civic education ought to
enable young people to take responsibility for the renewal of their democratic society and for the
perpetuation of rampage school gun violence.
From the outset, I assume education in a democratic society ought to be aimed at the
renewal of a robust democratic society wherein citizens learn to make sense of the deep and
ever-present associations that make possible associative life. On my view, this means citizens

12

Shapiro, “When the Exception Is the Rule,” 439.
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must learn to make sense of the ways in which agency is shared as well as the actors that make
possible and contribute to particular actions and associations. This project, therefore, focuses on
the kind of civic education that sustains or perpetuates gun violence, on the one hand, and the
kind of civic education that energizes peaceful social progress, on the other. In what follows, I
contend that even robust theories of liberal democratic education, that confront neoliberalism and
takes seriously real-world problems, have blind spots which limit their ability to deal with the
complexity of educating democratic citizens amid rampant gun violence. Liberal democracy
aims to educate the citizen to think of oneself as an ontologically unique and autonomous agent,
which on my view hinders a citizen’s ability to make sense of the way in which human
associations, power, and nonhuman material act on him and his environment. Following political
theorist Benjamin Barber, I refer to this conception of democracy as foundational and liberal.13
In place of a foundational democratic education that prepares young people to be rational,
autonomous, and solitary individuals, I argue that democratic education ought to more closely
follow John Dewey’s conception of democratic education, which readies persons to live in
associations of shared agency. On my view, teaching young people to build thinking habits, to
communicate, and to cooperate with different — and not always reasonable — peers, teaches
people to take responsibility for the community to which they belong.
A significant portion of my argument for an antifoundational and Deweyan democratic
education rest on an alternative conception of agency that takes into account the “thingy” power
of guns and the social power of gendered norms. This aspect of my argument extends a number
of insights Amy Shuffelon puts forth in “Consider Your Man Card Reissued: Masculine Honor

Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age by Benjamin Barber, First
Edition, Twentieth-Anniversary Edition, With a New Preface edition (University of California Press,
2004).
13
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and Gun Violence.” Drawing from two different accounts of contemporary gun culture,
developed by Douglas Kellner and Adam Winkler, Amy Shuffelton argues that we must re-issue
honor, and in so doing address our understanding of honor seeking behaviors and norms to make
sense of the vast middle ground between the hyper-masculine “gun nuts” and the genderegalitarian progressives.14 Shuffelton tells her readers that social norms, like gender, and
positional conventions, like honor, must be interrogated and revised to better suit a diverse and
egalitarian society. As I understand it, Shuffelton’s proposal demands a particular kind of civic
education—one that supports and extends a young person’s capacity to make sense of an
associative and shared middle ground wherein social conventions, positions, and norms are
interrogated as causal actors. Moreover, I agree with Shuffelton’s analysis of Douglas Kellner’s
Guys and Guns Amok: Domestic Terrorism and School Shootings from the Oklahoma City
Bombing to the Virginia Tech Massacre. Shuffelton states that Kellner maintains “an
esteem/competitive sense of masculine honor” which further obfuscates the middle ground made
up of men with various attachments to masculinity and guns such as Adam Winkler. (I take up
Winkler’s text below.) Here, it is worth noting Kellner’s text because it is a useful analysis of
hyper-masculinity, masculine entitlement, a harried gun culture, and the media spectacle that
links acts of domestic terrorism to school shootings. Additionally, Kellner insightfully turns to
the critical pedagogy of Paulo Freire, John Dewey, and Ivan Illich to claim that we must teach
young people about the connections between education, technology, and democracy if our aim is
to make explicit the complex factors that contribute to school gun violence.15 Hence, even
though Kellner dichotomizes masculinity and fails to explain exactly what learning about the

14

Shuffelton, “Consider Your Man Card Reissued,” August 1, 2015, 399.

Douglas Kellner, Guys and Guns Amok: Domestic Terrorism and School Shootings from the Oklahoma
City Bombing to the Virginia Tech Massacre, 1 edition (Boulder, CO: Routledge, 2008), 162.
15
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connections between technology, democracy and education will solve, he does introduce a
number of issues that foreground this dissertation.
Before commencing this analysis, I want to begin with a bit of history. First, about
rampage school gun violence itself. The questions here are: when did rampage school gun
violence become a phenomenon, and what distinguishes a rampage from a regular act of gun
violence? Second, I focus on contemporary interpretations of the Second Amendment. As I see
it, America’s gun problem is a part of this story insofar as it too revolves around notions of
intentional rational agents who have a constitutional right to own a gun. In fact, in later pages I
will argue that foundational democratic education supports the individual in thinking of himself
as the exclusive agentic actor. If my argument holds, then an additional implication of this
project is that how we go about educating American children about democracy ought to be a part
of our conversations about our gun problem. This chapter will conclude by delineating my
modest intention for this project: to see what the problem of rampage school gun violence can
help us understand about the limitations of liberal democratic education and to discern
antifoundational democratic educational practices that might stop the rampaging. In this final
section, I briefly establish the structure of the chapters that follow.
Rampage School Gun Violence
Steven Mintz’s book on the history of American childhood ends at the dawn of the 21st
century. Beneath an image of the Columbine shooters he writes, “The century of the child ended
with a bang, not a whimper…Not only was school violence not a new phenomenon; it had
actually peaked during the 1992-93 school year… Yet what made these school shootings
especially shocking was that the violence had spread from urban to rural and suburban areas and

9
involved multiple victims.” As Mintz notes, violence in schools was not new. Rather, what was
16

novel about the outbreak of rampage school gun violence was the type of violence, the location
of the act, targets of the violence, and the perpetrators of the violence. Between 1974 and 1990,
only two incidents could be called rampage school shootings. This stands in stark contrast to the
7-year stretch between 1992 and 1999, when at least 11 mass school shootings occurred. Prior to
1992, such shootings were anomalies, so infrequent and random that they did not warrant special
interrogation as a distinct or especially interesting problem.
A fully fleshed out definition of the phenomena that I have been calling rampage school
gun violence includes three parts. The ensuing subsections are dedicated to these: the place, the
shooter, and the victims. These key features are not the only similarities instances of rampage
school gun violence share, but they are essential elements of a complex and complicated
situation. Sociologists, like Katherine Newman, define a rampage school shooting as: a shooting
with multiple and often symbolic victims chosen at random, a shooting that takes place on a
public stage at or within the school, and a shooting that involve either students or former students
of school.17 I am less interested in definitional categories that demarcate the rampage at Sandy
Hook Elementary School from the rampage at Columbine High School. Instead, I am interested
in the ways in which the key dimensions of the phenomena which include, the place, the shooter
and the victims, highlight the complexity of rampage school gun violence.18

Steven Mintz, Huck’s Raft: A History of American Childhood, First Harvard University Press
paperback ed., 2006 edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2006), 376.
16

Katherine S. Newman, “Roots of a Rampage,” The Nation, December 19, 2012,
https://www.thenation.com/article/roots-rampage/.
17

Nils Bockler et al., eds., School Shootings: International Research, Case Studies, and Concepts for
Prevention (New York: Springer, 2013), //www.springer.com/us/book/9781461455257.
18
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Place
Place is the essential part of the phenomena. In the case of rampage school gun violence,
place includes both the site of the shooting and the location of the school. As of 2018, mass
shootings happen at various public locations—malls, concerts, and movie theaters are notable
site of rampages.19 Nonetheless, there has not been an explosion of movie theatre or mall
shootings; although, these kind of mass shootings are happening with greater frequency. Schools
appear to be significant sites that, beginning in the 1990s, invite or incite this particular kind of
violence. Moreover, not all schools have experienced a rampage. Rampages tend to take place at
schools in rural and suburban communities and not in urban areas. Thus, two aspects are at play
when we talk about the place of a rampage school shooting. One aspect is the institution, the
school, and the other is the location of the school.
A rampage school shooting is not just a mass shooting that happens on a school campus;
it is a mass shooting that happens at school, because the school and its social architecture are a
part of the target. In this way, rampage school shootings are like workplace shootings. On
Newman’s view, “Two similarities between workplace attacks and school shootings are
noteworthy. First, like school shooters, workplace shooters are arguably attacking not just
individuals but the institution itself. School shooters may be angry at the entire social system of
the school and the community.”20 The second similarity is that school shooters, like workplace
shooters, often feel the institution has played a part in their marginalization and misfortune.

Louis Klarevas and Christopher Price, Rampage Nation: Securing America from Mass Shootings,
Unabridged edition (Audible Studios on Brilliance Audio, 2016).
19

Katherine S. Newman et al., eds., Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings (New York: Basic
Books, 2004), 58.
20
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Schools, in particular American high schools, are places laden with expectations—they
are places where children build an identity, become adults, make friends, and experience many
of the firsts that define adult life. In “Gun Violence and The Meaning of American Schools,”
Bryan Warnick and his colleagues parse out at least three reasons why schools might be
interpreted as appropriate sites of gun violence.21 First, schools are sites of coercion and force
where students experience continuous “microaggressions.” For instance, teachers force students
to sit and raise their hand; some peers might force other peers to do something against their will;
and school policies often dictate what students can wear, say, and bring to school. Given the
amount of coercion in the school environment, it is not surprising some youth get angry at the
institution itself. The second reason schools might have become the site of rampage gun violence
is the expectation that at school one will find “romance, friendship, progress, and refuge,” say
Warnick and his coauthors. Developing young people expect to find like-minded peers, “their
people,” and when that expectation is met with ridicule their sense of self suffers. The third
reason, which is intricately related to the second, is that popular culture (movies like The
Breakfast Club, Ferris Bueller’s Day Off, and Ten Things I Hate About You among many others)
tells young people that they will discover and get to express their unique identity to a group of
accepting peers. When any or all of these expectations are thwarted—when a student does not
find a peer group, has trouble finding love, friendship, or refuge, and experiences the everyday
coercion of the school environment— extreme violence against the school, like rampage gun
violence, does not seem as shocking.
Further compounding the emphasis on place in rural and suburban settings, where all but
one rampage school shootings has taken place since 1970, the school is often the only public
21

Warnick, Kim, and Robinson, “Gun Violence and the Meaning of American Schools.”

22
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stage for students. For these young people, the school is the single public place students can
call their own. It is where they get to demonstrate and receive validation of their identity; it is
their stage. By way of contrast, urban settings generally feature more public places, some with
greater significance, note Newman and her colleagues.23 In Chicago, for instance, students have
their school, but also public parks, their block, public transportation, and student centers. This
does not mean there is less violence in urban environments, but that gun violence perpetrated by
young people is diffused among public stages that hold stronger significance for urban youth.24
The fact that rampage school shootings tend to take place in places without a history of
everyday gun violence, the likes of which one finds in urban cities like Chicago or New York, is
noteworthy. The dissonance of the event is part of what makes an outbreak of rampage school
gun violence so troublesome. Newman and her coauthors say the very things that make small
towns and suburban neighborhoods “safe”— friendly neighbors, close knit communities, strong
families, and vibrant religious life— contribute to mental health issues, notably depression, in
teen boys. Newman and colleagues put it this way, “these Edens of social capital are not so
exempt from the familiar adolescent rights of bullying and social exclusion.”25 Rather, they are
places that imagine themselves as immune to these adolescent rights and to the drama of the
American teen.
If the American school is the only public stage for suburban and rural youth, then there is
nothing spontaneous or especially noteworthy about the shooter’s choice of target. The school is

22

Newman, “Roots of a Rampage.”
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Newman et al., Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings.
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Cornell, School Violence. Joy D. Osofsky, ed., Children in a Violent Society (Guilford Press, 1998).
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Newman et al., Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings, 116.

13
where the shooters have learned what it means to be a member of a community. It is the space
where they have been invited to become and then denied the space to be.
The Shooter
A few traits link rampage school shooters: they tend to be male, they are often bullied,
some severely, and the bullying generally has something to do with the shooters’ performance of
heteronormative gender identities. Beyond these descriptors, many school shooters share
individual vulnerabilities toward mental illness, have unhealthy family lives, and play violent
video games.26 Following a rampage, some of these traits become explanatory rationalizations
for the event. Some will say video games are the cause; while, others will blame mental illness or
the shooter’s home life.27 Yet, any attempt to blame one factor, is an attempt to oversimplify the
complexity of our associative behaviors. Given the variability of youth development and human
experience, this section is an attempt to highlight some of the experiences that shooters share. It
is composed with the recognition that it is impossible to single out potential shooters via their
shared traits and that individual humans are actors in complex causal networks.
All but one rampage school shooter has been male. As one Times commentator puts it,
“What do these shooting have in common? Guns, yes. But also, boys. Girls aren’t pulling the
triggers. It’s boys. It’s almost always boys.”28 Brenda Spencer, the only female school shooter,
was 16 in 1979 when she took aim at the elementary school across the street from her home.
Although accounts agree that Brenda’s home life was unhealthy and neglectful, her stated
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Newman et al., Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings.

27

Cornell, School Violence.

Michael Ian Black, “Opinion | The Boys Are Not All Right,” The New York Times, February 21, 2018,
sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/21/opinion/boys-violence-shootings-guns.html.
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reasons for shooting members of the school community remain contradictory. She claimed she
was on drugs the morning of the shooting, but reports said otherwise. She claimed abuse at the
hand of her father, but not until 2001. The only sure evidence that remains is what she told
reporters on the morning of the shooting, “I just don’t like Monday’s.”29 Since Brenda was one
of the first school shooters, and remains the only girl, her story is interesting but frustratingly
opaque. What are we to make of the reports that she was a “tomboy” who took after her father,
that she fantasized about becoming a sniper, that her home life was unhealthy and possibility
abusive?30 Even though we cannot draw causal links from Brenda’s testimony to the shooting,
her story is noteworthy for two reasons. One, she is the only girl. Two, in most respects her story
parallels the boys who will follow in her footsteps.
In the social economy of the American high school, heteronormative gender identities
tend to ensure popularity and status. Like Brenda, many male shooters do not adequately preform
their heteronormative gender identity in the eyes of their peers. As Newman and colleagues put
it, “Masculinity is central to what makes a popular boy the king of the mountain” and he
becomes king by physically dominating on the football field or basketball court.31 The popular,
masculine, and powerful also tend to “get the girls.” Of the 11 rampage school shooters between
1992 and 1999, all but one boy was either dumped by a girl, harassed for his un-manly
appearance, sexually abused, or called gay. In the case of rampage school shooters, male-on-

Caitlin Lovinger, “The Nation: After the Madness; Violence, Even Before the Internet,” The New York
Times, April 25, 1999, sec. Week In Review, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/25/weekinreview/thenation-after-the-madness-violence-even-before-the-internet.html.
29

“Tomboy and Gun Enthusiast - The New York Times,” accessed March 13, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/1979/01/30/archives/tomboy-and-gun-enthusiast-ammunition-for-smallarmy.html.
30
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Newman et al., Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings, 144.
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male gendered harassment, which generally goes by the name of bullying is an important precursor to the violence of the rampage school shooting.32
Like all young people, school shooters are deeply involved in the process of figuring out
who they are and who they want to be. Unlike the majority of the peers, school shooters often
lack a healthy group of likeminded peers with whom they can share their anxieties. To this end,
Newman and her colleagues report that, “a quarter of students who committed suicide on school
campus were described as popular, preppies, jocks or athletes, compared with only 5 percent of
shooters in multiple victim fatalities.”33 These numbers come from the Center for Disease
Control and are based on a small population; nevertheless, the distinction is apt. Those who lash
out against their peers are those who do not feel they have peers. Moreover, the marginal or
excluded often suffer the most abuse. Newman reports that a young man from California, who
killed two peers, faced bullying so severe that “it bordered on torture.” Similarly, the Columbine
shooters had chairs kicked out from under them, food pelted at them across the cafeteria, were
beaten up, and were forced to push pennies along the ground with their noses.34
Insofar as rampage school gun shootings need a shooter, the shooter must be captured in
the dimensions of how we talk about the violence. That said, each shooter is a unique individual
whose compound experiences lead him to rampage. The impossibly of prediction does not mean
there is nothing to say about the shooters’ shared experience, as this brief section highlights. All
shooters experienced extreme difficulty developing an identity that adheres to the
heteronormative standards of the high school social economy, the result of which is gendered
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harassment and the perception of marginalization by the peers who matter to one’s sense of
self.35
The Victims
The final element of the definition of rampage school gun violence regards the victims.
While I have made it clear that the school is one target, rampage school shootings extinguish
more than the life of the school. The loss of human life is what distinguishes a rampage school
shooting from an everyday instance of gun violence on a school campus. To distinguish regular
school gun violence from a rampage school shooting, Jonathan Fast says the victims must
number at least two, not to include the shooter(s) who often commit suicide.36 For Newman,
there must be multiple victims and some of the victims must be chosen at random and for what
they represent. In other words, most rampage school shooters do not seek out specific human
targets. Instead, they shoot at random hoping to kill representatives of the social hierarchy of
which they are marginal members.
Although rampages are distinguished from regular school shootings by the number of
dead, the victims include those who were present and injured during the shooting, those who
were present and psychologically affected, as well as the parents, friends, and family of the slain
children and shooter(s). Of note, many survivors have become champions for stronger gun laws
and safer schools. Organization like the Million Mom’s March and Everytown for Gun Safety
are the direct result of school gun violence. Moreover, following the Sandy Hook rampage
Moms Demand Action for Gun Sense in America began organizing marches, protests, and
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gathering members and money. In 2018 Mom’s Demand Action had 200,000 members and is
backed by millions of dollars in funding.37 Lest one think adults are doing all of the work,
following the February 2018 rampage at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, students
staged walk outs, have taken to social media to enact stronger gun laws in Florida and take on
politicians, and have encouraged companies to divest from the National Rifle Association
(NRA).38 This is to say, although rampage school gun violence has continued to wreak havoc on
American society and education, the survivors are working to change the shape of the future.
Guns and Rampage School Shootings
Newman and her coauthors argue that a constellation of necessary, but not sufficient
conditions, contribute to the explosion of rampage school gun violence. The five conditions are:
the shooter’s perception of self as marginal, the shooter’s individual vulnerabilities such as abuse
or a family history of mental illness, the nature of schools’ organizational structure, the
availability of violent cultural scripts, and access to guns. That said, there is more to “access to
guns” than simply the ability to find a rifle when one goes looking. Ready access to guns is a
symptom of a culture, politics, and education wedded to studying war.
Americans have a complex historical relationship with guns, and it is a relationship that is
often simplified in contemporary gun debates. In his study of democracy in an armed society,
philosopher Firmin DeBrabander puts Americans’ relationship with guns this way:
“Guns are engrained in our national identity and have a privileged place in the country’s
founding narrative. The War for Independence was sparked by Minutemen, ordinary gunMark Follman, “These Women Are the NRA’s Worst Nightmare,” Mother Jones (blog), accessed
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owning citizens, intent on securing their liberty. Their actions were sanctioned by the
Founding Fathers, who inscribed the right to bear arms in the Constitution. For Thomas
Jefferson and his contemporaries, the Second Amendment was deemed a critical measure
for protecting democratic freedoms and the sovereignty going forward… Perhaps it is our
intimate relationship with guns—if not in our everyday lives, then in our cultural
imagination and national identity— that inclines the voting public to delay action on gun
control, or at least, not to object too strenuously to the positions of the gun rights
movement.”39
As DeBrabander notes, guns are an integral part of American’s democratic imagination and
history even for those of who do not own a gun.
Adam Winkler tells us that one of the reasons Americans have such a difficult time
appreciating our gun problem is because the right to bear arms is one of the “oldest and most

firmly established rights in America.”40 That is, even though the constitutional right to bear arms,
the one to which many refer, was nearly left off the Bill of Rights, forty-three state constitutions
enshrine the right to bear arms and many of these provisions date back to the America’s
founding.41 Yet, the parallel history of strong gun regulation, the likes of which existed for much
of America’s history, is met with skepticism and outright denial by contemporary gun advocates,
says Winkler. Moreover, the primary reason contemporary debates about gun rights in America
are framed as an either/or situation resides with rise of the modern NRA.
Prior to the 1960s the NRA’s signature publication, the National Rifleman, says little to
nothing about the Second Amendment.42 This is unsurprising given the decades of court
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precedent that upheld a militia interpretation of the amendment, which reads: “a well regulated
militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear
arms, shall not be infringed.”43 The militia theory holds that individuals do not have the right to
keep and bear arms. Rather, the right is collective and intended to ensure the state’s ability to
defend itself through the maintenance of an armed militia. Following sweeping federal gun
control legislation in the form of the NRA-supported National Firearm Act of 1934, the Federal
Firearm Act of 1938, and local legislation such as the Revolver Act of 1923 and Sullivan Act of
1911, the 1939 Supreme Court upheld the militia theory and ruled that the Second Amendment
applied to “the people of the states as a collective body” of the state. All weapons protected by
the amendment were those the state deemed necessary for its own defense, said the court. Since
sawed-off shotguns had no relationship with service in the militia they were not protected.44 The
court did not offer an opinion on whether the amendment applied to individuals or states, yet
decade after decade of subsequent rulings took the decision to mean the Second Amendment
applied only to states and that it guaranteed a collective state right to arm or disarm citizens. The
scholarship that would help win the 2008 District of Columbia v. Heller case, the case that would
overturn seventy years of militia theory precedent, emerged in the late 1960.
The individual rights view of the Second Amendment found a voice in a self-proclaimed
“John F. Kennedy liberal,” litigator, and law professor, Don Kates. Interested in protecting the
targets of the Ku Klux Klan by making sure black Americans had the right to defend themselves
with a gun, Kates studied the strange wording of the Second Amendment and found evidence
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that “the people” meant individual citizens. Whereas the militia theory read “the people” as a
collective state right to regulate a militia, Kates said “the people” pointed to individuals and that,
if it pointed to individuals, then black Americans could not be banned from owning a gun. Kates’
evidence was the Bill of Rights itself. He examined other uses of the phrase in the First, Fourth,
and Tenth Amendments and found that in all other instances “the people” had been interpreted as
a signifier for individual rights. Why should the Second Amendment be any different?45
Ironically, the individual rights approach gained popularity in tandem with the racial and
civil unrest of the 1960s. The specter of armed, radical black men (like the Black Panthers)
inspired both the NRA-backed 1968 Gun Control Act, an effort to take guns away from black
persons and coup within the NRA by gun rights advocates who advocated for an individual right
to own a gun.46 By the mid-1970s, on the advice of Congressman John Dingell, the NRA set up a
full-time professional lobbying arm, the leadership of the NRA fell to advocates of the individual
rights view, and the NRA updated the engraving on their headquarters to emphasize “the right of
the people to keep and bear arms.”47 This modern NRA espoused the idea that guns were
essential for personal defense and that all efforts by the government to grab guns was the
expression of a tyrannical government. The new NRA inspired nine states to add gun rights to
their constitution and sponsored a federal law to expand gun rights in the Firearm Owners
Protection Act of 1986.48
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In 2008, when a substantial challenge to the militia theory came to the Supreme Court,
the NRA did everything they could to oppose the case. Fearing the court would hand down an
unassailable defense of the militia theory which would undercut the profits of gun manufactures
and bankrupt the NRA, the NRA tried to keep the case off of the docket. And, if, against the
odds, the court did uphold an individual rights interpretation, the NRA worried its reason for
existence would disappear. The 2008 DC v. Heller decision did, in fact, transform “gun rights.”
In a 5-4 ruling the court held that the Second Amendment, “protected the right of individuals to
own guns for self-defense.”49 In the majority opinion, penned by Antonin Scalia, the court
argued governmental objectives such as public safety do not justify placing limits on rights
enshrined in the Constitution. Yet, as Scalia saw it, the Second Amendment gave individuals the
right to possess and use a gun in self-defense only. It did not give individuals the right to own
any gun they wanted, did not guarantee the right to use private guns in public, and did not nullify
previous gun control legislation. Guns should still be kept out of the hands of criminals and the
mentally-ill, said Scalia.
Although the individual rights view of the Second Amendment was substantiated in the
2008 Heller ruling, the majority opinion also revealed that the court viewed most gun control
legislation as constitutional. In the wake of Heller, lower courts have continued to uphold laws
that require permits for concealed carry, laws that keep guns away from fathers who don’t pay
child support, and laws that ban machine guns.50 Nevertheless, the NRA and proponents of the
individual right to own a gun did come out ahead. In an attempt to avoid another trip to the
Supreme Court, where stronger support for the individual rights view could further jeopardize
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attempts to limit guns in society, nearly all gun control legislation since 2008 has been weak and
ineffective. Some local lawmakers have even revised legislation in a preemptive concession to
gun rights.51
Fortunately for the NRA, profits have continued to roll in thanks in large part to gun
control panics that follow mass shootings. The NRA still thrives off of the trumped-up fear that
given the opportunity liberals will grab their guns. Gun rights advocates continue to argue for the
liberalization of guns, what I call the “more guns” approach. As they see it, more guns in more
places, on more hips, and in more hands will result in a society where no one will dare shoot.
They advocate for “stand-your-ground” laws which absolve a shooter who shoots when he feels
that his life is in danger, “campus carry” laws that gives college students and professors the right
to bring guns to class, and the fortification of soft targets, like schools.52
Post Rampage Schooling
Guns pose a real danger for democratic life. Insofar as democracy is learning to live with
differently situated others, it demands conversation, compromise, and accommodation. Imagine
attending a school where all the teachers were armed. In educational terms we might ask: are the
qualities or habits one needs to become a happy democratic citizen encumbered or misdirected
when common education is infected by the more guns approach to solving social problems? And,
when common education happens at the barrel of the gun, what does the student learn about his
or her place in the renewal of society?
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Schools and the education therein have changed following the outbreak of rampage
school gun violence. Many K-12 schools in the United States have instituted preparedness
measures for active shooter situations and some are considering new proposals. These include:
active shooter drills, lockdown drills, hiring school resource officers, and arming teachers and
staff. All of these measures take place in schools that, if targeted by a rampage school shooter,
would also be in the process of educating the shooter. After all, rampage school shooters
rampage at their school or former school. Hence, students practice blockading their classroom
and countering a shooter’s advance alongside potential shooters/classmates. Despite the varied
scope and scale of these physical measures, nearly all American schools have implemented some
kind of rampage preparation.53
The “more guns” approach has inspired calls to hire more police to protect schools and
authorized lawmakers to make the case that schools need more guns at the ready. “If only the
teachers at Columbine High and the students at Virginia Tech has been armed, the causalities
could have been avoided they say. The problem wasn’t the loopholes in the background check
system. It was the school policy that banned guns on campus,” say the “more guns” advocates.54
The Gun Free Schools Act of 1994 mandated a one-year suspension for any student who brought
a firearm to school and resulted in a hardening of schools via the zero-tolerances policies.
Automatic punishments for any violation of a rule, what is referred to as zero-tolerance, offered a
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quick “get-tough” solution to the mounting explosion of rampage school gun violence. The hope
was that students would be deterred from bringing guns to school, and thus school shooters
would reconsider their action, and if not their action, then at least the target. In reality, school
districts across the country began suspending students for using firearm facsimiles, like toy guns
and laser pointers, and for pointing finger-guns at each other. Unsurprisingly to the “more guns”
camp, rampage school shootings continued. To their mind, the Gun Free School Act punished
good kids, some of whom may have had guns, and broadcast the weak or soft security of most
American schools to would be predators. In place of the Gun Free School Act, which was
reauthorized in No Child Left Behind, the “more guns” camp might pass something like an
“armed schools act.”55
Some school districts have altogether ignored the Gun Free School Act. In 2008, the
same year the Heller decision was handed down, the town of Harrold, Texas announced that,
“carefully selected and trained teachers” would be allowed to bring loaded weapons to school.
Harrold’s superintendent explained his rationale, “we’ve had a very disturbing trend of school
shootings in the US. It is my belief that it is caused by making schools gun-free zones.”56
Campus carry bills, concealed carry on college campuses, follow the same kind of logic. If
college students and professors are allowed to carry guns around campus, then they can stave off
the shooter until the police arrive, the story goes. Ten states currently allow campus carry and
twenty-three leave the campus carry policies up to individual colleges and universities. One
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state, Tennessee, allows professors, but not students, with licenses to carry their firearms on
campus.57
Taken together, zero tolerance policies, active shooter drills, and changes in the physical
use of the school building, represent the hardening of schools to suit post-rampage schooling.
Fittingly, DeBrabander puts it this way, “Schools that are armed and fortified teach children that
the world is a dangerous place—they teach students to see manifold defensive gestures as second
nature.”58 I would add post rampage schools educate students as much as they do teachers. Both
teachers and students practice school shooter drills. Both imagine what it might be like to see
someone they know aiming an automatic rifle at them. Although few have spoken about arming
K-12 students, the NRA and pro-gun advocates often speak about arming teachers and many
states have allowed college students to arm themselves.
My Modest Intention
Often debates about rampage school gun violence are knee-jerk, ill informed, and
impulsive. Although rampages catalyze the issue of gun violence in schools, the challenge of
addressing rampage school gun violence has resulted in stop-gap policies rather than changes
that would stop the rampaging. My aim is to think about the prolonged presence of rampage
school gun violence, and to do so by putting the problem in educational terms. As such, the
following chapters will explore how the ways in which we teach young people about what it
means to be a democratic citizen affect the continuation of rampage school gun violence and
America’s overarching gun problem. My primary argument is that the mistake of teaching
citizens to locate agency exclusively in the individual leaves us with a bunch of individuals

Ben Boggs, “Guns on Campus: Overview” (National Conference of State Legislators, March 5, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/guns-on-campus-overview.aspx.
57

58

DeBrabander, Do Guns Make Us Free?, 171.

26
pointing guns at each other and no resources to build a society. On my view, the solution is to
begin with a conception of shared agency that is built on the fact of association and baked into an
alternative conception of democracy, which builds democratic and social habits within citizens.
In Chapter 2, I explore liberal democratic civic education and claim that civic education
of this sort hinders one’s ability to address school gun violence. I argue that civic education
situated in liberal democracy teaches citizens to be rational, autonomous, tolerant agents and
that, in so doing, it teaches the individual to view oneself as a unique center of internal rational
agency. The result of which, I argue, is a collection of liberal citizens who might support
freedom and equality, but who are ill equipped to make and renew democracy from the
associative behaviors that constitute human life. To support this contention, I explore Eamonn
Callan’s vision of liberal democratic education as it is one of the best articulations of its kind.59
Callan deals with contemporary neoliberalism and thinks carefully about differently situated
persons who must contribute to the foundations of liberal democratic society.
Chapter 3 is devoted to building an alternative conception of agency in which humans,
nonhuman things, and social power act within, and on, the environment. Drawing from the work
of the new materialist Bruno Latour, I argue that things have the power to become agents in an
actor network. Then, turning to Michel Foucault, I explore the ways in which we can say the
same about social power. Drawing from Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary and productive
power, I argue social gender norms produce and discipline individual bodies and are, therefore,
actors. This chapter brings to light the complex causal process that unfolds in any experience and
argues that an explication of this process aids the growth of one’s ability to purposefully affect
one’s environment. That is, for an individual to form purposes, create habits, and develop a
Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004).
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personality, he or she must be able to address the powerful actors that mediate his or her
experience. The liberal individual’s belief in intentional rational agency not only obscures the
agency of other actors, it reduces his capacity to form purposes, make plans, and act based on his
associative experiences as an actor in a network of distributed agency.
Chapter 4 argues that a notion of shared agency is baked into antifoundational
democracy. In this chapter, my intent is to problematize the materialist pretheoretical
assumptions on which liberal democracy rests. In so doing, I argue the new materialist,
alternative conception of agency, explicated in Chapter 3, is both a rejection of, and an
alternative to, the materialist frame. Drawing this conversation into the political, I then turn to
Benjamin Barber and John Dewey and claim that an antifoundational theory of democracy relies
on an alternative conception agency. The final step in this chapter is to situate the Deweyan
notion of “flexible habits” as the practice by which individuals acquire an understanding of, and
ability to impact, their environment. Finally, in Chapter 5, I build an alternative vision of
democratic education based on the theory of antifoundational democracy. Thinking alongside
John Dewey, I articulate a vision of education for antifoundational democratic citizenship where
children learn to be citizens by practicing democracy; where democracy works because growth
mediates educational outcomes; and where the environment reflects the means and ends of an
antifoundational democratic education.
The final chapter ends with a few policy recommendations for contemporary post
rampage schooling. These policy recommendation proffer ways to put the philosophical vision of
antifoundational democratic education to work in schools. My modest hope is that these
suggestions will give educators the tools to dismantle and rethink the post rampage education,
which has transformed schools into bunkers and children in citizen solider of foundational
democracy.

CHAPTER TWO
FOUNDATIONAL DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION
The question for this chapter is, what kind of citizen does foundational democratic
education aim to raise? To answer this question, I turn to Eamonn Callan’s plea for the political
education of virtuous, liberal democratic citizens in Creating Citizens: Political Education and
Liberal Democracy.60 Callan is rightly worried about neoliberalism. He frames his account of
virtuous, liberal democratic citizenship as a response to the contemporary challenge of neoliberal
social change. Callan’s concern for real-world problems and his attempt to deal with one,
neoliberalism, makes Callan’s articulation of foundational liberal citizenship a sound example of
liberal democratic education. His account draws inspiration from the tradition of liberal
perfectionism, an idea which challenges notions of thin liberal neutrality, and focuses on the
government’s role in liberal “soul-craft.”61 As a liberal perfectionist, Callan argues that the
perpetuation of liberal democracy requires an education in particular liberal values, values which
will dissolve the nightmarish social reorganization that results from neoliberalism’s ascendance.
Callan’s account is a robust argument for liberal democratic citizenship and its corollary
educational structure. In my opinion, it is the best case that can be made for civic education in
foundational democracy.
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Although Callan makes a strong case for liberal democratic education that teaches young people
to be reasonable, agentic, and tolerant, there are blind spots in this educational vision that make it
nearly impossible for civic education rooted in this frame to deal with gun violence. The blind
spots come from liberal democracy’s focus on the ontologically unique and autonomous agent,
which limits the theory’s ability to make sense of shared agency. That said because Callan take
seriously the demands of human relationships and the complexity of crafting a life in a world that
rightly values pluralism, it’s important to spell out civic education for liberal democracy. Only
then can we see the limitations of the frame the inspires this vision of citizenship education.
Foundational democratic citizenship is the kind of citizenship most Americans are
accustomed to thinking about when they regard democracy. Anywhere that democracy is equated
with individual rights and liberties to do as one pleases and with making choices about what to
buy, where to live, or who to vote for, notions of foundational democracy are evident. Yet, even
the best conceptualization of education for foundational democratic citizenship—a
conceptualization that supports individuals and communities, looks to extend freedom and
equality, and is appropriately wary of the marketization of political relations—raises citizens
who value freedom, but who are unaccustomed to interdependent living and “making
democracy.” My point is this, foundational democratic education, as Callan imagines it, does
educate the liberal soul to value freedom and equality; however, without education in the
antifoundational habits of communication and cooperation, the liberal has little experience
making democracy while encumbered by non-ideal and complex real-world situations. To make
and sustain democracy, children must learn to make sense of their interdependence and the
associative behaviors that enable them to craft communities. On my view, democratic education
that focuses exclusively on foundational, liberal virtues perpetuates gun violence because it
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teaches individual citizens to see themselves as autonomous and ontologically unique agentic
individuals who must emancipate oneself from one another and society.
In this chapter, I will argue that Callan presents an ideal picture of education for
foundational liberal citizenship, but not of for democratic citizenship. This chapter will proceed
in three sections. First, I will situate Callan’s dystopian vision of a liberal democracy weakened
by a neoliberal haunting, a haunting which replaces liberal values with market ones, because
Callan’s account of liberal citizenship education is intended to dispel this unsavory turn of
events. Second, I will think alongside Callan and make a case for liberal democracy built on
foundations of rational thought, autonomy, and tolerance. I will trace Callan’s argument and the
social contract tradition on which he draws. In so doing, I will engage Callan’s primary
inspiration, John Rawls, and other standard bearers of the liberal tradition.62 In section three, I
will situate the educational vision that accompanies Callan’s proposal, and in section four, I will
raise some concerns about whether Callan’s proposal is suited for democratic citizenship. In the
end, Callan’s goal is to argue public education in liberal democratic societies should be aimed at
teaching all children how to craft liberal souls. Liberals like Callan are of the opinion that the
institutions of liberal democracy are in the business of making our lives better by making us
better citizens. That is liberal democratic education is aimed at crafting individual souls. The
question is, can foundational democracy teaching citizens to be both autonomous and
interdependent? Put in the context of rampage school gun violence, does an education suffuse
with liberal soul-craft and its ideal of ethical self-authorship help young citizens make sense of
the complex causal networks and actors contribute to the situation?
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Neoliberalism the Nightmare
Callan begins Creating Citizens by asking his readers to imagine a society where wealth
is distributed according to whatever version of justice the reader favors, the formal rights and
requirements of a liberal democracy exist, and peace reigns. In this same society it is also the
case that people don’t bother to vote, mass media ignores what consumers do not care about,
political elites rule, and citizens believe the point of their lives is to satisfy their desires. As a
result, most citizens become overly committed to one way of life and shun contact with
differently situated others.63 In this formally just and peaceful “Brave New World,” as Callan
calls it, “the institutions [of liberal democracy] seems poised for collapse …because the shared
public morality that once enlivened them has vanished, and therefore they survive only as a
pointless system of taboo or modus vivendi among antagonistic groups…”64 The nightmare of
the “Brave New World” is the political rationality that eats away at that which makes liberal
soul-craft possible— a shared reverence for the foundations of liberal democracy.
Callan does not name the thing that inspires his nightmarish construction of the “Brave
New World,” yet his nightmare is reminiscent of contemporary critiques of neoliberalism.
Neoliberalism is the moniker for a form of liberalism that favors the market. When liberal
modifies democracy, it generally signifies the expansion of freedom and rights. When neo
modifies liberal, it signifies the expansion of market rationality to the realm of free and equal
citizenship. And when neoliberalism modifies democracy, market ideology repurposes
democratic practices. In this way, neoliberalism is not merely a new iteration of the market-based
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liberalism as it is described by Adam Smith.65 Rather, neoliberalism is a contemporary political
ideology that applies the principles of a market economy to all facets of social organization. In
fact, according to contemporary political theorist Wendy Brown, the hollowing out of democracy
rests on the global ascendency of neoliberal rationality and the subsequent marketization of
political relationships.66 In other words, the neoliberal values, such as accountability,
transparency, and choice, reorganize liberal democratic practices. Hence, when neoliberalism
becomes a governing idea, choosing anything from a president, to the good life, to your child’s
public school comes to be treated as democracy. In Brown’s words, the “the ‘neo’ in
neoliberalism…carries a social analysis that, when deployed as a form of governmentality,
reaches from the soul of the citizen-subject to education policy to practices of empire.”67 She
goes on, “neoliberal rationality, while foregrounding the market, is not only or even primarily
focused on the economy; it involves extending and disseminating market values to all institutions
and social action, even as the market itself remains a distinctive player.”68 Thus, Callan bemoans
the effect of an economic rationality, what Brown calls neoliberalism, on citizens’ participation
in political activity. Specifically, he worries neoliberalism will engender the erosion of
democratic foundations as citizens become lazy, passive, and incapable of protecting the
foundations of liberal democracy from dissolution.
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Neoliberalism’s political rationality replaces liberal soul-craft with the drive to consume
everything from news to education. To stave off the nightmarish fall of liberal democratic
institutions that are equipped to shepherd liberal soul-craft, Callan proposes a distinctive political
education that puts the foundations of political liberalism over and above the premise of
democracy. To save liberal democracy from neoliberalism, Callan suggests doubling down on
classical liberal education. As Callan sees it, “liberal politics is a politics of virtue” that promotes
the ethical flourishing of its citizens and the state. As a proponent of liberal perfectionism, Callan
is in the company of scholars like Amy Gutmann, Meira Levinson, and Harry Brighouse, all of
whom argue liberalism proffers a robust ethics; it too is a fighting creed, they say. On the other
side of liberal perfectionism is liberal neutrality. On this conception, the government ought to be
agnostic in determining the content of citizens’ souls because the role of the government is to
protect individuals’ negative liberties to be left alone. Liberal perfectionists agree that a liberal
political education ought to instill specific ideals of character, such as rational thought,
autonomy, tolerance of difference, and reciprocity. Jointly these traits of character make up the
liberal agent who has exclusive domain over his actions.
Philosophers of Education on Liberal Perfectionism
The next section focuses exclusively on Callan’s argument because he places explicit
emphasis on the ways in which liberal citizenship education might solve problems related to
democratic participation given neoliberalism’s social reorganization. Yet, before I move to
analyze Callan, it’s worth noting the philosophers of education who have devoted serious
attention to liberal democracy and its educational virtues. The significant voices I will briefly
explicate here include Amy Gutmann, Harry Brighouse, Meira Levinson, as well as Diana Hess
and Paula McAvoy.
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First, in Democratic Education, Amy Gutmann aims to construct a floating theory of
democratic education that does not rest upon any theories about human nature. Like Rawls and
Callan, she too believes the “…most politically significant features of human nature are products
of our education.”69 Gutmann argues that most normative theories of education that allow human
nature to set the boundaries of educational purpose fall into three categories. First, is what
Gutmann calls “the family state.” The “family state” is characterized by Plato’s Kallipolis and it
gives exclusive educational authority to the state as a means to establish harmony. The second
normative theory is “the state of families.” In the “state of families,” educational authority is
located exclusively with parents whose rights include the right to pass along their vision of the
good life to their children. Finally, Gutmann calls the third normative theory “the state of
individuals.” In the “state of individuals” children are treated as citizens and education
maximizes choices without prejudicing children toward one life or another. Hence, the dual goals
of opportunity and neutrality guide education in this frame. None of these normative theories is
sufficient according to Gutmann. The “family state” defines the good life for individuals. The
“state of families” replaces the state with parents and violates the state and children’s rights to
have a hand in the direction of education, and the “state of individuals” ushers in the problem of
neutrality. Hence, Gutmann argues that states, educators, and parents have a role to play in
shaping the education of the young, that cultivating the character of citizens is a legitimate
function of education, and that nonrepression and nondiscrimination must guide democratic
education.70 Gutmann’s theory of democratic education adequately addresses the education of
individuals and the creation of communities. She also deals with a capitalistic economic
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rationality, a la Milton Freidman, when she takes on the “state of families.”71 However,
Gutmann does not delineate the specific virtues or traits of character that her theory of
democratic education ought to instill. Therefore, it is not clear what habits citizens educated in
this manner might demonstrate.
In The Demands of Liberal Education, Meria Levinson, unlike Gutmann, does in fact
detail the traits a liberal education ought to instill. Arguing for weak liberal perfectionism,
Levinson states that, when autonomy is defined in the right way, it can justify cotemporary
liberalism and ground educational aims within liberal democracy.72 Defining autonomy in the
right way entails understanding people as fundamentally and principally autarchic, says
Levinson. To be autarchic is to see one’s self as an “intentional source of cause-and-effect
relationships.”73 Hence, a person is autarchic to the extent that he or she recognizes his or her
causative role in events and is autonomous to the extent that the person exercises the “capacity to
form a conception of the good, to evaluate ones values and ends with the genuine possibility for
revising them should they be found wanting, and then to realize one’s revised ends….”74 As
Levinson sees it, the autonomous and agentic person must move beyond the capacity to
recognize their agentic capacity and must actively exercise critical thinking and reasoning skills
as a member of a culture or set of cultures. Hence, Levinson’s autonomous agent is not the
atomistic individual with no point of reference or socialization who merely has the capacity to
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make rational or intentional choices. Levison, thus, states that “a coherent, attractive conception
of autonomy must incorporate not just the traditionally recognized conditions for specifically
autonomous action (critical thinking skills, self-knowledge, etc.) but the conditions for agency or
personality itself (and therefore also for autonomous agency).”75
Levison’s proposition is different from Callan’s in a couple of ways. First, she does not
begin with a particular crisis—as does Callan and as do I. Second, Levinson argues that, because
the exercise of autonomy is a good for the liberal state, the development of autonomy in children
is a legitimate paternalistic action of the liberal state such that “autonomy-promoting liberal
education is superior on both normative and empirical grounds to political liberal education.”76
On Levinson’s view, the state ought to make available a very limited market in education in
which children learn the habits of liberal democracy. Unlike Callan, Levinson rightly, I think,
makes a strong case for schooling that teaches children what it means to be an agent and how to
act autonomously. Moreover, Levinson argues that political liberals who disregard the
embeddedness of identity construction are mistaken. Although Callan positions himself as a
comprehensive liberal, like political liberals he does underestimate the power of cultural and
social groups over an individual’s ability to become an agent and exercise his autonomy. As
Levinson says, “civic identity is thick.”77 Nevertheless, Levinson places the same emphasis on
the exclusive autonomy of the individual as Callan does. Like Callan’s theory of civic education,
the aim of Levinson’s autonomy-developing education is the fostering of a socially and
psychologically independent individual. Hence, she accepts that some individuals in
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exceptionally needy circumstances or those who are dependent upon others to produce effects,
cannot exercise autonomy, at least when they are in circumstances of need or dependence.78
Although Levinson aims to provide a weakly perfectionist liberalism in which a culturally
embedded autonomy is the central aim of civic education, she too begins with a conception of
autonomy that starts us on the wrong foot. I take up Callan’s account and not Levinson’s in the
sections below because he both starts with a crisis to which liberal civic education is designed to
respond and because his argument is characteristic of a liberal perfectionist stance that views the
education of particular citizens as a necessary and legitimate endeavor.
The two other texts that give serious consideration to a liberal political education are
Harry Brighouse’s On Education and Diana Hess and Paula McAvoy’s The Political Classroom:
Evidence and Ethics in Democratic Education. Like Levinson, Brighouse makes a strong case
for a liberal democratic education centered on autonomy. In fact, because Brighouse does not
add much to the conversation that is not already taken up by Gutmann or Levinson, I do not
think it important to detail his claims here. Hess and McAvoy’s text presents a concerted effort
to deal with political education, given the crisis of political polarization. Their text is an
examination of how civic education ought to be taught and how classrooms should be managed
to facilitate such learning. Hess and McAvoy argue that classrooms are, and ought to be,
politically nonneutral spaces in which young people learn the particular values of a liberally
democratic society.79 These values include: political equality, tolerance, autonomy, fairness, as
well as political engagement and literacy. Furthermore, they argue these values should be taught
in civics classrooms through discussion, debate, and deliberation with peers. While I agree with
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what Hess and McAvoy have to say about how political classrooms ought to be constructed and
dialogue facilitated therein, they, too, place autonomy, or simply self-government, as an end of
democratic education. Yet, since their text does not seriously consider the political theory that
supports their understanding of deliberative democracy their text is not an adequate
conversational partner regarding the ends and aims of liberal democratic education.
Callan’s text is especially interesting for my investigation because he begins with a
significant crisis, what I named the “neoliberal nightmare.” This is important because I too am
beginning with a crisis, albeit a different one. I am interested in different approaches to
democratic education and how these approaches to civic education can help us solve specific
problems that threaten our democratic future. For Callan this problem is a corrosive economic
rationality and for me the problem is rampage school gun violence. Moreover, Callan carefully
interrogates the theoretical demands of liberal democratic education. He actively engages the
theoretical frame, foundationalism, that support liberal democratic education, and in so doing
attempts to deal with the blind spots that I have attributed to the theory—exclusive attribution of
agency to the ontologically unique individual.
Foundational Democracy and The Social Contract Tradition
Callan’s account of liberal education is a part of the foundationalist theoretical frame and
it draws upon social contract thinking. Callan partakes in the tradition by turning to John Rawls
to discern the apolitical grounds for human political interactions. While early foundationalists
such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke create a state of nature to justify key features of the
human political condition, Callan and Rawls forgo worrying about a hypothetical time when
humans were not emmeshed in political interactions and begin with core or essential features all
humans share. Even later accounts, like those of Rawls and Callan, which do away with state of
nature rationalizations, participate in the tradition, insofar as they begin with essential features of
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human existence. In this section, I describe the foundational theoretical frame that leads Callan to
argue that three specific ideals of citizenship, autonomy, critical rationality, and tolerance,
constitute the soul of the liberal, autonomous agent.
Foundationalism relies on theories of the political that are derived from apolitical
considerations of humans. It is the attempt to “justify political institutions without presupposing
any political considerations.”80 Humans in a state of nature, according to early iterations of the
theory, are unattached to any particular form of human interaction or history, and, thus, present a
vignette of natural social arrangements. Based on this unadulterated picture of human nature,
early foundationalists construct normative claims about the government’s role in human life.
Political theorist Arthur Ripstein puts it this way, “in foundationalist theory some set of
considerations is held to support a particular form of political order, without itself depending on
any substantive assumptions about the legitimacy of particular forms of human interaction.”81
Foundational accounts of liberal democracy are, therefore, inclined to measure human political
capacity and propensity against a vision of natural, free, and apolitical beings; despite the fact
that there is little evidence apolitical humans ever existed.
The social contract tradition is the primary mode of discerning the apolitical features of
human life. The appeal of state of nature thinking comes from the idea that if we construct our
conceptions of political life on visions of a time when all was fair and equal, if not hospitable,
then the political principles that emerge will be just and justifiable. The basic components of a
social contract are: a state of nature, or a time before institutions, government, and civil society;
scarcity and limited goods; an assumption that the survival of men and women mandates some
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kind of agreement between individual persons; and a belief in the natural equality of humans.
Martha Nussbaum, a thoughtful critic of the social contract tradition, puts it this way, “through a
procedure that assumes no antecedent advantages on the part of any individual, we extract a set
of rules that duly protect the interests of all.”82 The idea that political principles can arise out of
an imaginative state of nature, where hypothetical humans agree on the principles of society, is
one of the most significant contributions of the tradition.
Callan looks to the social contract tradition to ground his argument for strengthening
foundational democracy. He legitimizes the teaching of psychological traits that will engender
public virtue and sustain liberal democracy, such as an interest in questions about the good life, a
willingness to engage in deliberative conversations, competence and confidence of judgment,
and respect for fellow citizens, by turning to apolitical considerations of human beings. On
Callan’s interpretation, these various psychological traits boil down to three foundational and
universal competencies: rational thought, autonomy, and tolerance. Liberal democracy, places
emphasis on the psychological development of the individual person, who in Callan’s phrasing
crafts a soul, because it rests on the assumption that humans are fundamentally independent form
other another as well as the idea that the malformed or extreme individual who does not cohere
with these psychological traits resides outside the political community. I will say more about this
inertial frame in Chapter Four. For now, what’s important is the recognition that Callan’s vision
of liberal democratic education is situated on assumptions about psychologically independent
persons.
The theoretical frame, or foundation, that supports Callan’s interpretation of the
interrelated nature of the competencies for foundational liberal citizenship, rational thought,

Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge,
Massachusetts London, England: Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 2007), 10.
82

41
autonomy, and tolerance, make sense if one thinks about the way a foundation works to support a
building. When erecting a building one must assess the environment, dig deep into the ground,
and construct a complex foundation to support the whole structure. The bigger the structure or
the softer the ground, the more complex and overlapping the supports must be. Like a Chicago
high-rise that is built on massive pillars of reinforced concrete, liberal democracy rests on a thick
layer of intermingled assumptions that arise from a premise that goes like this: because we
cannot know for sure which form of government is legitimate, we ought to discern the
foundations of human political life from universal, shared, and apolitical traits.
Callan’s conceptualization of political education for liberal democracy begins with John
Rawls’ take on the social contract tradition. Building on Rawls thinking, but disagreeing with
Rawls’ own assessment of his political liberalism, Callan argues that Rawls’ political liberalism
is actually quite comprehensive and that Rawls’ theory of political liberalism puts powerful
constraints on how we should think about political life. Rawls calls these constraints the burdens
of judgment. For his part, Callan places the burdens of judgment at the center of his vision of
liberal political education. In fact, Callan’s theory of political education is decidedly Rawlsian.
Rawls replaces the state of nature with the “original position,” a thought experiment
designed to facilitate “public and self-clarification.”83 In the “original position” people are
imagined to shed the trappings of race, class, gender, ability status, and religious affiliation, to
become unencumbered and neutral reasoners.84 Placed behind what Rawls calls the “veil of
ignorance” members of the original position are left with only the capabilities that are natural to
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all members of their species—rational thought and the ability to communicate through language.
Their job is to define the rules that will govern a just society. Drawing from the Kantian
tradition, Rawls argues that these deontological subjects, who have been stripped of social and
cultural identifiers, are equipped to establish a society based on the principles of justice because
they must reason based on their knowledge of the universal features that humans share. For
Rawls and Callan, the original position illuminates a political conception of the person who has
two moral powers. The first moral power is a sense of justice and the second is a conception of
the good. Coupled with the ability to reason, which comes with species membership, these moral
powers imbue citizens with dignity, constitute the basis of their formal equality, and help citizens
deal with the facts of pluralism.85 On Callan’s view, the burdens of judgment, that is the moral
responsibility to make judgments about the good and the just even though our powers of reason
can be swayed by historical circumstance, mandate a conception of citizenship as
reasonableness.
In Rawls’ thought experiment there is no environment to shape human nature; instead,
reasonableness stands in for human nature. In fact, the two moral powers which substantiate the
idea that persons are free and equal are found in our ability to reason. The first moral power, a
capacity for justice, is described by Rawls this way, “it is the capacity to understand, to apply,
and to act from the principles of political justice.”86 The capacity for a conception of the good,
the second power, is “a capacity to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the
good.”87 Rawls is careful to differentiate reason from rationality. While it might be rational for
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one to pursue his self-interest, if the pursuit of his interest harms another, it might not be
reasonable. In other words, rationality is a core attribute of human beings and reasonableness is a
feature of the social contract; it is the fence that imposes constraints on rational parties, says
Rawls. Reasonable people are individuals who have accepted the social contract and who agree
to craft a political situation based on the burdens of judgment.88
Rawls is not alone in placing the capacity to reason at the center of human propensity in
an apolitical situation. In fact, Rawls draws on John Locke. Locke’s state of nature is a thought
experiment with an environment. As Locke sees it, humans are born with natural liberty into a
world governed by laws of nature, “the state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which
obliges everyone, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or
possessions…”89 Locke is careful to clarify that the state of nature is one of liberty and not
license insofar as it is ruled by reason. Despite the laws of nature, which induce men to act upon
their freedom reasonably, the “inconveniences” of the environment are many. Not everyone
respects the rights of others; justice is arbitrary; war with each other and outsiders is harsh and
unorganized, and resources are scarce. As Locke understands it, the state of nature is not absolute
war, but it does hold the possibility of war and the promise of arbitrary invasion of one’s
property. Thus, the social contract legislates the creation of a commonwealth to protect persons
natural rights to liberty, life, and property. 90 In Locke’s imagination, the state of nature is a land
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ruled by reason where men are content to pursue their own ends. The social contract merely
codifies one’s right to pursue his vision of the good life in one’s corner of the world.
Foundational Liberal Citizenship
Three important ideals of citizenship come out of the social contract tradition: reason,
autonomy, and tolerance. In fact, Rawls, Locke, and Callan agree; the ability of humans to
reason is a psychological trait the grounds the emergence of liberal democracy. In the Rawlsian
interpretation, apolitical people not only have moral powers, but they are also capable of
discerning the just structures of a political society because they are rational and can be
reasonable. In the Lockean construction, the law of nature imbues all humans with rationality,
and thereby the ability to agree to a contract that works to make good neighbors out of good
fences. Rationality is both pre-political and universally distributed. The social contract not only
formalizes the principles that will govern when some irrationally seek to dominate others, it also
facilitates the forgetting of the thought experiment altogether. The theoretical frame disappears,
and reason becomes a pillar of liberal democracy.
First, let’s consider reason, or as Callan calls for critical reason. Callan makes the case
for an education built upon a Rawlsian critical reasonableness. What gives reason its critical
tendency in Callan’s sense is reason’s embeddedness. While Callan appreciates and makes
conceptual use of Rawls’ original position, an example of reasoning from nowhere, he
recognizes the practical necessity of reasoning from somewhere. Plus, Rawls already worked out
the necessary conditions of a just political society; so, there is no need for a young liberal patriot
to do the same. What the young patriot needs to be able to do is reason while engaged in
conversation with contextually situated people. Once again drawing from Rawls, Callan states
that, “a political education that meets the challenge will teach the young the virtues and ability
they need in order to participate competently in reciprocity-governed political dialogue and to
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abide by the deliverances of such dialogue in their conduct as citizens.”91 In other words, young
people ought to learn that reason entails dialogic conversation with others who are capable of
reasoning, but who think and reason based on their particular history. The critical reasoner
accepts the burdens of judgment and aims to use reciprocally agreeable evidence, which is to
say, the evidence ought to be such that someone educated in another comprehensive framework
can understand it. The critical reasoner, therefore, knows that she does not occupy the original
position, but does use methods of abstraction to converse with others.
Eschewing the sort of reason that is a view from nowhere and favoring historically
contingent political thought, Callan strengthens his notion of foundational democratic
citizenship. The critical reasoner is someone who carefully approaches the dialogical
conversation after a thoughtful assessment of her own affiliations and affections as well as those
of her interlocutor’s. Callan says the young patriot must learn “historically embedded patterns of
political thought” by practicing a “way of looking at the past, a way that is both emotionally
generous and imaginative.”92 The critical question the liberal patriot must be able to answer is,
“what is the best of this tradition?”93 The patriot’s rootedness shapes, but does not preclude or
undermine, her efforts at critical scrutiny. Rather, the patriot reasons from her particular position
and endeavors to find the good. She reads for the gaps between what is best in a tradition and
what she knows of the historical reality. As a practitioner of critical reason, the liberal patriot
accepts the supposition that the human ability to reason bequeaths all members of the species
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equality and dignity. She looks for evidence that celebrates this supposition while noting the
practices and policies that could be better.
That is critical reason as Callan presents it. Critical reason is the ability to engage in
reasonable conversation with others about living the good life. Callan states, “now the exercise
of reasonableness presupposes deliberative settings in which citizens with conflicting beliefs and
ends can join together to ask how they might live together on terms all might endorse on due
reflection.”94 By definition, critical reason involves others in the dialogic task of constructing a
liberal community. Additionally, because critical reason asks the reasoner to emotionally identify
with liberal democracy, it necessitates education for autonomous self-authorship. Each citizen of
foundational democracy must be able to articulate, in reasonable terms, their life choices.
Autonomy is, therefore, the competency to which I now turn.
The second ideal of citizenship is autonomy. Autonomy is the bedrock of liberal politics,
insofar as it names the process by which individuals make choices about the kind of life they
would like to live. Achieving autonomy requires that one be treated as an individual capable of
making reasonable choices between alternative visions of the good life as well as a belief that
multiple visions of the good life are legitimate. Autonomy, in Callan’s consideration, is not
merely choosing, it is also the ability to make choices and the inclination to reason for oneself.95
As a capacity, autonomy entails more than being left alone to choose; it requires one know how
and why she ought to be interested in making decisions about the ethical direction of her life.
Choice is not equivalent to autonomy, in Callan’s scheme. The liberal patriot does not
choose from just any kind of life. Instead, controlling for reasonable pluralism, or for a “morally
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selective deference to diversity,” the liberal chooses only from the diversity that is worth
having.96 In practice, this would mean any vision of life that is based on illiberal values would be
rejected out of hand. The question is, how would the reasonable liberal, who believes each
individual has the right and duty to determine how they would like to live, establish grounds for
inclusion and exclusion? Kwame Anthony Appiah, a thoughtful liberal, puts it this way, “In soft,
or liberal, pluralism, the individual remains both the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem:
its concern for identity groups is not only motivated by but ultimately subordinated to the wellbeing of the individual and the bundle of rights and protections that traditional liberalism would
accord her.”97 The flourishing of autonomous individuals requires both the perpetuation of
meaningful cultural groups and the right of individuals to choose a different way of life. This
notion also requires the state to remain neutral among conceptions of the good life, while
providing protection for individuals as individuals, and in Callan’s estimation, the value of
autonomy leads to robust educational demands. The educational aim is to teach young citizens
both how to define a good liberal life that resonates with their idea of who they want to become,
and how to accept others’ visions as equally worthy of living. Toleration is the name for this
final capacity, according the Callan.
In fact, autonomy is a rather empty concept without the corollary call for toleration. If the
education we should want for our children is one that asks the young person to evaluate his or
her self, his or her family’s conception of the good life, and the life he or she wants to build, then
it must also teach him or her to tolerate different conceptions of the good life and moral
disagreements therein. After all, teaching children to accept the burdens of judgment teaches
children that the process of forming one’s best judgment about how to live requires careful
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assessment of the reasons one provides to others. The dialogic task of education is to prepare
children to think carefully, or critically reason, about the difference between acceptable and
unacceptable pluralism, says Callan.98 If unaccompanied with some sense that diversity is a
welcome fact of communal life, the requirement that children become self-reflective choosers of
the good life could lead to the education of moral tyrants who demand that their way of life is the
only way.
The third ideal of liberal citizenship is toleration. Toleration teaches the liberal patriot
how to live with conflict and skepticism about the best life; it is an attitude every liberal patriot
learns in the process of becoming an ethical chooser of his or her good life. Callan puts it this
way, “the bare idea of reasonable pluralism does not license an aggressive moralism on the part
of the liberal state; it merely signals the need for thoughtful moral discrimination in the way we
respond politically to the fact of diversity.”99 The tolerable and the virtuous are different, and
liberal democracies are liberal only insofar as they continue to care about the difference.
Although the education Callan proposes aims to instill laudable political virtues in each citizen,
exclusion and domination are likely to remain a feature of a diverse and free society. Hence, the
hope is that an inculcation of toleration will lessen the severity by which some are excluded.
As we see then, critical reason is the willingness to accept the burdens of judgment and to
be reasonable in situated conversations about the good life with different others. Autonomy is the
value of self-authorship, and it encourages young people to build lives with which they identify.
Finally, toleration is the capacity to accept, reasonable as well as unreasonable, differences in
opinion on what constitutes the good life. The sense here is that there is less harm in allowing
people to go their own way, than in forcing them to choose a particular kind of life. As capacities
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that bring about public virtue, reason, autonomy, and tolerance are built upon the idea that, when
stripped of its historical trappings, society is composed of rational and ontologically unique
individuals. Ideally, citizens educated in foundational democracy would be experts at engaging
in Rawlsian thought experiments, would be equipped to make liberal choices about the shape of
their life, and would tolerate people with differences of opinion. In the end, foundational
democratic citizens ought to be virtuous individuals who know how to tolerate others enough to
build a community based on freedom and equality.
The Educational Demand
Consider an instance in which these virtues — autonomy, critical reason, and tolerance
— might come into play. Imagine the child of socially conservative parents who are intolerant of
gender diversity living in America. The child’s parents reason with the child from within the
comprehensive framework they favor. Their vision of justice presumes homosexuality is a sin
and that heterosexual norms of marriage constitute the fabric of a moral society. When the child
asks why his parents will not allow him to be friends with a member of the LGBTQ community,
they imply or explicitly say it is because this friend is not fully human or is a corrupting
influence. When this child asks why he cannot join the cheerleading squad or take a dance class,
his parents tell him boys and girls have different roles in society. Boys are expected to play with
balls and guns to learn how to dominate and control, while girls are expected to dance in order to
learn how to be flexible and accommodating, they say. Since he and his parents reside in a liberal
democracy that allows its citizens to pass their most cherished beliefs on to their children, the
state has limited ability to mitigate the perpetuation of illiberal beliefs. If the parents decide to
send this child to his local public school, he will presumably encounter peers and teachers who
hold different beliefs.
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In the robust liberal democracy of Callan’s vision, while attending a public school this
child would learn to accept the burdens of judgment and begin to converse with his classmates
using only the evidence that is publicly available. This is to say, recognizing that he couldn’t
explain why he wasn’t allowed to have a gay friend using his parent’s reasons, he would have to
explain why he couldn’t play with his friend in terms that his friend could understand and accept
as valid. In adolescence this same kid would learn to weigh different ethical perspectives and the
effect of social contingencies on one’s social position, at which time he would come to develop a
sense of justice, powers of reason, and a conception of the good. As a teenager, this young
person would then become a member of society and a citizen for himself insofar as he comes to
accept the burdens of judgement. On Callan’s view, if this young person truly comes to consider
the reasonableness of his convictions, he will necessarily reconsider the framework in which he
was raised. It is, of course, possible that one could experience this kind of education and choose
to reaffirm the commitments that were instilled within the family. Callan, however, argues that
anyone who undergoes this sort of education does not merely accept the same conception of the
good as before because they now understand the burdens of judgment.100 Having achieved
independent reflection on the moral import of their life, the young person becomes an ethically
autonomous chooser.
We see through this example how education in the virtues of liberal citizenship could
lead to a positive outcome. This young man who was raised with certain illiberal beliefs crafted a
liberal soul when he encountered diverse others in a public institution that set about teaching all
of its students to accept the burdens of judgement. While it is evident that education for
foundational democratic citizenship, as Callan conceives it, ought to instill psychologically
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rigorous methods to evaluate one’s self in relation to others, it is unclear whether the young
person who does not achieve ethical autonomy, because he chooses to affirm the gender
intolerant framework within which he was raised, should be included in a politically liberal
society. Given Callan’s interest in an ethical liberalism, which aims to make citizens’ lives better
by making them better authors of ethical and reasonable selves, it stands to reason that the
liberally educated gender intolerant citizen presents a failed case. Callan answers that in cases
where a person does not come to see justice as fairness – “reasonable agreement on fair terms of
cooperation”- they must be tolerated.101 The gender intolerant, sexist, racist, and illiberal
proponent of unreasonable pluralism poses a problem best handled with toleration. Hence, their
views should not be met with coercive political responses. For example, they should not be put in
jail or fined solely for their views because such a response would be both illiberal insofar as it
would restrict one’s freedom to believe as they see fit and actively violate the state’s neutrality
on citizens’ right to self-authorship. Unreasonable pluralism ought to be excluded from public
deliberation because the reasons proffered by folks who are intolerant of gender diversity do not
meet the burdens of judgment. However, the people who espouse these beliefs must be tolerated
in principle.102
Ultimately, Callan’s project is an educative one. Schooling not only spans much of a
child’s life, it is the one liberal democratic institution that touches nearly everyone as they
transition from “membership in the family, to membership in the polity.”103 Callan argues that
the appropriate institutional design of public schooling within a liberal democracy “pose[s]
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increasingly taxing intellectual demands with regard to the art of perceiving the person and the
understanding of social complexities. At the same time, it nourish[es] an ever widening web of
relations of trust, reciprocal good will, and associative loyalty.”104 Public education, as Callan
sees it, is the process and place that schools young people in the art of becoming ethical liberal
patriots.
For Callan, without public education, children are liable to become who their parents, the
state, a political organization, or religious institution wish them to be. To become both free and
ethical members of a society where others are imbued with the symmetrical freedom, a liberal
patriot must attend public school and learn to perceive herself as an individual who has the
capacity to reason and deliberate with differently situated and sometimes illiberal members of
society. Importantly, Callan places emphasis on the years immediately preceding a young
person’s rise to complete citizenship. Hence, the educational value of public schooling for young
children is that they are exposed to other ways of life and the practice of reasoning. For
teenagers, the educational value of public schooling is that they are invited to engage in ethical
self-authorship.105
Due to their public nature, public schools are vital institutions in the structural
maintenance of foundational democracy. A public school is common if it not only admits all but
is also hospitable to all. Ideally, then, common schools would mirror the differences that are
present in the wider society. Practically, Callan concedes the best we may hope for, given the
range of pluralism present in local communities, is quasi-public schools that reflect at least some
of the issues facing society and are committed to pluralism. Moreover, schools that are, in fact,
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common would not treat education as cultural conquest. They would, however, assimilate all
new members of society into the ethical life of liberal democracy. In fact, to educate liberal
democrats who patriotically uphold the institutions of liberal democracy, common schools would
be required to produce young people who are literate, capable of self-reliance, can reason with a
critical eye, and know that justice is expressed in reciprocal reasonableness.
Civic education in Callan’s foundationally democratic scheme is rationalized and
supported based on the extent to which it prepares young people for their future roles as citizens.
Drawing from the Aristotelian thesis, which says virtues are learned through practice, Callan
argues that adequate preparation for liberal democratic citizenship requires the young to exercise
the liberal virtues they will need when they reach the age of majority.106 Accordingly, then,
common schooling in foundational democracy encourages children to practice respecting their
classmates’ different social positions through the public structure of schooling in common. As
children get older and near the age of majority, they are urged to practice conversing with one
another about the moral issues that will shape their ethical soul-craft. In so doing, children learn
to tolerate different convictions, practice extending goodwill to their interlocutors, and
experience developing relations of trust. The ideal end result is the maturation of an autonomous,
critical reasoner, who can tolerate the opinions of others.107
To put the theory in the context of contemporary rampage school shootings, which are
rare but unacceptable at any point, where gender-based bullying too often leads boys to rampage,
foundational democratic education ought to teach young people to tolerate one another to the
extent that this sort of bullying withers away. In fact, to deal with rampage school gun violence
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foundational democratic education would simply follow the prescriptions outlined above.
Starting in the early grades children would learn to express their sense of self in terms others
could understand. The kid from the gender intolerant family would learn to express his
worldview without relying on religious reasoning or other exclusionary evidence. His peers
would do the same and collectively the class would learn about one another and the people who
make up the community. As these young people move from simple reasonableness in the early
grades to critical reason in the later grades, they would learn to deploy critical reasoning skills to
articulate how their views fit within a liberal democratic society. Once again, thinking about the
kid from the gender intolerant family, he might learn to speak about his right to craft a life that
doesn’t infringe on the rights of freedoms of someone else. Perhaps, he would say something
like, “to each, his own.” Presumably, this utterance would also indicate his tolerance of other
people’s views. Insofar as rampage school gun violence is a problem of unreasonable teenagers
who lack a level of acceptance for one another, foundational democratic education would solve
the problem.
As a skill-based education in the art of crafting an ethical self, foundational civic
education prepares potential school shooters and school bullies to articulate an identity in terms
that suit the ideals of free and equal citizenship. Shooters and bullies alike would be taught to
carefully assess cultural scripts that legitimize violence and to choose actions and experiences
that add up to a life plan that suits their goals. What’s more, given the way the school social
economy, the hierarchy that ranges from jocks to outcasts, defines an American teenager’s sense
of self, an ethical re-valuation of the kinds of identities students can choose should lead to more
egalitarian and harmonious relations between students. In best case scenario, these students
would learn to appreciate their classmates’ difference and to tolerate one another when a
difference in life choices leads to conflict.
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Concerns About the Education of the Liberal Citizen
In this chapter, I described the theoretical foundations of liberal democracy and the
political education that accompanies Callan’s account of liberal democracy. My intent was to
situate a robust account of foundational civic education. Foundations, like the metaphor from
which the phrase is drawn, support a structure without any other aid. In political philosophy,
foundations are usually drawn from imagined, pre-political core features of the human
experience to support political institutions. The legitimacy of the foundation is rarely questioned
because its very existence is pushed out of the frame. To build a high-rise one does not simply
pour concrete on topsoil or cleared ground. Rather, one must dig down into the bowels of the
earth, insert support structure, test the soil, check for water, see about the likelihood of natural
disasters, and secure the appropriate material. Eventually, the foundation is poured and all that
remains visible is the structure above. Indeed, the foundation becomes the thing that supports the
structure; meanwhile, the notion that the foundation has a contextual, ecological, and material
history is all but forgotten. Foundations are more than unexamined starting points, they are
starting points that one cannot help but accept.
Rational thought, autonomy, and tolerance are the foundational psychological traits that
affect the structural health of liberal democracy, as Callan conceives it. If foundational liberal
democracy stands for free and equal citizenship, and humans are equal because they are rational,
then they will remain free from the whims of others insofar as they are able to reasonably
participate in public governance. Plus, a reasonable citizen is better than an unreasonable one. A
reasonable teenager who gets angry at the way his classmates have treated him or who feels his
identity has been misrecognized by his peers would not seek out a gun, take that gun to school,
and embark upon a rampage. A reasonable teenager who understands that he and his peers can
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interact on terms of equality since they all share the ability to be rational would appeal to his
peers’ sense of reasonableness and capacity for toleration to address a conflict.
Callan’s account succeeds at establishing the grounds for creating liberal citizens. As we
see with the example, public schools that admit and welcome all young people introduce students
to diversity and train them to accept the burdens of judgement. As they age, these young people
practice using the burdens of judgment to talk with one another about what it means to live the
good life. In so doing, they develop a sense of self and an inclination about the kind of life they
would like to author; they become individuals.
Callan’s account is valuable and important, but it is not enough. Autonomy, critical
reason, and toleration are key pieces of the liberal democratic tradition that have expanded
opportunity to previously marginalized people and continue to inspire the global advancement of
freedom and equality. The ideal of autonomy has influenced important protections for
individuals and led to educational aims wherein each person learns to define, author, and live a
life that resonates with their sense of self. Critical reason is a vital aim for any democracy that
hopes to maintain diversity and create a shared political morality. In a democracy, where
political decisions are made by the people, it is important that people who believe or live
differently know how to engage in dialogue about how they interpret situations. The ideal of
critical reason has resulted in education that teaches the young to converse with different others.
Toleration mandates the acceptance of diversity. In teaching young citizens to tolerate peers who
hold different beliefs, liberal citizenship education dissuades moral tyranny and sustains
autonomy. This too is a vital feature of a free society.
Nevertheless, I have some concerns about the sufficiency of these aims given the
foundation on which they sit. As I see it the ideals of liberal citizenship are premised on a
theoretical frame that limits our ability to see agency as shared, conflict as necessary, and
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violence as complex. Just as a building can collapse on top of foundations, messy human
experience can mitigate the very best foundational civic education. Callan’s account leads to the
education of liberal citizens that know something of getting along with one another, of defining a
good life, and reasoning with individuals who are different. These same citizens do not, however,
know anything of making community, speaking with different others while angry, gendered, or
wielding a gun, or crafting provisional decisions even though they are uncertain of another’s
stance, beliefs, reasonableness, or willingness to tolerate difference. In short, Callan’s citizens
are prepared to uphold liberal institutions, but are ill-prepared to make democracy work. Here, I
will raise three concerns, all of which pivot around the idea that foundational democracy falsely
locates agency exclusively in the individual. In the following chapters, I will adumbrate an
alternative conception of agency—one that is shared among humans, nonhuman matter, and
social power. For now, let me raise three interrelated concerns.
My first concern is about the human body and its absence from the conversation thus far.
I am not so sure that there is a way to be certain something resembling a rational and
ontologically unique person is hiding beneath emotion, gender, sex, race, class, ability status, and
history. We, after all, are beings made of body and mind. The best foundational democratic
education in reasonableness, autonomy development, and toleration will not divorce a person
from his or her emotional, particular, and bodily experience of the world. The hurt or
marginalized young person is unlikely to set aside his emotional responses to his experiences in
the world because he recognizes that he ought to be reasonable. More importantly, it is not
politically necessary that he learn to do so. Gendered norms act on and through this teenager. His
emotions and sense of self are constituted through the disciplining forces of social power and in
his associative interactions. As a democratic citizen he needs to know how to make decisions and
act while emotional, while living in a marked and coded body, and while in association with
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people, social power, and nonhuman things. Hence, the problem with the rational idea is that it
leads to the conception of an ontologically discrete individual who acts based solely on the
operation of his reasoning mind.108
My second concern is that, although thought experiments which ask citizens to imagine
life as another or without a certain defining feature of their identity can be illuminating and
educative, they do not aid in the construction of habits for making community. I’m not
convinced that accepting the burdens of judgement or thinking about the state of nature will help
citizens construct habits and practices that will enable them to take action in the present, or to
engage in public governance alongside a celebration of their particularities because associative
and conjoint behavior is a fact of existence in this world. Humans are never solitary or exclusive
individuals; rather, we exist within a network of actors and relationships. Democratic citizens
need to be able to learn from living alongside one another and must be able to take action in full
recognition of the ways in which social power and things are acting upon and through humans.
My third concern is that an education in the liberal virtues ignores all of the ways in
which our environment shapes what we are able to imagine, do, and become. Guns are objects
which affect how we think about what we are able to accomplish. I’m concerned that the liberal
citizen who has no practice interacting with the environment as a mind/body, lacks the ability to
appreciate and address all the ways in which the environment and things can shape the person.
This is to say, I fear Callan’s narrow focus on creating liberal citizens, who have virtuous souls,
obscures the influence of environment, community, public, and assemblage of actors on the
content and character of our society.
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The alternative to Callan’s vision of foundational civic education is not unreasonable,
scripted, and intolerant citizenship. In fact, the alternative is an extension of Callan’s vision into
the messy non-ideal circumstances of early 21st-century democracy, wherein the drive to ground
democratic life in foundations is replaced with experimentation and conversation about the kind
of things imperfect humans and powerful nonhumans might accomplish together. Callan’s vision
of civic education prepares young people to engage in an orderly public life that is not marred by
emotion, embodied humans, social power, and deadly weapons. In addition, because Callan’s
vision of liberal democratic education is situated with the liberal frame, it is blind to complex
networks and entangled human interdependence.
The fact is people make decisions while emotional and they decide to act because a
particular associative experience has driven them to do so. School shooters are often dealing with
intense emotions related to acceptance, recognition, and gender. They should not be expected to
shed their embodied experiences to reason with the classmates about the trouble they are having
performing heteronormative gender roles. On the liberal view, these young people are not
shooting because they lack the ability to reason or because they have not learned to provide
publicly acceptable evidence or because they do not feel tolerated or have not learned to tolerate.
They are shooting because something is wrong, psychologically, with the individual. They are
simply failed students of liberal democratic education. Hence, liberal democratic education is
only sufficient for a world in which guns and school shootings do not exist.
This is the limit of liberal democratic education. It cannot account for students who
choose the extreme, and because it cannot make sense of these young people and their choices
liberal democratic education cannot address the continued presence of rampage school gun
violence. Shooters are waging war because they are not a part of the community and because the
young people educated under the banner of foundational democratic education do not know that
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making community is an integral part of being human and enacting democracy. Shooters and
non-shooters alike are bereft of the practices and habits that would enable them to organize their
embodied experience with the world of things and people and to learn by and from living
alongside their peers.
Democracy is learning to live alongside one another. Callan’s liberal patriotism
encourages young people to become loyal liberal democrats on the grounds that they have found
the good in the tradition and have become an individual, rational agent. They participate because
they have been taught to love liberalism and are virtuous liberal citizens. Foundational
democratic education does not, however, teach them what to do when they encounter the bad,
ugly, and incomprehensible. It does not teach young people to reason while emotional,
embodied, and while equipped with tools designed to kill, or how to compromise, transform, and
recognize the actor that affect one’s actions. It does not give young people the resources to see
themselves as anything but ontologically unique individuals with exclusive domain over one’s
individual agency who are in a competition to gather resources, whether those resources are for
identity construction or material well-being.
Conclusion
In sum, on Callan’s view, political education for liberal democracy is grounded in
reasonable citizenship that cultivates autonomous individuals. Its charge is to adequately prepare
the next generation of the voting public to lead virtuous, self-authored lives while making
reasonable decisions about government. In an ideal world, the child from an illiberal background
would learn about liberalism when he attends a school with students from different backgrounds.
In elementary school, he would learn to engage with different students, to appreciate the
foundations of liberalism which make the framework within which he was raised wrong but
assures him he too has dignity, and he would practice giving publicly justifiable reasons to his
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peers. As he ages, he would prepare to craft an ethical life by accepting the burdens of judgment
that require he tolerate others. When he reaches the age of maturity, he would become a liberal
citizen. However, I am not convinced that he has the tools to become a democratic one when
something goes wrong and the complex real-world demands that he act.
Callan’s vision of political education for liberal democracy prepares the young to be
liberal, but not democratic citizens. As it stands, nothing in Callan’s conception of liberal
education tells a young person why they should participate in public governance, let alone how
to participate alongside folks who have guns, who do not see the value in toleration, or who
begin from radically divergent starting points. What is the child from an illiberal family to do
with his parents who do not value toleration? What is society to do when foundational political
education fails to teach children how to work together and how to make sense of complex and
pressing problems? What of compromise and halting conversations? Of public will and public
action? Insofar as foundational democracy is beneficial for grounding notions of free and equal
citizenship, it is a valuable political ideology for developing liberal democracies. But political
theory and practice must move beyond foundationalism if it hopes to adequately deal with
complex contemporary issues. Progressive, antifoundational iterations of democracy do just this.
Children ought to learn how to value freedom and equality while acting as democratic citizens
who can affect their environment. On my view, the capacity to affect the environment, to become
an agent, requires a sense that agency is shared and that anyone who acts is a part of the political
community, including the school shooter.
In the next chapter, I will explore an alternative conception of agency; one that addresses
the things and social power that constitute the environment and support individuals in forming
purposes and affecting the environment. My contention is that conceptions of foundational
democracy, even strong ones like Callan’s, reinforce a positive orientation to gun violence,
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because they educate citizens to see themselves as exclusive owners of intentional rational
agency. This mistake places the rational individual in the untenable position of having to master
tools and social power. As an intentional rational agent, the individual is bereft of the conceptual
resources and habits one needs to make sense of, and act upon, her conjoint experiences. Hence,
the foundationally liberal citizen is left in the terrible position of having to wrest her rational,
autonomous self from the trappings of being an embodied human in a world of things and social
power.

CHAPTER THREE
THE POWER OF GUNS AND THE SOCIAL CONCEPTION OF GENDER: AN
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF AGENCY
In this chapter, I argue that it is a mistake to see agency as located exclusively in the
individual. I contend that agency is shared and that it is best understood as dispersed among a
reciprocal network of humans, nonhuman things, and social power. When agency is understood
as exclusively located in the individual, the individual is solely responsible for his actions. This
view is equivalent to the saying, “guns don’t kill people, people kill people.” Not only is the
agent/person held solely responsible for his actions, he is taught to see himself and individual
others as intentional rational agents. Hence, a more descriptive slogan for this stance might read,
“guns don’t kill people, a singular and discrete person within whom all agentic capacity resides
kills people.” On my account, this conception of agency obscures the ways in which human
action, intentionality, emotion, and the body, are influenced and shaped by social power and
nonhuman things. This chapter grapples with the complexity of the causal process by identifying
nodes along a network of distributed agency. In describing an alternative conception of agency
wherein agency is expanded across a network, I focus on the nodes which contribute to
America’s rampage school gun violence problem as my dissertation’s central argument is that a
foundational/liberal conception of individual agency has blind spots that exacerbate our gun
violence problem.
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When we expand our sense of who and what acts when a rampage school shooter attacks
his school we find at a minimum teenage boys, guns, and gendered social norms. Thinking about
the ways in which a teenage boy is an agent poses minimal, if any, conceptual stretch from the
foundational liberal conception. Insofar as the liberal conception of agency posits the arrival of
agency with the ability to make rational decisions, the maturity of a teenager might cause the
liberal to pause, if only briefly. As a singular person, the teenage boy’s ontologically unique
agency is only called into question to where his actions and decision cannot be attributed solely
to his reasoning mind and not that of his parents, for instance. Most foundational liberals would
hesitate to accord agency to anything outside of the thinking and reasoning human mind. Things
nor gendered social norms have minds and thus they cannot act independent of human users.
Neither can be agents in the foundational sense, where agency is the result of an individual and
rational choice. Thus, to describe the kind of agency things and gendered social norms do have, I
will turn to two bodies of work, new materialist work on the status and power of things and
Foucauldian analyses of social power. New materialists, such as Bruno Latour, provide an
account of “thingy power” that aims to capture the ways in which things act; thus giving us
conceptual tools to characterize the agency of a thing. Meanwhile, through a Foucauldian
analysis of power, I will detail the ways in which social norms of gender produce and discipline
individual bodies. In other words, power and things are nodes in the causal network that form,
produce, and shape humans.
As a democratic theorist interested in an antifoundational and radically democratic
future, I believe it is imperative that expand our sense of agency and what it means to act and
impact the environment. An alternative conception of agency helps us accounts for the material
things and social power that affects what we do as well as who or what we might hold culpable
for which actions. The image of the intentional rational mind that uses things like guns and
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passively accepts social norms of gender rests on the belief that things do not have the power to
shape and gendered social norms discipline but are not productive. This image obscures the
agentic power and constitutive affect that things and social norms hold as actors in complex
causal networks. In fact, I will argue that when guns, social gender norms, and teenage boys
comingle in the American high school, guns and social gender norms are actors in the causal
network. Ignoring the distinctive and productive effects of these agentic nodes heralds more gun
violence and less democracy. Moreover, American society bears responsibility for the continued
presence of mass shooting events, including school shootings, insofar as we refuse to expand our
conception of agency to hold responsible the nonhuman actors that share our environment and
co-constitute our very sense of what it means to be a human.109
New Materialist Agency
In the new materialist conception, things have a certain kind of agency.110 However, to
make sense of what new materialists mean by agency, it is important to understand how new
materialists define agency in comparison to the liberal view. Agency, as Callan and other
foundational liberals understand it, is the result of rational decision making. To be an agent in
this sense is to be a chooser, a decider, and a thinker. And to be a thinker is to be a person with a

While completing this dissertation the Connecticut Supreme Court has ruled that gun makers,
including Remington, can be sued for wrongful marketing. In particular Remington marketed the gun
used by the shooter of Sandy Hook Elementary School with the slogan “Consider your man card
reissued.” This is a significant State level acknowledge that nonhumans can be held liable for gun
violence and will have ramifications for further thinking on this project. For more on this case see Rick
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mind who engages in rational intellectual activity. Hence, the agent not only makes choices, he
can be held responsible for these choices insofar as the agent is a reasonable individual. Building
on the work of feminist scholars, new materialists argue that humans are equal in terms of their
irrationality, not their reasonableness, and in so doing call attention to the way in which emotion
and experience operate as sites of knowledge construction. As Samantha Frost puts it, “for the
new materialist, however, it is not enough to assert the rationality of modernity’s others … they
also seek to challenge the very notion that matter is passive and unthinking… and to question the
distinction between the self and world that positions individuals as separate from yet in relation
to the contexts of their actions.”111 In other words, it is not enough to say women and people of
color, modernity’s irrational or unreasonable others, are intentional rational agents, too.
Extending agency to groups of people who were previously perceived to be “lacking the
wherewithal to distance themselves from the body’s operations and to steer a rationally defined
course of their behavior and actions” does not address the ways in which human behavior,
action, and thought is constructed by and enmeshed within nonhuman things.112 On the new
materialist view, agency is the reciprocal production of effects. Humans and things jointly make
up the contexts in which events unfold, and a new materialist agent is anything that produces
effects, that shapes, constrains, or enhances the possibility for knowledge or action.113
A worry arises with this new materialist definition of agency. Do new materialists, in the
attempt to make sense of the agency of things, place particular historical cultural and political
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“facts” onto material? Put another way, the concern is that new materialists misrepresent and
perhaps even reconstruct as agency that which is constructed by humans. Given that humans
physically make things, like guns, and then construct the language and culture that names and
delineates the thing’s use and value, it would appear that humans are in fact the source of all
effect production. In response to this valid challenge, new materialists argue that we ought to pay
attention to the ways in which culture and language affect human constructions and analyses of
things. In so doing we ought to carefully weigh the evolving and productive social and political
history of things. A thing, like a gun, might have been created by a particular human, but guns in
America have evolved alongside their makers, human and machine, and in that evolution have
become powerful things, which produce effects independent of the human makers and
codependent with human users.
New materialism aims to decenter our thinking about human intentionality and to refocus
our attention on how we, as humans, understand our relationships to and with nonhuman things.
Insofar as humans intended to make our society more inclusive, peaceful, and just, then we must
attend to the ways in which guns, masculinity, civics education, and schools, to name a few
actors, contribute to the problems that affect us as well as the extent to which each might
contribute to the solution. What I am interested in here is the complexity of the causal process.114
To say matter/things have agency is to say matter can produce effects on us and in the material
world. In the landscape of post rampage America, this position seems right to me.
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The Thingy Power of Guns
To address the power that things have, I will turn to Bruno Latour’s thinking about the
thingy power of guns.115 Latour identifies as a science studies scholar and does not refer to
himself as a new materialist—although, other new materialists like Jane Bennett claim Latour as
one of their own.116 Latour’s aim to demystify the social and political history of nonhuman
actors, and I turn to him in an effort to make sense of agentic things. For the purposes of piecing
together an alternative conception of agency, Latour helps distill and define the ways in which
we might say things act.
Latour turns to the slogan “Guns kill people” and the oft-heard reply, “Guns don’t kill
people, people kill people.”117 Latour parses the phrases as follows. The first slogan implies that
guns, alone, cause human death. Latour calls this position materialist because the view implies
that the gun comes with a script that transforms the carrier. In the case of a rampage school
shooter, this would be tantamount to the idea that when a vulnerable teenage boy acquires a gun,
he is imbued with a course of action that he cannot change and that he could not have imagined
prior to acquiring the gun. It is as if picking up a gun causes one to shoot and kill. Hence, “guns
kill people.” Latour calls the second slogan, “people kill people,” sociological since the material
presence of the gun has no bearing on the moral make-up of the person who decides to use a gun
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Harvard University Press, 1999).
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for evil. The gun is a neutral carrier of human will; it is merely a tool. Latour puts it this way,
while the materialists’ claim, “we are what we hold in our hands” the “NRA sociologist makes
the troubling suggestion that we can master techniques [guns], that techniques are nothing more
than pliable and diligent slaves.”118 As is so often the case in dichotomous, either/or
propositions, neither the materialist nor the sociologist has it quite right.
Latour offers four increasingly complex definitions of mediation to make sense of the
gun’s thingy power. Mediation is a key feature of the realm of engineers and craftsmen. As
Latour sees it, once men began building, crafting, and using tools to achieve the desired result,
no unmediated action was possible. To put it another way, when the first human picked up a
stick to extend her reach, she entered the realm of engineers and mediated action. After using the
tool, the extent to which she subsequently thinks about the ways in which the tool helped her
achieve her end modulates the ways in which she distinguishes herself from thing and her
reflection comes to mediate the human/thing interaction. Reflection, like thinking, is a practice
that demarcates the being who resides inside from that which is outside.119 Hence, the human
reflects, while the thing mediates. In both cases reflection/mediation is a complex and
complicated space of interruption and neither is prior to, or more important than, the other within
the unfolding of an event. What is of interest is the direction, magnitude, and semiotic
ramifications of the interruption, there are the characteristics to what I now turn.
Latour’s first definition of thingy mediation is characterized by interference. Imagine a
young boy. He wakes up, stumbles through his morning routine, gets to school, gets pushed into
the lockers, goes to classes, and during lunch finds a gun in the garbage bin. In relation to the

118

Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 177–78.

119

Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, 31.

69
gun’s interruption at least three options obtain. He can pick up the gun, turn it over, examine its
construction, and then place it back in the garbage bin. In this case he carries on with his
intended goal, presumably throwing away his garbage and is unphased by the gun’s proposed
interruption. In the second scenario, the boy sees the gun, picks it up, and begins to shoot
indiscriminately simply because he found a gun. In other words, by picking up the gun, the boy
inherited the gun’s script and acted upon the gun’s intentions. The first scenario is reminiscent of
the what Latour terms sociologist’s utterance “people kill people.” The boy, on a foundational
liberal’s reading ignores the gun because he has a sufficient and strong moral center. The gun
cannot mediate, that which it cannot affect. The second instance is akin to the materialist’s
utterance “guns kill people.” As if imbued with magical powers, the gun’s mere appearance
causes the boy to pick it up and shoot. The first and second scenario are both fictionalized
characterizations that do not take seriously the power of things to affect human action.
Thus, in the third scenario the boy’s goals are translated. The gun in the garbage bin
presents new possibilities. Let’s say the boy walked over to the garbage bin to throw his trash
away—this was his goal. The presence of the gun translates his goal. The gun creates a “link that
did not exist before.”120 Now the boy can pick up or leave the gun, throw his garbage away, and
return to his afternoon classes. In either case, he is no longer just a boy. He is a boy with a gun or
a boy who saw a gun in the garbage bin at school. In Latour’s words, “You are different with a
gun in your hand; the gun is different with you holding it. You are another subject because you
hold the gun; the gun is another object because it has entered into a relationship with you.”121 In
this scenario, neither the boy nor the gun has an unchangeable essence; rather, the boy and the
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gun modify each other and become a “hybrid actor.”
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The boy-gun or gun-boy are now defined

by their association. If and when the boy goes back to pick up the gun, perhaps the next time he
gets pushed into the lockers, or when a teacher finds the gun in his backpack, the gun’s presence
will modify the boy’s interactions.
The point is not only that the gun modifies; rather both the gun and the boy become
actants in a situation. An actant is simply an actor within a network; it is the new materialist way
of describing the kind of action traditionally done exclusively by an agentic person. For Latour,
and the new materialists, anything can be an actor. Actants are, however, an assemblage of actors
that enter into relations and become a new distinct agent, e.g. the boy-with-the-gun. The key
dictum is to follow, trace, and describe all of the actors that come together to constitute any one
event and, here is the key, to recognize that the actant is merely a “semiotic distinction.” As a
semiotic distinction the word actant calls our attention to the hybrid and ontological plural nature
of actors. In other words, the actors in a network are actants when they are in relation to other
actors. Alone the boy is a boy and the gun a gun. The gun has a function and the boy a goal.
Collectively the boy-gun and gun-boy make possible a new goal. The gun-in-the-trash-can is
now the gun-in-the-boy’s-hand and together the boy and the gun act. Materialists and
sociologists make the same mistake, they begin with immutable essences. When things and
people comingle, the thing becomes an actor as it co-constitutes the emergence of the actant.
Jointly, humans and guns make the killing of people possible. In Latour’s lingo, “It is neither
people nor guns that kill. Responsibility for action must be shared among various actants.”123
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Yet, it is not only the physical and immediate comingling of actants that makes things
powerful agents. If it was merely the case that guns only become actors in a network when a
human decides to pick the gun up, then there would be no grounds for an alternative conception
of agency. The human would still be the center for action. It is the sociopolitical, historical, and
imaginative comingling of actants that foregrounds the agency of things. To this end, in his
second and third definitions of mediation Latour expands on the construction of the network and
the historical location of possible actants. Latour calls the second meaning “composition” and the
third the “folding of time and space.”124 On composition, the actor network is composed of an
indefinite number of possible actors. Sticking with the scenario above, perhaps the boy who
happened upon the gun in the garbage bin knew the gun would be in the garbage bin because he
made arrangements for it to be there. Perhaps he also had a plan to use the gun during the passing
period following lunch, but when he picks up the gun, he learns that he forgot to acquire
ammunition. He promptly skips school, goes to the gun store, and purchases ammunition. He
looks at the time and realizes school will be letting out in an hour and races back to campus. He
gets to campus in time for school to let out and begins to shoot as students exit the building. His
actions, in this case, were made possible by an association of actants. The person who left the
gun, the garbage bin that held the gun, the gun, ammunition, the salesclerk who sold him
ammunition, and the prompt dismissal of students, etc., all made the rampage possible.
The third meaning of mediation, the folding of time and space, calls attention to the
material and social history of tools, techniques, and people. Latour uses the example of a
projector, but a gun will also work. Let’s say the boy who set about to rampage picks up the gun
and discovers the firing mechanism is broken such that he cannot commence his rampage.
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Assuming this boy does not have other working guns, the gun’s malfunction might inspire the
boy to look up the gun’s manufacturer. Let’s say the gun was made by Winchester and the boy
finds information about Winchester’s marketing plan called, aptly I think, the “boy plan.”125 He
reads about the early 20th century direct marketing of guns to 14-year-old boys. He thinks, “I,
too, am 14.” He deduces something about the construction of the narrative which links the gun to
becoming a man and thinks about what the gun means to him. These discoveries might help him
edit his goal or they might reaffirm his project. The point Latour makes is that this assembly of
actants is hidden by our relationship to modern technology wherein each agent perceives the
thing/matter/technology as devoid of a context and history. When a thing’s “time and space” are
apparent one can see how an innumerable series of past things, people, and networks make the
thing more than a passive object to be used. The thing is emerging as a powerful producer of
effects.
Recognizing the third mediation has the effect of un-folding time and space, to play with
Latour’s designation. Put another way, the social and political history of the thing becomes
apparent when we consider the temporal composition of actants, and in so doing helps us account
for the effect of the intended function of particular thing on its power as a contemporary actant.
Guns, for example, were designed to help humans kill other beings quickly and at a distance. As
the making of guns evolved from the craftsman’s shops to the industrial titan’s factory, gun
markets were carefully sculpted with meticulous marketing plans that created customers and
played into social gendered norms.126 Guns that were made for war were sold and marketed to
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male civilians as toys and tools for enjoyment and security. Shortly thereafter semi-automatic
war-guns found their way into civilian markets and the hands of teenage boys who were facing
gendered based harassment in schools, which were supposed to be safe and supportive spaces,
and rampage school gun violence began.127 This very abbreviated sociopolitical history is
engraved in invisible ink on every gun.
On the history of use, historian of American gun capitalists, Pamela Hagg, puts it this
way, “In this post-frontier economy and society, the Winchester had to make a transition from
being considered a tool to being seen as something with richer qualitative value in order to attract
what a Winchester historian called the average, prospective shooter”128 In the frontier economy,
the gun served pragmatic needs related to war and the conquest of Native Americans. In the postfrontier economy, guns served psychological needs. In apt phrasing, this is what Hagg refers to
as the “gun heart prevailing over the gun head.”129 More to the point, when gun marketers sought
to create consumer markets where martial markets had once stood via emotionally resonant
marketing, multiple types of gun owners emerged. Those who had always owned guns, the
hunters, trappers, or “mountain-men” earned the moniker “market hunters.” Meanwhile, men
who worked office jobs and sought the “emotional asylum of recreational hunting” derided the
market hunters who made a business of what they felt should be a sport.130 What Hagg gets
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wrong is the notion of time when a tool was merely a tool. Tools are always and already shaping
hearts, minds, and narratives. As such, it is not merely human narrative construction, e.g.
marketing, that created a desire for guns. Powerful things like guns have elicited responses,
produced effects, and mediated human interaction because they are actants in a network of
distributed agency.
Finally, the fourth definition of mediation, what Latour calls “crossing the boundary
between signs and things,” introduces human language and semiotics into the actor network.
Insofar as an actant is merely a semiotic distinction that signals the ways in which two or more
actors have entered into relationship and become a new hybrid actor in a network relative to
other actants, an actant which crosses over the boundary demarcating sign from thing becomes
something else entirely. Latour calls these boundary-crossing actants technical delegates. In
Latour’s words, things and “techniques modify the matter of our expression, not only its
form.”131 In other words, when we aim to represent actants via signs, these actants mediate the
form and matter of the resulting semiotic construction. For example, lumps of concrete on the
roadway discipline drivers to slow down and change the matter of expression— now “make
drivers slow down” is articulated in speed bumps.132 Latour describes the process of becoming a
technical delegate this way, “An object stands in for an actor and creates an asymmetry between
absent makers and occasional users. Without this detour, this shifting down, we would not
understand how an enunciator can be absent: either it is there, we would say, or it does not
exist… In delegation it is not, as in fiction, that I am here and elsewhere, that I am myself and
someone else, but that an action, long past, of an actor, long disappeared, is still active here
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today, on me. I live in the midst of technical delegates; I am folded into nonhumans.”
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Technical delegates are actants composed of human desires, linguistic phrases, and nonhuman
matter. A speed bump is a technical delegate of the human phrase “get drivers to slow down.” A
metal detector at the entrance of a school is a technical delegate of the Gun Free Schools Act and
the phrase “make sure a school shooting never happens here,” and the sign with a gun crossed
out is a technical delegate of the phrase “no guns allowed in here, even though guns are allowed
out there.” As technical, or thingy delegates, these boundary crossing actants bring to life
linguistic desires to affect the environment based on the effect of past actants. This final actant is
formed by language and matter. It is, therefore, neither human nor thing, but entirely thinghuman or human-thing that engages in the network of distributed agency.
To summarize, the power of things comes from four mediations wherein an actant
network appears, and in which agency is dispersed among the actants. In the first mediation,
things interrupt human aims. In the second, multiple nonhuman things and humans come
together to form an association of actants. Third, things carry with them a social, material, and
political history and these histories also act within the network. In fact, these histories make
apparent the ways in which things are more than passive technical objects for human use. Fourth,
nonhuman things and human language comes together to form new actants which Latour calls
“technical delegates.” Thingy power is, therefore, the power to elicit responses from human
users. Things produce effects in the material world, and things are complex constructions of
human intentions, interpretations, and histories. This is not to say that guns and other powerful
things have agency, in the foundational sense. Guns cannot verbalize their wants and make
choices among alternatives. This is to say, however, that nonhuman things are actors in a
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complex causal process wherein agency, that is a being’s feeling of power or control over his or
her actions, is the result of hybrid actants comingling to impact the environment.
On this view, it is impossible to say that humans act alone. Likewise, it is impossible to
say that things simply imbue human agents with scripts. The materialist and sociologist are both
wrong because at no time in human history has an immutable subject met a fixed object. Instead,
humans and objects constitute the “body corporate.” “The body corporate is what we and our
artifacts have become. We are an object-institution,” says Latour.134 The point, however, is
symmetrical. Latour continues, “There is no sense in which humans may be said to exist as
humans without entering into commerce with what authorizes and enables them to exist (that is,
to act).”135 Humans and nonhuman things permit and make possible one another’s existence and
as such it seems quite sensible to weigh the ways in which things can be said to act.
Agency, from the new materialist standpoint, is the result of the causal process wherein
humans and nonhuman things interact. Yet, it is difficult for humans, who are accustomed to
thinking about their unique status in the world as being dependent upon an unquestionable
subject/object distinction, to appreciate the full impact of according power to things. To say
things are actants in a causal network is to say humans make both conscious and unconscious as
well as rational and irrational decisions to act based upon the kind of things they encounter and
happen upon. Moreover, things mediate human intention and action in a myriad of surprising and
unpredictable ways.136 In fact, it is a thing’s ability to surprise us and to produce unplanned
effects that characterizes a thing’s power. Nevertheless, up to this point, one could say that in
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following Latour I have made an argument for the interplay of things and consciousness. To be
sure, Latour has no intention of splitting the consciousness from its bodily trappings, yet he does
not speak to the ways in which human bodies come to matter in the actor network. Nonhuman
things, like guns, have power over the way humans think and the kinds of actions they choose to
complete. Yet, aesthetically speaking, guns are an extension of the human body. The gun quite
literally edits what the human body can accomplish. As an editing object, the gun manages,
checks, and presides over a human’s desire to use the gun. The gun is not netural and nor is it
powerless. What’s more, when we look to the gun’s varied sociopolitical history it is apparent
that guns have been extensions of particular human bodies.
In the next section, I turn to the making of these particular male bodies in an effort to
make explicit two important actants within the network of distributed of agency that contribute to
rampage school gun violence. In so doing, I do not intend to discern and adumbrate every
possible actor within this network. Rather, I hope to illuminate the ways in which agency is
shared by highlighting the ways in which two necessary, but not sufficient actors—guns and
gendered social norms—act. Another key player here is the human shooter. To round out this
chapter, I will turn to the shooter to explore the ways in which an alternative conception of
agency might help us make sense of and his/our actions.
Gender and Guns
In speaking of bodies, I do not mean to call attention to the human body as distinct from
the mind. There is no splitting of the mind from body or subject from object in new materialism.
To borrow Latour’s phrasing “once there is no longer a mind-in-a-vat looking through the gaze
at an outside world, the search for absolute certainty becomes less urgent, and thus there is no
great difficulty in reconnecting with the relativism, the relations, the relativity on which the
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The intentional rational subject is not the primary locus of

individual agency in the new materialist construction. Rather, new materialism asks us to
consider the agentic contributions of nonhuman matter and human constructs as “purposeful
action and intentionality” are properties of “institutions and apparatuses, of what Foucault called
dispositifs” and not of humans or objects. In other words, new materialism eschews any sort of
mind/body dualism; thus, a human’s experience, emotion, cognition and body are all wrapped up
in the human as actant which is shaped, as are things, by social power.
To follow the Foucauldian line of thinking, the bodies, we embody along with the selves
we claim to know, are produced and disciplined by the institutions, and knowledge structures
that maintain the exercise of social power. Gender, for instance, is a concept that inscribes and
describes how sexed bodies ought to function in a collective and as individuals. When
comingled, the thingy power of guns and the social power of gender introduces the gendered
body and social gender norms into the actor network. For the purposes of this analysis, I set
aside questions about what exactly gender is and about what theories of gender and gender
justice are best for a particular vision of society. Instead, I am interested in the ways in which
social gender norms operate. In other words, I want to talk about the social power that works
within and through our conceptions of gender. Hence, I assume gender is a concept that inscribes
and describes how sexed bodies ought to function in a collective, such as society, and as
individuals. Following Michel Foucault’s theorization of the types of social power that produce
and discipline human life, I will outline the ways in which social power shapes social gender
norms and gendered bodies as both become actants in complex causal processes.
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Power for Michel Foucault comes in two forms—that which disciplines and that which
produces. Power is not a possession; power is an act. Power is exercised. In Foucault’s words,
“To analyze the political investment of the body and the microphysics of power presupposes,
therefore, that one abandons where power is concerned – the violence-ideology opposition, the
metaphor of property, the model of contract and conquest; that – where knowledge is concerned
– one abandons the opposition between what is ‘interested’ and what is ‘disinterested,’ the model
of knowledge and the primary subject.”138 He goes on, “One would be concerned with the ‘body
politic,’ as a set of material elements and techniques that serve as weapons, relays,
communication routes and supports for the power and knowledge relations that invest human
bodies and subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge.”139 To analyze the ways
in which power affects humans, Foucault says we must first revise our understanding of how
power works, how power is enacted, and the ways in which power creates knowledge.140 In
modern society, says Foucault, power is exercised to shape, coerce, and form; hence, it is more
than the power to punish the physical bodies of law breakers. Moreover, knowledge is
constructed in the soft workings of this new kind of power and, as such, we must account for the
ways in which knowledge is embodied and enmeshed in human experiences of the world.
Modern society is thus constituted by humans, nonhuman things, and social power where social
power can harm, create, and produce all manner of relations, beings, and knowledges.
Insofar as social power is an actor in this network of distributed agency, we can say
social power bears some responsibility for our actions. Speaking directly to culpability and the
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punishment of criminals, Foucault describes the emergence of a microphysics, or anatomy of
power, which produces the soul and identifies the mind. For Foucault, the soul “exists, it has a
reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of power that
is exercised on those punished…” supervised, corrected, and trained.141 Therefore, social power
generates the idea that an individual person is a trainable, correctable, rational person who has a
soul/mind. Moreover, through the subjugation of the body this individual can be trained to strive
for what newly established disciplines and new accumulations of knowledge determine to be
normal functioning.142
Social power, in Foucault’s view, is both disciplinary and productive. As a disciplinary
force, power can be taken up by “specialized institutions,” like prisons, “institutions that use it as
an essential element for a particular end,” like schools, by “pre-existing authorities,” like the
family, and by state apparatuses, like the police.143 Yet in all cases, disciplinary power aims to
control and make useful individuals by instilling a “society of surveillance” and the means to
conduct examinations.144 Whereas examinations are conducted by professionals in disciplines of
accumulated knowledge who intend to classify and qualify individuals for various roles in
society — police officer, military personnel, dysfunctional, and normal are but a few
qualifications and classifications — surveillance is democratized and internalized through the
omnipresent gaze of indefinite others. In the disciplinary scheme, power descends through
individuals. In other words, disciplinary power becomes more anonymous as it becomes
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What we are talking about here is the power of normalization as

well as the corollary power to make norms. The power of normalization implies a standard and
“imposes homogeneity,” but it also makes it possible to weigh and measure individuals who fail
to achieve the norm. It is, thus, tempting to read Foucault’s theory of disciplinary power as
productive insofar as it describes a breaking down of the body in an effort to inscribe new habits,
ways of being, and modes of thinking. This, however, is not what Foucault means when he says
power is productive.
Power is productive insofar as power forms subjects in the biological sense.146 Hence,
what Foucault calls biopower, is related to biological processes, like birth, propagation, health,
and death.147 Daniel Just calls this a shift in power from “man-as-body” to “man-as-species.”148
Biopower, therefore, is power aimed at controlling the global mass of humans and works to
regulate the population as a whole. Sam Binkley characterizes the shift this way, “by invoking
this biological norm on the level both of biopolitics and biopower, as both a problem of this
body, the body you embody, but also of these bodies around you that compose the nation or
community, biopower encourages us to re-experience individual modes of embodiment through
the lens of the defense of popular health.”149 In other words, bodies are vulnerable to abnormal
and pathological developments (as are souls). But when bodies become pathologically abnormal
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and come into contact with other bodies, they risk public health. Importantly, though, biopower
disciplines each individual to experience their body through the surveilling frame of public
health. A paradigmatic example here would be the case of child vaccinations. Public health
agencies, schools, and the military urge, and in many cases mandate, certain vaccinations on the
basis of public health. Yet when a group of people who question or reject vaccinations gain the
public stage, individual persons start to identify as “vacciners” and “anti-vacciners.” Both a
subjectivity and an actual body is produced in the exercise of biopower.
To the extent that social power affects an individual’s decisions, actions, and physical
propagation, social power — specifically the norms it produces — must be accounted for in an
alternative conception of agency, which aims to address the complexity of the causal network.
As Foucault accurately argues, techniques and technologies of power work directly on our
bodies, reach into our souls, and shape the lives we produce. Thus, one is the individual he
claims to be because he has been disciplined and taught to view himself as that particular
individual. What’s more, in the move to locate an educatable soul, the microphysics of power
instills within the individual the sense that he is full of agentic potential, has unique ideas, and is
solely responsible for his actions. One might even say the foundational conception of agency is
an outcome of disciplinary social power. What matters here are the ways in which the power of
normalization, a technique of disciplinary power and a product of biopower affect how we
embody our bodies, the actions we undertake, and the power of material objects.
One particularly powerful set of normative assumptions revolves around the social
conception of gender. Building from an analysis of power, Donna Haraway situates gender-based
social norms this way, “Gender is at the heart of constructions and classifications of systems of
difference. Complex differentiation and merging of terms for ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ are part of the
political history of words…the shared categorical racial and sexual meaning of gender point to
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the interwoven modern histories of colonial, racist, and sexual oppression in systems of bodily
production and inscription and their consequent laboratory and oppositions discourses.”150 As
Haraway points out, gender is a concept that seeks to discipline and categorize human sexual
difference. As a technology of disciplinary power, the concept of gender — the disciplinary and
“scientific” knowledge about sexual difference — works to break down the human body and
inscribe new habits based on normative sexual difference. As a technique of biopower, gender,
quite literally, regulates the normative propagation of new humans. Hence, gender affects a
human’s subjective understanding of the self, their soul and body, as well as the organization of
society. Yet, unlike other less visible “subjectivities” or “pathologies,” such as political
orientation or one’s metal health status, gender is inscribed and encoded on the body for all to
see and surveil.
The normalizing social power of gender defines a standard of sexual difference,
determines the homogenous sexual categories that humans ought to embody, and orders and
organizes the sexed humans who move about society. Importantly, there is a difference between
one’s sexual orientation and one’s gender. One’s sexual orientation is based on the sex of the
people with whom one engages in sexual activities, while one’s gender is a social category
defined by disciplinary and biopower relations.151 Thus, gender is often assessed based on visible
characteristics and comportments, whereas sexuality can be concealed. Despite the analytic
difference in the theoretical literature on gender and sexuality, popular American discourse tends
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to conflate the two. This conflation is endemic of the fact that gender is a constructed social
category based on a particular, binary construction of human sexuality.152 The norm toward
which gender tends is a binary construction of female and male. In this binary construction,
males who typify the norm presume a dominate social position; they are strong, assertive, and
are sexually attracted to, and perceived as attractive, by women. Meanwhile, women who typify
the feminine occupy the opposite pole; they are submissive relative to men, weak in physique
and will, but attractive to men.153 Insofar as social gender norms act, they do so through
surveillance by individuals who ascribe to and identify with the norms and through internalized,
that is, individualized, examination of the self. Social gender norms create the subjectivities and
the bodies we embody through careful regulation of human sexuality.
Extending the example of the boy who finds the gun in the trash can, an inclusion of the
social power of gender norms would require that we begin with the boy and not the gun. Instead
of starting our investigation of the causal network with the boy finding a gun on the school yard,
we would begin with a young person who identifies as male and whose body is male, but who is
not perceived as typically male by his peers and who attempts to preform heteronormative male
gender roles.154 The first interrupting actor is not the thingy gun, it is gender. This rather typical
story of a boy negotiating the exercise of social power in the form of social gender norms and as
such highlights the ways in which gendered social norms can act. In fact, if we grant social
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gender norms status as an actor, then the person-attempting-to-be-masculine-boy is already in
one relationship with a powerful linguistic category and approaches the gun as an actant.
Gendered social norms encourage the young boy to perform his gender in accordance with the
norm. Thus, he literally tries to demonstrate his dominance and strength as well as his
attractiveness to the opposite sex. In the case of the boy in this scenario, whose gender
performance is challenged by his peers, the normative and productive power of gender leads the
boys and girls in the school to police the boundaries of gender role homogeneity. Moreover,
because masculinity is a privileged social category, which is to say, the social power of
masculine gendered norms creates a form of rule, it is always precarious and needs continual
policing. Without the constant re-inscription of this fundamental relationship,
masculine/feminine, the power of gender would no longer be a worthwhile technique to
discipline and produce individuals.155 The boy who finds the gun is not just trying to prove that
he is masculine enough to his peers, he is trying to prove it to himself. He is involved in the
process of becoming a gendered person who thinks of himself as a masculine individual.
The normalizing social power of gender works to discipline individual subjectivities. The
social power of gender is framed as a normative concept and as such shapes our basic conception
of what it means to be human, but so to do things. As I stated at the end of the last section, guns
edit the human. In other words, when humans and nonhumans enter into relationship with one
another, each as the ability to manage or modify the existence of the other. Donna Haraway
might call the result of the new being — a being made up of social power, human, and things —
a cyborg. As a cyborg, the socially gendered human recognizes its monstrous and illegitimate
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origins and finds nothing troubling about the recognition. The cyborg’s utterance proceeds, “I
find no shame…in acknowledging my egalitarian relationship with non-human material Beings;
everything emerges from the same matrix of possibility.”156 In this utterance the cyborg
acknowledges the horizontal actor network wherein social gender norms, humans, and guns
interact and constitute the resulting being in a myriad of ways. The benefit of Haraway’s
description is that it brings to the imagination the image of a being/body that is inherently
mediated by things and social power. If we begin from this conception, there is no theoretical
space for notions of unmediated rationality, unmediated human beings, or unmediated
democracy to emerge. Instead, Haraway offers the term “sympoiesis” or making-with to envision
multispecies companionship wherein our hybrid nature generates practices to account for our
entanglement and entangled actions.
An alternative conception of agency takes seriously the complexity of the causal process,
which is to say it presupposes enmeshed, mediated, and varied human-cyborgs. It rejects the idea
that agency is the exclusive property of the discrete individual, who on the new materialist’s
rendering is a fiction, and the notion that individuals are ontologically unique subjects. This is
for two primary reasons. One, an analysis of nonhuman things demonstrates the fundamentally
mediated nature of human interaction with nonhuman things. Two, an analysis of social power
reveals the disciplinary and productive powers that co-construct and normalize social gender
norms and gendered subjectivities.
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Shooters & School Shooters
A serious consideration of the causal network reveals a complex network of actors among
which agency is shared. To say that agency is shared is to say that an individual is not
exclusively to blame for his or her actions. In the case of a rampage school shooting, the most
immediate reaction to such a proposition is liable to be shock or horror. After all, one or two
teenage boys tends to plan and execute these horrific shootings. However, I am not claiming the
shooters are innocent or blameless. Rather, insofar as agency is shared, blame is shared. To
explicate this point, let’s take a quick look at Columbine school shooters. The rampage school
shooting at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado was well documented by the shooters
themselves. Plus, additional analyses of the shooters are available due to the length of time
which has passed since the shooting. On April 20, 1999, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold stormed
the school shooting and shouting, “All the jocks stand up!”157 In all, they took 15 lives, including
their own, injured nearly two- dozen more, some severely, and psychologically scarred an entire
community.158
As is the case with the Columbine shooters, school shooters tend to be male, but more
than that they are usually boys whose performance of heteronormative male gender roles is
questioned by peers who exemplify these roles. This means the boys who exemplify teenage
masculinity, generally the athletes or “jocks,” protect the boundaries of male gender
identification through a performance of their masculinity. Given what we know about the
microphysics of social gender norms, it is unsurprising that two boys who were not accepted as
masculine enough call out the most representatively masculine as they begin their rampage.
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In the Foucauldian sense, the “jocks,” but also the culture which supported the
veneration of the athletes and jocks at Columbine, was an anatomy of power that inscribed and
habituated binary social gender norms wherein males were the perpetrators of violence and
protectors of the weak. Evidence of this is found in a film the boys produced during their junior
year. Called “Hit Men for Hire,” in the film, “they roam the hallways of the high school corridors
in black dusters, cool sunglasses, and ferocious attitudes, pretending to execute school athletes
with toy guns,” while dialogue runs, “We’ll protect you on school (sic). Take away any bullies
that are pickin’ on you.”159 Moreover, in their taped basement interviews of one another, the
boys often talk about the concept of natural selection, which they understand to be a culling of
the weak. During the shooting, Eric wore a t-shirt that had the words “Natural Selection” printed
across the front.160 The boys’ reference to natural selection is explicitly connected to the social
power of masculine gendered norms. Eric and Dylan wanted to be the kind of men who
exemplified the masculine ideal, but because they were excluded from the traditional way of
preforming this subjectivity they sought out a way to edit their current mode of being in the
world and entered into relationship with guns.
For people in male bodies who struggle to perform masculine gender roles, the gun can
serve as a masculine cloak. This is one of Amy Shuffelton’s main points in “Consider Your Man
Card Reissued.”161 Shuffelton states that, “masculinity is never an identity a man can establish
permanently: it needs to be ‘reissued’ by those in a position to judge a man’s masculinity.”162
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Similarly, Douglas Kellner argues that American history bequeaths to us a violent and
entrenched gun culture which, coupled with male rage about perceived power shifts, has led to
the explosion of rampage gun violence.163 Building on these ideas, my argument is that the gun is
powerful thing/actant that acts on and through humans. The extent to which the power of gender
encourages men to conform to “typical” or “natural” masculine gender roles wherein they must
dominate, where they ought to be the arbitrator of “natural selection,” and where being harassed
for one’s inability to perform these roles constitutes an unparalleled failure to become a certain
kind of self, the thingy power of the gun will remain as seductive as a siren calling to Odysseus.
And here is the crux: Odysseus, who was able to avoid the siren’s call by literally tying his body
to the ship’s mast. Most teenage boys are able to restrain any desire to stick it to their rivals,
harassers, and bullies by shooting up the school without binding their physical bodies. And
according to the individualistic premise of liberal democracy, those who survive the siren call do
so because their “reason” wins out. Put another way, the boys who do not turn to gun violence to
enact their masculinity at school are functional liberal individuals who get to grow up to become
the agentic rational-male-gun-owning-protectors of society. The trouble with this analogy, of
course, is that Odysseus tied his literal body down; he was keenly aware of reason’s failings and
agency’s entangled workings.
The narrative of an intentional rational agent who can use a gun to protect his family or to
ensure the stability of society disciplines men through the power of social gender social norms to
divorce the body from the mind and to demonstrate their masculinity through their singular and
exclusive agentic capacity to reason and to use material tools. While masculinity for American
teenagers is often organized around physical dominance, masculinity for American adults

163

Kellner, Guys and Guns Amok, Chapter 1.

articulates its ideals through control and dominance physically and cognitively.

164

90
In other

words, for adults, ideal masculinity is an expression of one’s ability to reasonably and rationally
affect one’s environment, and for teenagers masculinity’s ideal expression is expressed in one’s
physical ability to affect the environment. The construction of this binary space, in which one is
either masculine or one is not, is detrimental for the developing teenage boy who is transitioning
from boy to man, and thus liable to experience, and fail to adequately appropriate, the social
power of both organizing ideals. Put another way, because teenagers move between adult and
not-yet-adult norms, the social expectation is that they will appropriate both — that they can be
both rational and physically powerful. The binary construction of social norm of masculinity
along with liberal democracy’s insistence on the agency of the singular and intentional rational
agent is, therefore, disastrous for any conception of democracy which aims to make possible life
in association. Furthermore, in the foundational liberal scenario, where unchecked and
unacknowledged social power constructs binary social gender norms and thingy power is
ignored, women, people of color, children, and any other group of people which does not
appropriate the liberal and masculine ideal, have no claim to reason and thus no claim to agency.
On the foundational liberal view, things are tools to be used by those who reason and those who
approximate the capacity to be rational. Hence, tools, like guns, which require the “user” to be
exceptionally “rational” because of their power to control human life, are masculinized by the
same social power which disciplines individual subjectivities. Agency, here, is the exclusive
property of singular individuals who can be held responsible for his or her actions.
On the new materialist view, there is no sense in which our effect on the social world and
natural environment, our agency, is exclusively our own. Educating teenagers, boys and girls, to
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believe otherwise, as foundational liberal democratic education would have us do, will only
perpetuate rampage school gun violence, specifically, and the violent organization of society, in
general. As we have seen thingy power changes who we are. The boy with the gun is different
from the boy without the gun. And social power constructs individuals who think of themselves
as individuals in gendered terms and individuals who apply these constructs to material things.
Together thing power and social power act on teenage boys and bear some responsibility for the
evolution of school shooter.
Conclusion
The notion of a singular and intentional rational agent who masters and puts to use
material things to enact his ontologically unique goals is upended when we take seriously the
thingy power of material and the workings of social power. Yet, contemporary teenage boys and
girls are educated in theories of democracy, and, therefore, the self which instruct them to
identify, locate, and cultivate a rational and reasonable agentic self who resides in the mind/soul
and who is unaffected by nonhuman material things or the body. In the search for “a true self,”
foundational civic education teaches young people to say things like “guns kill people” and
“guns don’t kill people, people kill people,” even though both utterances are absurd. The
absurdity of this utterance lies in the notion that things are magic, and people are rational
bulwarks of self-making mojo. Neither is true. Things are powerful because of the responses they
elicit from humans and nonhumans, alike, and the impact they have on our environment. Guns
affect not just humans but our entire social and natural world. Guns have changed human
interpersonal relations in countries like America, the shape of war and hunting, manufacturing
and — insofar as metal was extracted from the earth to create guns — the natural world. Humans
and things constitute one another. As humans, our thoughts, intentions, and actions have been,
and continue to be, shaped by the things we hold dear, the things we fear, and the things that
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make possible our way of life. In addition to things, social power concentrated in disciplines,
knowledges, and objective conditions is always working on humans as individuals and on the
social collective.
School shooters, like everyone else, are embodied people who are disciplined via
gendered norms to appropriate individual subjectivities. Male school shooters perform
heteronormative masculine roles and, when they encounter guns, do so as developing young
people who occupy and try out specific masculinized subjectivities. For the harassed teenage
boy, who faces daily harassment based on the performance of his social gender, the thingy power
of the gun presents an opportunity to gain enough masculinized power to establish his
masculinity amongst his peers. When the harassed not-masculine-enough-boy finds the gun-inthe-garbage-bin, he finds the thingy power to kill in a masculine totem/thing that has acted on
schools through other boys like him in the not too distant past. Jointly, thing and norms, along
with their histories, act on and through us in ways that we cannot always see, but which we must
attempt to understand if we hope to build peaceful associative communities. The trying-to-bemasculine-teenage-school-shooter-with-a-gun is a “cyborg” operating in a world constituted by
technical delegates of guns and the normalizing social power of gender, but the point is
recursive. Things, too, are Harrawayian cyborgs. Insofar as things are made of human, social,
and political histories, nonhuman material is an entangled assemblage with which we must make
and remake the world . Cyborgs, by definition, share agency with things and social power. They
are not singular, unique, or fundamentally individualized. As such, to hold a cyborg responsible
is to hold the constitutive elements/parts of the being responsible. In the case of the cyborgschool-shooter, we might demand that liberal democratic education, traditional conceptions of
agency, social gender norms, guns, and the shooter should be held accountable for the ways in
which each comingles to perpetuate rampage school gun violence. Humans never have been, and
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are not now, singular and agentic beings who can make use of things and social power without
being affected by the very things we use and create.
An alternative conception of agency is, therefore, needed to address the ways in which
associations of humans, things, and social power co-constitute one another and make up the
associations with which we interact and out of which we make democracy. Taking new
materialism seriously allows us to begin the work of decentering the human subject in this
project. That said, the new materialists invoked here, Latour, Bennett, and Haraway, do not
assume that we, humans, can ever fully escape our lived experience. Rather they urge us to think
carefully about our entanglements and to respond with care to the associations that construct the
self and the world. In this dissertation, I am interested in the developing further the ways in
which humans as thinking beings who are already and always cyborgs might develop the
capacity to make sense of their associative behaviors in the political sphere so as to hold
responsible all of the actors that affect our society. I am not concerned with the ethical account
one gives of the self, although this seems to be a related project.165 Moving forward, I will work
to explain how an antifoundational democratic theory of the likes theorized by John Dewey and
Benjamin Barber begins with a conception of shared agency and that is, in fact, situated in the
political.166 Although neither of these men were particularly interested in new materialism or
worried about the human as cyborg, their pragmatic theories of democracy are flexible enough to
encompass this development. As Barb Stengel points out there is more that connects critical
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In the next chapter,

I will lay out an antifoundational theory of democracy, which rests on the alternative conception
of agency that I have laid out in this chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
TOWARD AN ANTIFOUNDATIONAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY OF AGENCY
The disciplinary exercise of social power vis a vis social gender norms produces the
bodies we embody and disciplines individual subjectivities; meanwhile, the thingy power of
material objects, like guns, affects the kind of selves and associations we co-create. Each —
social gender norms and guns — is an actant in a rampage school shooter’s network of
distributed agency. An alternative conception of agency, one that does not see agency as the
exclusive property of the singular and liberal individual, is derived from an acknowledgement of
the primary “swapping of properties among inert, animal, symbolic, concrete, and human
materials,”168 and an understanding of the ways in which technologies of power are exercised
over individual bodies and collectives of bodies to produce and control individuals.169 As I see it,
if the aim is to teach citizens how they might construct peaceful futures wherein each person is
equipped to participate in society’s renewal, then a sufficient theory of democratic education
must account for this alternative and expanded conception of agency. A person who is taught that
his actions and decisions are, at least in part, the result of a complicated mix of social power as
well as the power of things, in essence that one is a cyborg, is better equipped to critically engage
with different others and with the complex causal networks that characterize public action in a
shared world. Moreover, when democratic education begins with shared, expanded, and

168

Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 122–23.

169

Foucault, Discipline & Punish.

95

96
distributed agency, the action, impact, and agentic contribution of everyone else— gun
manufactures and advertisers, the NRA, masculine cultural norms, liberal democrats—is
revealed. Thus, when our notion of agency is expanded to account for the actants as well as the
cyborg beings that constitute our world, agency is both more diffuse and limited.170 Agency is
shared among actants because human-cyborg action is always (inter) and (trans)action; hence it
is more diffuse. And agency is more limited insofar as we as human persons do not have
complete control over our actions. Thinking about agency in this way allows us to more clearly
see, to pinpoint, the ways in which the interactive and constitutive elements of the cyborg impact
the political and social actions one might take. As a pragmatic philosopher of education, I will
spend the remaining pages of this dissertation fleshing a theory of democracy and democratic
education suited for a human-cyborg. In so doing, I am interested in articulating the ways in
which the human-cyborg might make use of the limited, but vital agency, they do have. As such I
look to the kind of education the human element of the cyborg ought to receive such that the
human can think and act in ways that acknowledge interdependence and shared agency.
In this chapter, I argue that in order to address violence, specifically rampage school gun
violence, we need an alternative theory of democracy, which sufficiently accounts for the
interplay of non-rational humans, nonhuman things, and gendered social norms in the making of
the communities to which we belong. Without an alternative theory of democracy within which
to situate an alternative conception of agency, we cannot expect young people to create peaceful
democratic communities and we should expect rampage school gun violence to persist. This
chapter claims that antifoundational democratic theory teaches citizens to think of their agency
as necessarily shared across a network of actants. Antifoundational democracy, therefore, helps
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citizens make sense of violence by highlighting the dynamic causal networks that contribute to
the making of shooters and school shootings. Rather than allocating blame in the singular
individual, antifoundational democracy teaches citizens how to share the blame, take
responsibility for unacceptable violence, and participate in the renewal of a democratic society.
Whereas foundational democracy begins with the exclusive individuality and
separateness of human beings, antifoundational democracy begins with the fundamental
interdependence of humans. As a way of being in the world, antifoundational democracy has
little use for foundations derived from a distant pre-political vignette of human relations; it is an
orientation to living in common based on the present. Following American pragmatists,
specifically, John Dewey and Benjamin Barber, I argue that antifoundational democracy is well
suited to provide solutions to our gun problem because antifoundational democracy is constituted
in our non ideal interactions with other humans and nonhuman things.171
Specifically, I contend that antifoundational democratic education distributes
responsibility for rampage school gun violence to various human and nonhuman actors and
teaches individuals how to make sense of each agent’s actions. In so doing, antifoundational
democracy readies individuals and communities to leverage their understanding of the complex
causal network to enact changes to stop the rampaging via the revision of old habits, thoughtful
engagement with complex associative actors and Latourian actants, and collaborative social

For more on non-ideal theorizing and democracy see: Samantha Deane, “Prefacing as Educating:
Building Educational Utopias and Barber’s Strong Democracy,” Philosophy of Education Archive 0, no. 0
(February 23, 2018): 118–27; Michele S. Moses, “Nonideal Theory and Philosophy of Education:
Considering What Is While Working Toward What Ought to Be,” Educational Theory 65, no. 2 (April
2015): 107–10, https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12101; Terri S. Wilson and Matthew A. Ryg, “Becoming
Autonomous: Nonideal Theory and Educational Autonomy,” Educational Theory 65, no. 2 (2015): 127–
50, https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12103; Terri S. Wilson and Matthew Ryg, “Non-Ideal Autonomy: Dewey
and Reframing Educational Authority,” Philosophy of Education Archive 0, no. 0 (March 17, 2017): 247255–255.
171

98
endeavors. The chapter begins by returning to the conversation about materialism to suggest
that the new materialist, alternative conception of agency, which I proposed in Chapter 3 and
link to antifoundational democracy here, is a rejection of, and an alternative to, the conceptual
frame that grounds liberal democracy’s emergence. In the second section of the chapter, I turn to
John Dewey’s understanding of associative behaviors to situate this alternative conception of
agency in the political. Finally, in the third section, I argue that John Dewey’s notion of habit
helps us see how one exercise this alternative agency to affect his or her environment.
From Materialism to New Materialism’s Alternative
Up to this point, I have not explicitly adumbrated the ways in which new materialism is
connected to the political, and yet, my argument revolves around the necessity of an alternative
conception of agency for peaceful democratic social progress. In this section, I will, therefore,
connect the premise upon which new materialist agency is constructed to a rejection of the
materialist frame of liberal democracy. Following Benjamin Barber, I claim that liberal
democracy is constructed upon an appropriation of materialism to the political and, therefore,
that new materialism is a rejection of both materialism and materialism’s political premise. Yet,
new materialism is more than just a rejection, it proposes an alternative to the materialist premise
and supports an alternative construction of political theory.
Benjamin Barber links liberal democracy’s contemporary dispositions to a materialist
pretheoretical premise. As Barber sees it, liberal democracy is a set of political responses to
conflict where, “Autonomous individuals occupying private and separate spaces are the players
in the game of liberal politics.”172 In Barber’s taxonomy, foundational democracy’s responses to
conflict solicits three dispositions: the anarchist, realist, and minimalist. In very succinct terms,
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the anarchist is “conflict denying,” which is to say conflict is created only by political
interaction.173 The realist is “conflict repressing;” for the realist politics becomes the “art of
power.”174 Finally, the minimalist is “conflict tolerating.”175 In this last disposition, politics is the
art of toleration because it seeks to accept conflict and dissensus. These dispositions are not
evolutionary; rather, they coexist in American politics and even within the same individual. They
are all a part of the same “inertial frame of reference” or constellation of starting premises that
constitute foundational liberal democracy.176 I will explicate the inertial frame on which the
traditional conception of human nature and dispositions of liberal democracy rest in an effort to
clear the way for a pragmatic conception of habit as human nature.177 In so doing, my goal is to
argue that antifoundational democracy emerges from an acceptance of our associative nature and
that democratic society is continuously constructed upon habits that make sense of our shared
agency and personal actions.
In Barber’s parlance, an “inertial frame of reference” is the embodiment of all the
“pretheoretical material of a particular world view.”178 An inertial frame is a “starting or rest
position from which a theorist launches his argument and to which he can safely return when a
given philosophical voyage of discovery fails or is aborted.”179 The important point is that one
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cannot get behind an inertial frame of reference. It is prior to the articulation of theory.
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Inertial frames are, therefore, backward looking attempts to find starting points for theory. In
Barber’s estimation, liberal democracy’s inertial frame rests on the 16th century discovery of
materialism. As Barber puts it, “The most striking feature of the liberal inertial frame is the
physicality of its language and imagery. There was a ‘thingness’ about Hobbesian and postHobbesian liberal thought that seems to have been both new and extraordinary in the history of
political discourse. Mimicking the newly revealed physical cosmos of the scientists, political
theorists suddenly began to depict the human world as inhabited by units, particles, and atoms,
things with solidity and externality quite at odds with the traditional teleological, psychic, and
spiritual understandings of the human essence.”181 Barber’s point is this: the shift to language
and metaphors drawn from physics and the science, which are deeply connected to laws of time
and space, changed how political theorists spoke about human nature. Prior to the arrival of this
“thingness,” humans were characterized as beings bound by time and space but also beings with
timeless or transcendental souls. Thus, when political theorists applied materialism to “human
nature,” humans became individuals with discrete boundaries who, despite their uniqueness, are
composed of the same matter. In one sense, this move created the grounds from which to say
individual humans are equal and all positions are symmetrical. In another sense, the application
of materialism to human nature divorced humans from their fundamental associations and
replaced spiritual or teleological understandings of human nature with scientific and political
ones.182

180

Barber, 28.

181

Barber, 34.

Materialism as I am talking about it here is broadly characterized as the arrival of thingness. Hence, I
am not talking about historical materialism of the Marxist variety. Marx’s notion of materiality is limited
182

101
Liberal democracy is, therefore, born of the idea that humans can be depicted in the
language of physicality, that humans are alike in their material presence but different insofar as
there exists something like a mind or an interior space where reasoning takes place, and that each
human is a discrete being. These last two premises, that humans have minds and that humans are
fundamentally alone, are supported by corollary premises. On the epistemological side is the idea
that “there exists a knowable and independent ground,” what Barber call Cartesian politics.
Barber’s characterization of Cartesian politics goes something like this: because we know the
material world is made up of men, things, and nature, all of which are governed by physical
necessity and laws of motion, political laws, which seek to describe normative human behaviors,
ought to be similarly rooted in certainty, science, and reason.183 Liberals, therefore, spend a great
deal of time looking for and describing the unassailable and knowable ground upon which
political norms can be built. Of course, for humans to be certain of something, there must be a
knower and a mind that can mirror and make sense of what exists in the material world.184
Hence, theorists from Hobbes to Locke to Rawls concern themselves with what it means to be a
rational or reasonable person who can make rational (analytic) choices. The second premise rests
on a psychological assumption which takes that man is singular and alone from the beginning
and in the end. The psychology of individualism tells liberal individuals that “the dominant
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reality of human life is the fact of our separate existences.”
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The psychological frame thus

reinforces the epistemological premise that humans are unique insofar as they have unique
minds. While our physical bodies differ, bodily differences are insignificant for a materialist
liberal theory because individuality is a hallmark of a mind that is able to reason. Liberal
democratic education that revolves around an individual’s ability to become an intentional
rational agent is, therefore, consistent with materialist liberal theory.
If materialism grounds liberal democracy’s foundational premises, then new materialism
is a rejection of, and an alternative to, materialist liberal politics. New materialism, in other
words, flips on its head the conclusion that liberal democracy draws from the appropriation of
materialism. For new materialists, the insights of materialism highlight what humans and
nonhumans share, and not what makes humans distinct from the made or natural environment.
Natural things, like planets, along with human artifacts (things) and humans (body and mind) all
affect the environment. Therefore, a recognition of material objects and their laws makes clear
the multi-linear networks of causation, argue the new materialists. By relinquishing a
unidirectional view of agency or causation, where “the agency of bodies and material objects is
understood largely as an effect of power,” new materialists propose an alternative framework
that embraces a “recursive and multi-linear” view of causation.186 New materialists, therefore,
reject the appropriation of thingness to human political relations but not the recognition of
things. Hence, the new materialist, Jane Bennett, says her methodological aim is to
“overemphasize the agentic contributions of nonhuman forces (operating in nature, in the human
body, and in human artifacts) in an attempt to counter the narcissistic reflex of human language
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Bennett’s methodological point is a political one as well. If we accept the

ways in which material objects and the idea of thingness has influenced human thought about
science and politics, which is to say if we acknowledge the history of materialism as a discourse,
then our contemporary political thought ought to take as its unit of analysis a heterogenous
public of human and nonhuman things.188
As an alternative to materialism, new materialism rejects all three positions posited by
materialist liberal democracy. It rejects the idea that scientific notions about things can be
unidirectionally appropriated by humans. The process is recursive. “Humans are involved in the
making of scientific facts and the sciences are involved in the making of human history,” as
Latour would say.189 New materialists reject the idea that bodies are insignificant, that minds
function independent of the body, and that certainty, or “independent grounds,” ought to guide
political theory. Instead, new materialist’s wonder what it would mean to say the body thinks and
seek to take seriously contingent starting points derived from embodied experience.190 Finally,
new materialism rejects the idea that humans are fundamentally solitary individuals. Once
human bodies and minds are reintegrated, it is a short step to articulate the various associations
that constitute human existence. In the next section, I explicitly detail the political implications
of taking seriously new materialism by using as starting points the alternatives new materialism
brings to the forefront.

187

Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, xvi.

188

Bennett, 108.

189

Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 10.

Frost, “The Implications of the New Materialisms for Feminist Epistemology”; Latour, Pandora’s
Hope.
190

104
Associative Behaviors and the Fundamental Interdependence of Humans
Methodologically, new materialism, Deweyan pragmatism, and antifoundational
democracy are based on the idea that we ought to launch inquiry from lived experience. This
presumption is evident in Barber’s careful demystification of liberal democracy’s “pretheoretical
givens” and in new materialism’s relentless pursuit of ways to characterize life in a world
constituted by things, power, technologies, nature, and people. New materialism presumes that
humans, nonhuman things, and nature are in close association and that each is capable of
producing affects such that our inquiry ought to begin by tracing these associations. Similarly,
the Deweyan stance argues that lived experience guides the generation of ideals, which can then
guide subsequent experience. Hence, the marriage between new materialism and Deweyan
pragmatism is generative. Adding Dewey’s work to the mix highlights the political significance
of new materialism’s rejection of the materialist liberal frame and places the alternative
conception of agency that I worked out in Chapter 3 squarely in the political.
In the Public and Its Problems Dewey contends that the relation of the individual to the
social is “the first and last” problem in the search for the “the great community.”191 The exact
problem in Dewey’s sense is our commitment to a binary construction where it is either a unique
individual or a collective that acts. “The human being whom we fasten upon as individual par
excellence is moved and regulated by his association with others; what he does and what the
consequences of his behaviors are, what his experiences consists of, cannot even be described,
much less accounted for, in isolation,” states Dewey.192 In other words, all experience is shared
and human behavior is fundamentally associative. Dewey expands, “A thing is one when it
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stands, lies or moves as a unit independently of other things, whether it be a stone, tree,
molecule or drop of water, or a human being… [Yet] The tree stands only when rooted in the
soil; it lives or dies in the mode of its connections with sunlight, air and water. Then too the tree
is a collection of interacting parts; is the tree more a single whole than its cells?”193 Like the tree,
the individual human is always comprised of interacting parts. Joint activity is a fact of
existence—it is how the world, at present, can be observed to operate. Trees have and need roots.
Humans are born from other humans, who have to interact with one other or scientific
technologies to create a fetus, which once born as a human baby cannot thrive without significant
human and nonhuman interactions.
The difficulty with making heads or tails of the political significance of interdependence
is related to concerns about how to locate and hold responsible the individual. Dewey puts the
problem this way, “because an individual can be disassociated from this, that and the other
grouping… there grows up in the mind an image of a residual individual who is not member of
any association at all. From this premise, and from this only, there develops the unreal question
of how individuals come to be united in societies and groups: the individual and social are now
opposed to each other, and there is a problem of reconciling them.”194 In this scenario, the
individual must liberate himself from the collective so as to not be solely defined by the
collective and in the effort must claim his status as an autonomous agent. This is the scenario on
which materialist, liberal democracy and its corollary ideas about individual agency are
constructed. Yet, as Dewey points out, it is an artificial construction. The fact that a human can
move between contexts and remain a distinct person does not indicate that this person is either
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consumed by contexts or entirely free of them. Humans are always engaged in different
associations and groupings. Moreover, some contexts are consuming while others are less so,
indicating that persons are in flux between moments of individuality and moments of
collectivity. As such, the questions should be in what associations and causal networks do we
find ourselves, what are the consequences of these associations, and in what way does the
network or association need to be adjusted to secure more just or equitable circumstances? In
other words, we ought to be searching for networks, actants, and cyborgs that ought to be held
responsible for violence.
Although new materialists are quite keen to discuss agency, Dewey did not have much to
say about agency, per se. He did, however, use the word autonomy sparingly across his various
works.195 To the extent that autonomy is something like the capacity to make and revise choices
about one’s life, which is how it has been defined throughout this work, and agency is the ability
to affect or act on one’s environment, then it is fair to say the terms are closely related for Dewey
and liberal theorists alike. Like his liberal counterparts, Dewey agrees that agency is related to
what it means to act on and within one’s community. Nonetheless, Dewey diverges from the
liberal conception of agency to the extent that agency, in his sense, is the associative and shared
capacity to act and produce effects and is not the sum of an individual’s solitary endeavors. For
Dewey, what matters is the impact of associative behavior on society. Although the individual
person acts, he always does so within an associative situation.196
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Yet, society is not implied in Dewey’s notion of associated behavior; it takes active
will and intelligent action to make the political communities to which we belong. We each
participate in interactions where associations form, such as those that happen in the family, and
we are each a part of small communities. For example, church, book groups, neighborhood
associations, and organized labor are a few “small communities” to which individuals persons
belong by virtue of their personal associations. Becoming a member of a public, on the other
hand, requires particular actions. For Dewey, the public, which is to say political community, is
made up an infinite number of local publics — what Sarah Stitzlein and Amy Rector-Aranda call
“small publics.” And where small publics are the result of local interaction, public is understood
as a verb.197 Small publics are the result of local, even neighborly, groups of people who come
together to impact a shared problem. Through communication about the effects of their personal
and communal associations these small publics, seek flexible and continuous social
improvements. On Dewey’s view, these small publics, when vibrant, effective and in their verb
mode, form a worldwide scene in which democratic communities are generated. He states,
“Unless local communal life can be restored, the public cannot adequately resolve its most
urgent problem: to find and identify itself. But if it is reestablished…. It will not be isolated. Its
larger relationships will provide an inexhaustible and flowing fund of meaning upon which to
draw.”198 In other words, small democratic publics will become a large democratic public to the
extent that the individual persons who make up the small publics share habits and attitudes.
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Individual associations and memberships in small communities are a natural feature
of human life as we find it; however, becoming a member of a public by communicating about
the impact of our various experiences in an effort to affect some particular social change takes
effort and requires the training of certain capacities. Like liberal democracy, antifoundational
democracy is closely connected to a vision of education. Yet, unlike liberal democracy,
antifoundational democracy does not look to instantiate or shore up an individual’s exclusive
agentic capacity. Rather, antifoundational democracy is the result of associative, or shared,
agency, and in place of aiming to develop ontologically autonomous agents, looks to develop
habits that will enable individual persons to expand their associations and impact an everwidening network of people and things. Democracy, for Dewey, is more than “a form of
government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated
experience.”199 Whereas Callan understands liberal democracy to be a balance between the
freedom for individuals to craft meaningful lives and the demands of collective self-rule wherein
“autonomy or reasoned self-rule is key to understanding what rightly holds together liberal and
democratic principles,” Dewey emphasizes the social and shared nature of human life and,
therefore, of the political.200 For Dewey, democracy is a way of life made possible by the
capacity to communicate about shared experiences, ideas, and common ends that are in view.201
The democratic capacities demanded by an antifoundational vision of democracy are
consistent with, and require, a notion of shared agency. In fact, I am claiming that in the
antifoundational, pragmatic schema of democracy, the educative task of developing agentic
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capacity is the project of facilitating the growth of one’s ability to make sense of complex
causal networks in association with others as well as the capacity to formulate purposes that
affect the world as a constitutive member. To this end, Terri Wilson and Matthew Ryg argue that
a Deweyan view of autonomy is built on a broader account of Dewey’s notion of the
transactional self. They state that the Deweyan self “interacts with and is shaped by
environments through the interstices of interest and habit…we do and act, undergo and are acted
upon.”202Additionally, the individual, or self, on Dewey’s view is not set against the social.
Rather, the transactional self who interacts is, “continually re-constituted in the world with and
by persons interacting with environments.”203 Although many liberal theorists, like Callan,
would agree with this vision of autonomy where an encumbered self becomes capable of asking
questions about the value of his various encumbrances, Dewey helps us see that one is never
fully autonomous in the liberal sense. For Dewey, one is always in the process of have more of
less impact on one’s network depending upon one’s ability see and make sense of all of the
actors, including oneself, in a given situation.204
This is to say, even though individuals must learn to communicate, think, and make
sense of causal networks, they are not the exclusive locus of agency. Agency, here, has little to
do with a singular, intentional, and rational agent, but instead has everything do to with the
networks and associations that evidence what “we will together, do together, and say
together.”205 Moreover, the antifoundational understanding of our fundamental interdependence
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does not preclude the introduction of nonhuman actors into our causal networks. In fact,
although Dewey is not a new materialist and might have some serious concerns about thingy
power, Dewey begins his discussion of associative behaviors and interdependence by talking
about the association of trees and roots as well as that of rocks, humans, and hammers.206 Even
though humans are, by and large, the “willers” and “talkers,” an alternative conception of agency
contends that a variety of human and nonhuman things comingle to co-constitute the willing,
talking and doing.207 It is, therefore, appropriate and methodologically consistent that Bennett,
after considering the vitality, or power, of material and Dewey’s concept of the public, argues
that “all kinds of bodies may be able to join forces, but a pragmatist would be quick to note that
only some bodies can make this association into a task force. And yet there also remains a selfinterested motivation for the presumption that all material bodies are potential members of the
public into which one has been inducted. Such a presumption will enable me to discern more
fully the extent of their power over me: How is this food or worm or aluminum contributing to a
problem affecting me? How might these nonhumans contribute to the solution?”208 As Bennett
points out, even though the pragmatist may be inclined to point out that only humans can discern
and then act upon their knowledge, it is in our self-interest to take seriously the associative
agency of material, if democratic social change is our goal.
On my view, Dewey’s theory of the public can encompass a new materialist conception
of agency, and, perhaps, more importantly, Dewey shows us how individual persons can develop
the capacity to treat material and nonhuman members of society as co-constitutive actors in the
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public. For Dewey, an individual is always in relationships with and is conditioned by her
environment, practices, and habits. However, the key to understanding and acting upon our
associative agency rests on Dewey’s notion of habit. On his view, habits are a way of responding
to and acting upon our environment and, as such, the development of particular habits is the
development of democracy. Taking seriously the generation of habits creates some space
between the idea of action and the notion of human intentionality. In the next section, where I
turn more fully to Dewey’s concept of habit, I argue that flexible habits enable individual
persons to become associative and agentic figures in networks of distributed agency. In other
words, developing Dewey’s notion of habit illuminates the specific agency of the human-cyborgs
ought to develop to become response-able and thoughtful antifoundational democratic actors.
Habit and Agency
Habits are accumulated experiences that allow humans to function both cognitively and
non-cognitively in the world. In colloquial understanding, a habit is something one does
reflexively and without thought; it is mindless. Raising one’s hand to answer a question is a habit
that we inculcate in school children. The majority of us probably do not remember learning to
raise our hand, nor do we recall the dispositions that were supposed to be on display when we
extended our arm to answers a teacher’s question. What’s more, those of us who spent
considerable amounts of time in school may find ourselves raising a hand in non-educational
settings, further exemplifying the hold this habit has on us. On Dewey’s view, the kind of habit
characterized by the raising of one’s hand demonstrates one’s ability to adapt to his or her
environment and is better described as habituation. Habituation, or accommodation, is what
Dewey calls the acquisition of habits that evidence our ability to acquiesce to our environment.
To make a key distinction, habits that serve our environmental needs are not the same as habits
that emphasize an ability to change the environment. Both types of habits are important. There
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are times when knowing how to adapt to one’s environment ensures survival and ease of
being. Knowing when and how to raise one’s hand often ensures that the teacher hears one’s
ideas and questions. But, the habit of raising one’s hand does not guarantee that you will be
called on, that the ideas you offer will be taken seriously, or that the learning environment will
be one of cooperative, joint activity.209
Insofar as the child knows that raising her hand is how she demonstrates her classroom
citizenship, she is aware of, to varying degrees, the purpose and consequence of the habit. She is
cognizant of the habit and its effect on her environment. Depending on the child’s age and level
of maturity, she may become aware of the ways in which the practice of raising a hand works to
discipline peer interaction, she may come to find the habit tiresome, or she might not give the
habit a second thought. To the extent that she thinks about and reflects upon the purpose and
consequence of the habit, she, the actor, has a hold of the habit. Just as important, insofar as she
understands the purposes and consequences of the habit, she is also aware of the ways in which
her actions affect and are dependent upon the actions of other human and nonhuman actors.
Unless told otherwise, when she is cognizant of the habit, she necessarily understands the
associative character of agency. Dewey tell us that, “Habits reduce themselves to routine way of
acting, or denigrate into ways of action to which we are enslaved just in the degree in which
intelligence is disconnected from them.” Thus, “routine habits are unthinking habits” and “‘bad’
habits are habits so severed from reason that they are opposed to the conclusions of conscious
deliberation and decision.”210 Bad habits are, therefore, not the same as unthinking habit.
Unthinking habits are routine ways of acting that help us navigate a complex world of
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associations. An unthinking habit can be anything from raising a hand to answer a question,
to brushing one’s teeth, to driving a car or riding a bike. Habits about which we don’t have to
think give us space to think about the actions that need conscious deliberation, such as having a
conversation. A bad habit, on the other hand, is habit with which we persist in spite of reasons to
discontinue the action. Driving a car while texting on a cell phone or selling semi-automatic
rifles to teenagers are two examples of bad habits.
Although not all habits need to be thinking or cognitive habits, it is key that children
construct reflexive and flexible habits to navigate the social world. How does one retain the
capacity to both think about a habit and still routinely act in accordance with the habit? Dewey
responds that habits determine the channels of thought.211 Hence, “thought is, in this sense, both
conditioned by habits but achieved through critically reflecting on habits.”212 In other words,
habits structure the thoughts we have but thinking is the process of standing outside that habit
and asking whether the habit and its attendant thought-channels are conducive to our growth as
members of various associations. In Dewey’s undemanding parlance, we must cultivate the habit
to “stop and think” about our habits. In so doing, we gain the capacity to form purposes and act
as creative and intelligent agents.213 A Deweyan notion of agency, the ability to form purposes,
is, therefore, located in the space between habit and intentional action.
For Dewey, humans are always in the process of becoming and constructing the social
environments; yet, natural and made environments are also in the constant process of
conditioning associative behaviors. As such, an individual autonomous agent who has exclusive
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purchase on his actions, such that he can be held exclusively culpable, is a fiction. Think
back to the young boy who, in Chapter 3, found the gun in the garbage bin on the schoolyard. It
was determined that this young boy is not controlled by the gun. The gun does not impart a script
of action on the boy. It was also decided that the young boy is not entirely free from the thingy
power of the gun. Instead, when the boy picks up the gun, he and the gun become an actant
because the boy and the gun affect each other. The boy is different with the gun and the gun is
different with the boy. The thingy power of the gun mediates the boy’s plans and social gender
norms produce the boy’s subjectivity. Liberal autonomy, as an ideal, would have the boy, and us,
believe that because he is rational agent who alone controls his actions. In other words, the belief
is that he can pick up the gun and not become different. As a subject who knows he is an
ontologically unique individual, (e.g. as a subject constituted by the epistemological and material
frames of liberal democracy), this boy would have no reason to seriously consider the effect of
the gun on his interests, self, and habits. He affects the gun, not the other ways around. The same
holds for the consideration of social gender norms.
In contrast, a young boy who has cultivated “flexible habits” and knows that he is coconstituted by his association or transactions with people and things would recognize the
appearance of the gun as a new situation rife with various actors and associations. He would
understand the ways in which an interaction with the gun might reconstitute his thoughts and
habits. More importantly, perhaps, a society educated to cultivate a similar understanding would
be ready to take responsibility, collectively, for the purposes the boy comes to form.
By cultivating flexible habits, a person is able to become a thinking actor and actant in a
network. As I see it, because agency is necessarily distributed across various associations,
agency exists only to the extent that a Deweyan notion of habit helps us cultivate space between
the idea of action and the idea of human intentionality. For the pragmatist, like Dewey, the
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notion of habit has extraordinary explanatory power because it “complicates our
understanding of what it means to act… It is a liminal concept, occupying a space at the border
between several of the binaries that organize the philosophical discourse of action. In this
respect, it tends to mingle oppositional concepts like freedom/determination, natural/artificial,
active/passive, cause/effect, spontaneity/instinct, and agent/patient,” note Tom Sparrow and
Adam Hutchinson.214 Sparrow and Hutchinson highlight the malleable and liminal work a notion
of habit can accomplish. Habit helps us see that a human is both free and determined.
Determined insofar as she is constrained by her habits, and free to the extent that she learns to
develop flexible, cognitive habits to engage with the co-constitute relations that constitution
human and nonhuman life; natural and artificial to the extent that she accepts the evolving
construction of the cyborg and the interplay of habits on her thoughts and actions; and active and
passive in that some habits act on her and others enable her to act on her environment.
Embracing these tensions, Dewey compels us to consider the multi-linear and recursive nature of
causation. An understanding of habit enables us to reconcile the facts of association with the
construction of a society in which unique persons, nonhuman things, and nature share conjoint
experiences. In addition, flexible habits allow us (humans and cyborgs) to act within the
constraints manufactured by society and social power and to change that which uncomfortably
constrains.
One final word on the notion of habit; habits are sometimes stable and at other times
reflect sets of actions and thoughts that are formed by the total social environment. Yet, the
production of effects is reciprocal, changes in the environment create changes in habits and
changes in habits lead to changes in the environment. The habit of owning a gun has, for
Tom Sparrow and Adam Hutchinson, A History of Habit: From Aristotle to Bourdieu (Lexington
Books, 2015), 3–4.
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instance, created a particular environment in America, which the same habit has not
replicated in Canada. The point is simple, but important: in the very nature of habit reside the
objective conditions that constitute a particular point and place in time. Dewey maintains that,
“Individuals with their exhortations, their preachings and scoldings, their inner aspirations and
sentiments have disappeared, but their habits endure, because these habits incorporate objective
conditions in themselves. So will it be with our activities.”215 Hence, the objective conditions of
the total social environment are noteworthy factors that influence the construction of particular
habits. As such, it is not enough to say we must cultivate flexible habits that make our shared but
limited agency possible; we must also aim to change the objective conditions encoded in our
habits. On my view, this means that the cultivation of habits via education is about what young
people learn about habits, which are conducive to associative living, and how young people learn
to build these habits. In the next chapter, I turn explicitly to antifoundational democratic
education and schooling, where I consider together the “what” and “how” of a habit building
educational practice.
Turning Toward Antifoundational Democratic Education
In this chapter, I have argued that new materialism, in particular new materialist agency,
is a rejection of and an alternative to liberal democracy’s materialist pre-conceptual frame. In
addition, the alternatives posed by new materialism are methodologically aligned with a
Deweyan notion of the political. New materialism’s insistence on multi-linear causation, shared
agency, and situated inquiry ground an alternative conception of society and action therein.
Following Dewey, I characterized human behavior as primarily associative and claimed that
society is constructed on, but is not equal to, associations. Rather, small and local publics emerge
John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (New York, N.Y:
Cosimo Classics, 2007), 22.
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when individuals communicate about their conjoint experience and their shared ends-inview. Becoming an agent in the Deweyan sense is, thus, related to becoming a member of
society who learns from experience, associations, and transactions with people and things, and
then acts based on a discernment of how one’s actions will affect, and be affected by, other
actors and social power. Finally, I argued that a robust and thorough understanding of habit pries
apart ideas about human action and human intention in a way that allows us to see how thinking,
action, and intention are multi-linear, multi-dimensional, and can encompass the cyborg.
The multi-linearity and dimensionality of habit is key, not only because it fits
methodologically with new materialism, but because it makes clear how agency and
responsibility are distributed in the public. Flexible habits enable the individual to take action
after careful consideration of the co-constituting things and powers that impact one’s being in the
world—this is what it means to form purposes. Meanwhile, when ensconced in social institutions
and magnified through small publics, flexible habits elucidate the “ontologically plural public”
throughout which agentic capacity is distributed.216 Because Dewey’s notion of habit brings
together action and thought as well as individuals and the environment, it makes clear the various
actors and actants that can be held responsible for problems in the public. In the ontologically
plural public, the boy, the gun, a history of school shootings, liberal democratic education, and
the contemporary state of schooling are visible actors whose affects can be addressed insofar as
the practice of cultivating flexible habits in citizens has been institutionalized. In other words,
schooling children on the practice of building flexible habits is vital to the enactment of peaceful
democratic social progress. Dewey puts it this way, “We may desire abolition of war, industrial
justice, greater equality of opportunity for all. But no amount of preaching good will or the
216
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golden rule or cultivation of sentiments of love and equity will accomplish the results. There
must be change in objective arrangements and institutions. We must work on the environment
not merely on the hearts of men. To think otherwise is to suppose that flowers can be raised in a
desert or motor cars run in a jungle. Both things can happen and without a miracle. But only by
first changing the jungle and desert.”217 Changing the objective conditions and institutions is the
first step to take responsibility for the existing habits that have created the environment in which
violence, such as rampage school violence is continuous.
As I see it, affecting the objective conditions is an educational task, one that involves the
creation of spaces and opportunities for young people to practice building flexible habits. In
addition, these habits must be ensconced within the democratic institution of the school. Thus, in
the next and final chapter, I take up the project of describing and proposing concrete steps to
changes the objective conditions of contemporary post rampage schooling. On my view,
antifoundational democratic education is a solution to our rampage school gun violence problem
insofar as it replaces the conditions and habits generated by liberal democracy’s materialist
frame, namely the idea that individuals are ontologically unique rational agents who alone ought
to be held culpable for their actions, with conditions that generate flexible and associative habits
and which illuminate the ways in which agency is shared and distributed. Through the institution
of the school, antifoundational democratic education instills habits such as cooperation,
communication, and public decision making and begins from the premise of shared agency.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EDUCATING FOR SHARED AGENCY: PROPOSALS FOR ANTIFOUNDATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION
The question is, how do we inculcate the habits of antifoundational democracy given the
persistent logic of liberal democracy which instructs young people to see themselves as
individual agents who compete for status and life in a dangerous world? Civic and community
engagement have been correlated with reductions in violence by public health scholars, school
psychologists, out-of-school-time practitioners, and political scientists218 Yet, gun violence
continues, especially in schools. My argument builds on these studies and the good sense that
leads one to think violence against a community is connected to how one engages with that
community. My argument adds a particular nuance to the chorus, which says that how we
conceive of and teach young people about what it means to participate in one’s democratic
community is primary to any effort to integrate or emancipate the individual into society. On my
view, any vision of civic education that aims toward integration or emancipation of the
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individual has already failed. As I argued in Chapter 4, human behavior is inherently
associative, and society is made up of associations such that individual persons are always and
already a part of complex networks. The individual person does not need to be integrated into
society or emancipated from it; instead, she must learn to make sense of her associative
experiences and the ways in which the multi-lateral dimensions of causation help her understand
her capacity to act cognitively and as an actant/cyborg/citizen whose agency is both shared and
constructed through the cultivation of flexible habits.
In this chapter, I introduce three policies that explain how we might move toward solving
our gun problem with an antifoundational democratic education. Acknowledging the thingy
power of guns, the first policy would ban guns from school grounds and thereby create
environments free from violent modes of association. The second policy would affirm the agency
humans and nonhumans share and displace social gender norms by ridding schools of the study
of war and instead include the study of associative agentic capacity. The individualized and
hyper-competitive environment of the school wherein heteronormative masculine virtues
discipline would be replaced with an environment that makes possible divergent gender
expressions. Finally, the third policy is iterated as a set of pedagogies that administrators and
individual teachers might take up to engender the democratic habits of communication,
cooperation and conjoint purpose formation. Before describing each policy in depth, I want to
take a moment to carefully detail what education entails from the antifoundational perspective.
Education for the antifoundational democrat is, in fact, democracy, and democracy is education.
Hence, beyond these specific policy proposals, antifoundational democracy emphasizes the
comprehensive role education and schooling, as objective conditions, play in the transition to
inculcating flexible democratic habits.
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Antifoundational Democratic Education
From the antifoundational perspective, education is more than the mere acquisition of
information. In a democracy, how a society institutionalizes the education of the young as well
as what a society teaches developing people affects the perpetuation of that particular society.
Education is something that can happen anywhere, with anyone, and results in one becoming
educated. Schooling is an institutional process by which someone is conditioned to know that
which the institution deems valuable. When schooling is done in common, all are formed and
schooled as the institution sees fit. Public education is the common effort to raise all children of a
particular society to be particular types of people. One could say America schools its children in
common in the hope that the effort will result in democratic citizens who are committed to the
renewal of a democratic society. On the foundational side, this results in schooling that instills
the respect for the liberal foundations of society, such as the individual, over the practice of
democracy. Liberalism, not democracy, is the outcome of foundational democratic schooling. On
the antifoundational side, the schooling of democratic citizens includes the practice of
democracy by children as they mature, because the aim is to raise democratic citizens who will
renew a democratic society.
For the antifoundational democrat, the distinction between formal and informal education
(schooling and education) is unnecessary. Although schooling children in common is a positive
and necessary feature of an advanced, populous, and diverse society, the distinction between
what children are to learn when in school and what they come to know outside of it obscures the
interconnected nature of human agency and learning. In his 1899 essay, The School and Society,
Dewey highlights the porous and necessarily enmeshed nature of education that happen in the
school and learning that happens in the course of life outside of school. Dewey states that, “when
the school introduces and trains each child of society into membership within such a little
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community, saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing him with the instruments
of effective self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guarantee of a larger society which
is worthy, lovely, and harmonious.”219 In later work, especially Democracy and Education,
Dewey stresses to his readers that classroom learning is not just preparation for democratic life,
but is democratic life itself. The task of the school, and the educators therein is to dissolve the
divide between formal and informal education by facilitating experiences that illuminate
connections between experiences children have inside the school to those they have while living.
The aim is to conduct education in institutions of formal learning in such a way that the
boundaries between the school and society are imperceptible. School and society, integrated in
this way, foreground an environment where learning about democracy is living democracy. Here,
students come to understand that they are always learning how to be a member of society.220
The technical definition of education, according to Dewey, is “reconstruction or
reorganizing of experience which adds to the meaning of experience… Any activity which
brings education or instruction with it makes one aware of some of the connections which have
been imperceptible.”221 In other words, education is the intentional expansion of a child’s
experiences that, when appropriately directed, make up a continuum of experience.222 Students
grow in maturity and learning as their continuum of experience expands. As Dewey describes it:
“The child lives in a somewhat narrow world of personal contacts. Things hardly come
within his experience unless they touch, intimately and obviously, his own well-being, or
that of his family and friends. His world is a world of personal interests, rather than a
realm of facts and laws… As against this, this course of study met in school presents
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material stretching back indefinitely in time, and extending outward indefinitely into
space. The child is taken out of his familiar physical environment, hardly more than a
square mile or so in area, into the wide world-yes, and even to the boundary of the solar
system.”223
Dewey’s point here is twofold. First, the experiences children have inside and outside of school
are connected. There ought to be no against. Rather the child’s intimate world and the solar
system are connected, just as the child’s experience with communication and cooperation are
connected to her understanding of citizenship. It is the job of the educator and school to
recognize and make apparent these connections. Hence, the educator must come to know and
value the student’s intimate and personal associations because these experiences foreground a
child’s comprehension of future experiences and associations. Second, the school and the

educator are jointly charged with nurturing a child’s growth. This means schools must introduce
new material, experiences, and associations by taking the child outside of her environment while
providing the means for the child to construct a bridge from here to there.
Education, for Dewey, is a condition of growth and the growth of anything demands
consideration of the environment in which it grows. “The fundamental factors in the educative
process are an immature, underdeveloped being; and certain social aims, meaning, values
incarnate in the matured experience of the adult. The educative process is the due interaction of
these forces,” says Dewey.224 If one were to grow basil from seed to plant, she would need to
find the right soil, learn where the proper amount of sunlight streams into her home, monitor the
water level of the budding basil, check for bugs, and more. The words she may use to speak
about her attempt to grow and sustain a basil plant might be: foster, nurture, and cultivate. Each
of these words also arises when we speak about education. What is significant here is the idea
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that education is akin to growth. The notion that education ought to be conceived of as
growth implicates a causal network and, thus, shared agency. In the case of the basil plant,
humans monitor the soil, the sunlight, and the water to monitor their effects on the plant, while
the plant uses the sun light and water to produce leaves and grow. In the growth of one basil
plant a host of actors meet, associate, and contribute to the production of the environment. The
child, like the plant, is affected by and affects her environment. Yet, unlike the plant her growth
does not peak; it is continuous. She speaks back and edits her environment as she forms purposes
and creates community.
Antifoundational democratic education necessitates a fluid and integrated education
where a child is invited to grow into a mature member of society through ever expanding
associative experiences with ideas, people, and things. More to the point, children must learn
subject matter—they need to know how to read and write, be able to do math, have a handle on
the sciences, know something of history and more—yet, each subject only matters insofar as
children figure out how it relates to life among human and nonhuman others. Subject matter,
content, and text books are for naught if children are unable to locate actors in a causal network.
Antifoundational democratic education aim to lay bare all of the ways in which agency is shared
so that human-cyborgs and cyborg-humans can formulate purposes that accurately weigh the
complicated forces that affect action. For example, a contemporary American high school
student who is learning about American history and the shape of civil government in the United
States should be able to describe how America came to be a nation and the key components of
the government, such as the separation of powers, the branches of the government, the levels of
government, and so on. They should also understand the ways humans, things, and social power
constituted particular subjectivities and made possible certain actions while precluding others
and must learn how to communicate with particular and entangled others about their associative
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experiences. Knowledge of American government means little if it is not accompanied with
edification in the habits that make democracy possible.
Although the distinction between formal and informal education, is unnecessary for the
antifoundational democrat who sees a child’s growth in conjoint experiences as primary, the
school is a vital democratic institution. The school is a formalized institution of democratic
construction where children from all backgrounds get the chance to expand their horizons and
identify the associations that constitute their world. Hence, the civic education that happens in
schools is of vital importance; it may be the only education of the sort some children receive. On
this point, Dewey agrees. Writing at the turn of the 20th century and in the midst of the industrial
revolution, Dewey says, “All that society has accomplished for itself is put, through the agency
of the school, at the disposal of its future members.”225 Quoting Horace Mann, he goes on to say,
“Where anything is growing, one former is worth a thousand re-formers.”226 Schools that are
democratic ought to be, therefore, engaged in forming citizens who are growing and will
continue to grow in their associations. In the Deweyan spirit, Sarah Stitzlein and Amy RectorAranda put it this way, “public schools function to sustain, support and enact democracy, in part
by serving as physical spaces open to all, where people gather together as citizens to engage in
deliberation, learning, and community building. And children gather there to learn not only skills
and knowledge needed to fulfill public needs, such as military protection and workforce
development, but also to work with others, thereby learning to be part of the public.”227
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Schooling in democracy that approaches democracy as way of life cultivates habits of
learning from associative experiences, communication, and acting in concert.
The habits that undergird antifoundational democratic education are communication,
cooperation, and the formation of purpose. Through communication associated behaviors create
society. Discussion, deliberation, and persuasion are all modes of communication that bring
together various human-cyborgs and actants around a common vision. As humans,
communication is how we learn from another’s associative experiences. Learning in this scenario
is akin to finding new and better ways of dealing with, talking about, and characterizing the
world. It is something that happens in conversation with different others. On Dewey’s view,
“signs and symbols, language, are the means of communication by which a fraternally shared
experience is ushered in and sustained.”228 In other words, awareness of our associations and
sustained reflection on the workings of shared agency is made possible insofar as the habit of
communication formalize human interdependence in society. Importantly, for the
antifoundational democrat one does not learn to communicate once and for all. Rather, since
communication is about relating to and engaging with different others who reside in different
environments and take part in different associative behaviors, there is not one language or way of
communicating that is universal to all. Hence, “perfecting the means and ways of communication
so that genuinely shared interest in the consequences of interdependent activities may inform
desire and effort and thereby direct action” is the aim.229 Democracy as education is transmitted
in communication and communicative habits that ensure all individual persons have the means to
learn by living in association.
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Although democracy is transmitted in communication, it is enacted insofar as
individual persons are willing to cooperate in joint action. Moreover, communication implies
cooperation. It is surely possible to talk at someone or to annunciate words to no one at all, but
these actions would be characterized as speech. Communication implicates another in a process
of cooperation where each conversational participant engages in the associative experience. The
final habit of antifoundational democratic education, formation of purposes, teaches young
citizens to build thinking habits in concert with others. Moreover, insofar as the student build the
habit to consider the perspective of others, to assess one’s association with human and nonhuman
things, and to reflect upon the consequences of proposed courses of action given one’s lived
experience, this person or person-cyborg can be said to have formed a purpose. An education
that takes this habit seriously would encourage students reflect on their interactions with one
another as they make plans to do and try new things.
My argument is that, if democracy is the aim, then education as it happens through
schools must incorporate the habits of democracy. That said, curriculum and pedagogical
changes are important but will not be sufficient. Rather, the ethos and organizational structure of
the school must reflect democratic ends. As it stands, schooling in the United States is marked by
post-rampage security measures like the employment of school resource officers, the installation
of metal detectors, and the use of active shooter drills. What’s more, the dominate strand of
citizenship education, as evidenced in my characterization of Callan, is suffuse with notions of
citizenship constructed on the idea that individuals are the exclusive owners of agency. The
result of liberal democratic education and post-rampage security measures is a school that
operates like a military base and students who come to think of themselves as solider-citizens,
who must become intentional rational agents so that they can defend oneself and one’s way of
life against rogue or psychologically defective agents.
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On my view, schools must first become spaces that welcome antifoundational
democratic habits, and this mandates the expulsion of all guns (including those carried by adults)
from the environment and the de-securitization of school buildings. Second, school activities and
curricula ought to be gender inclusive and designed to confront gendered social norms as well as
the ways in which social power is exercised in human interactions. This means the study of
domination and war through the veneration of masculine virtues must end. Third, our
philosophies of education and classroom pedagogies ought to actively instill and teach
democratic habits that make our shared and limited agency apparent. In the following sections, I
will explore each of these normative claims
No Guns Allowed
First, if schools are to be the kind of educational institutions capable of teaching the
habits of antifoundational democracy, then the environment of the school must be free of violent
modes of association and disciplinary security measures that individualize students and
perpetuate false ideas about individual agency. The de-securitization of schools demands, at a
minimum, the re-instantiation of weapon free school legislation and the discontinuation of zerotolerance policies, armed teachers or adults, and active shooter drills. With the construction of
the environment being key for the edification of democratic habits, softening the school
environment is primary.
Following the rampage school shooting at Sandy Hook, champions of the “more guns”
approach to the rampage school gun violence problem moved beyond calls to hire more police to
protect schools, such as school resource officers, and began to argue that schools need more guns
in the hands of more people.230 The idea is that a good guy with a gun can stop a bad teenager
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intent on shooting his classmate. The proliferation of guns on school campuses (and I would
argue in society generally) promotes violence and dissuades the making of antifoundational
democracy. Here I want to raise three specific questions to problematize the “more guns”
approach. One, who trains teachers and school staff how to shoot students? Two, once everyone
is armed how do you distinguish the good guy with a gun from the bad guy with a gun? Three, in
a democracy is it acceptable that the more guns approach normalizes the notion that all social
problems can be solved by guns and their owners?
First, consider the training of teachers to shoot students. The military uses a detailed
educational program to teach its members how to kill a human target. In fact, the low firing rates
of American soldiers in WWI and WWII led military educators to conclude that soldiers were
purposefully not killing the “enemy” and must be taught to shoot other human beings.231 Police
officers also undergo extensive firearm training as well as education on the ethics of killing
another human being.232 Requiring schools to arm teachers and staff would require an equal level
of additional education in the ethics, psychology, and act of killing. Advocates of arming
teachers do not address the educational imperative and psychological training teachers will need
to accurately shoot a student or former student. These shooters are, after all, young people about
whom the staff has intimate knowledge of and relationships with. If members of the military
cannot shoot the “enemy” without extensive video simulation and practice, how will teachers,
even armed ones, shoot “students” without similar training? Although guns are powerful actants,
they do not come with scripts. Nor do guns imbue their user with technical or moral know-how.
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To follow this line of thinking, schools dedicated to the preparation of teachers and schools
for military preparation might simply converge on the training of soldiers. At both institutions,
the idea that humans are culpable rational agents, would be primary to the construction of the
enemy.
Second, let’s look at the notion that we ought to arm everyone. Imagine a school shooter
walking down a hallway of a high school and shooting at whomever he happens upon. As
students and teachers hear the sound they too pop out of their classrooms with guns at the ready.
Everyone has their gun out. The police arrive—who do they shoot or detain? Folks in the more
guns camp might say this is to beg the question since the point of arming everyone is to affect a
disciplined society wherein the school shooter forgoes rampaging out of fear of others with guns.
The more likely outcome of the more guns answer will be little to no change. Rampage school
shootings will continue. Students and teachers with guns on the campus will be called cowards
for having trouble shooting a student, or worse, they will shoot the wrong person.233 Everyone
will fear everyone else and in this environment the habits of democracy, like cooperation, will
become a dangerous liability.
The third and largest issue with the more guns approach to rampage school gun violence
is the severing of associations, the inaccurate distillation of individual agency, and the
inculcation of the notion that guns/war/fear will save individuals from one another. In his book
on guns and democracy, Firmin DeBrabander asks: “Do we want our youth to grow accustomed
to guns, perhaps using them routinely to deal with confrontations or perceived offenses? Is it
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compatible with democracy that guns are part of our everyday methods for dealing with
social challenges?” (DeBrabander, 2015, p. 165). People in the more guns camp would answer
DeBrabander’s first question with a correction. They might say that when youth become more
accustomed to the idea that their peers and teachers could be armed with a concealed gun, they
will show deference to another individual’s exclusive agentic potential. Hence, the proliferation
of guns would guarantee that individual citizens act reasonably and tolerate of one another’s life
plans. In this way, argue the more guns camp, guns enable individuals to protect and make real
foundational democracy wherein each individual is bereft of the habits needed to craft society
and but in supply of the agentic potential to make rational choices about his or her individual
behavior.
On my view, DeBrabander’s question gets at the heart of the matter. Guns affect the
emergence of democratic modes of association insofar as guns are actants that affect the ways in
which citizens understand the facts of association and lead to the construction of environments
and objective conditions that are hostile to and might even preclude the enactment of democracy.
The aim of antifoundational democratic education is to make evident our shared and limited
agency and to inculcate the capacities and habits a citizen/person-cyborg needs to make
democracy. Yet, the proliferation of guns further obfuscates the gun’s thing power and the
complex causal networks of which we are all apart. Telling teachers, students, parents, and
community members that the best way to protect schools and the students therein from rampage
school gun violence is to give everyone a gun, tells them that exclusive agentic individuals are
the problem and the solution. Moreover, this response ignores the kind of environment the
proliferation of guns manifests. The proliferation of guns in schools constructs boundaries of
conflict between intentional rational agents, disciplines individuals to see one another as threats,
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and mandates adherence to security measures. The result is a “zero-tolerance” society that
suspends democracy.234
A zero-tolerance society is not democratic, and a zero-tolerance school cannot teach
young people to be citizens. When we are disciplined to see everyone as potential threats to our
safety and view security practices, such as gun ownership, as necessary features of society, we
abdicate our responsibility to communicate and learn from one another. We abdicate our
responsibility to make democracy by communicating about our conjoint experiences. These
violent modes of association individuate humans and replace the fact of association with the fact
of bad actors. In a zero-tolerance school the teachers and students are taught to participate in the
making of a micro police state wherein violence and fear of violence are organized into a
coherent order.235 What will students educated in this environment know of accommodation and
compromise? What will they know of making community and learning from associative
behavior? What will they know of shared agency?
The alternative is to craft educational environments built on the study of democracy.
These environments would be free of guns, metal detectors, active shooter drills, and zerotolerance policies. They would be environments constructed on the facts of association and
would invite inhabitants to learn alongside one another and nonhuman things. In an
antifoundational democratic school that is cognizant of and concerned about rampage school gun
violence there would be spaces for students to convene and communicate about rampage school
gun violence, bullying, or gender-based norms. There would be opportunity to collaborate on
solving problems, environments open to student ideas, and reflexive community norms. Security
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would be maintained and affirmed through the construction of this environment. As such,
each particular student would be invited to think about their role in ensuring a peaceful and
democratic educational space. Thus, students would not be drilled into preparation for an active
shooter event, they (and their parents) would be welcomed to participate in the construction of a
safe and gun-free school environment.
Displacing The Study of War
The more guns approach is akin to celebrating the study of war in school. In this section,
I am going to explore what the study of war has to do with gender and social power. My
argument is that the study of war, and therefore the more guns approach, is built on a celebration
of masculine virtues, emblematic of a society wedded to the veneration of war, and, in a circular
fashion, reinforces the more guns approach to problem solving. As virtues constructed on social
gender norms, masculine virtues teach students to take on warrior like subjectivities that are
suited for war but not democracy.236
The study of war is not a new phenomenon. It could be said that American children who
attend public schools have been studying war since the founding of the common school. In his
1855 Lectures on Education, Horace Mann argues that unless the rising generation is educated in
the “strength and sobriety of intellect which shall dispel the insane illusions of martial glory; and
unless they shall be trained to the habitual exercise of those sentiments of universal brotherhood
for the race…” war and war making will persist.237 As Mann saw it, education for killing
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produced nothing more than artful killers, while education for peace and “universal
brotherhood” paved the way for the genuine renewal of society.238
More to the point, schooling that educates children in common to become citizens must
weigh complicated demands. Schools must keep children safe and educate them to renew
society. The extent to which schools view these aims as competing modulates the kind of civic
education the schools perpetuate. Antifoundational civic education teaches young people that to
make peace they must participate in the renewal of a democratic society. Logically, education for
peace makes peace and creates a secure environment to the extent that citizens are capable of
solving problems through their association and experiences and without violence. Education for
war/safety mandates security measures, the creation of warriors, and, more importantly,
anticipates violence. The study of war supports the production of more war makers. Education in
the values of solidarity, brotherhood, and harmony bring about peace, says Mann.
To this point, in a small essay on what might make the “war against war” winnable, the
early 20th century peace-party member and pragmatic philosopher, William James, argues that,
“the military feelings are too deeply grounded to abdicate their place among our ideals until
better substitutes are offered…”239 James argues, adeptly I think, that our feelings about war and
warriors harden our judgements and make it harder for us to appreciate others, like pacifist, with
feelings different from our own. In other words, American’s feelings about war, the warrior life,
and binary depictions of masculinity are too deeply rooted in our judgements about the kinds of
life that are worthwhile for the peace program to ignore the military folks. But what are these
“American feelings” about warriors and the warrior life? James’ primary conversational partner
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was Theodore Roosevelt, and Roosevelt lauded the manliness of war as well as the dearth of
manliness in the nation’s boys. In a speech on the strenuous life, Roosevelt strongly asserts that,
“Our country calls not for the life of ease, but for the lift of strenuous endeavor…Let us therefore
boldly face the life of strife, resolute to due our duty well and manfully; resolute to uphold
righteous by deed and by word.”240 In a later speech he goes so far as to state that the American
boy “must not be a coward or a weakling, a bully, a shrik, or a prig.”241
It is difficult to reconcile James’ account of war with James’ stance as a pacifist and his
thoughtful work on human psychology and happiness. How could such a careful person who was
committed to peace have ignored the place of women in the war against war? Did he really think
men could be educated in masculine virtues and not create war? Is a war against war, counter to
the point? At least part of the answer must be that given his interest one’s individual character,
James reminds us to take note of the individual psyche of the folks who wage war. Although
military virtues represent the apex of masculine nature, according to the military party, each man
is an individual who must assimilate desirable traits of character. Without the proper education
men are liable to fall prey to baser war-like traits of characters, but with education in the martial
virtues, boys will become heroic men, says James. Hence accoding to James, listening to the war
party reveals the importance of martial virtues, including “intrepidity, contempt for softness,
surrender of private interest, and obedience to command.”242 Pace Mann, James says manly,
martial virtues can be redirected insofar as individual men are educated to love the right ends.243
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Although James sought to soften Roosevelt’s toxic vision, James and others who have
attempted to re-evaluate militarism and masculinity in democratic education have led us
astray.244 James underestimates, or perhaps just does not account for, the conflict between
educating for individual adoption of “appropriate” social gender norms educating for shared
agency or the making of pragmatic democracy. This is akin to Jane Roland Martin’s critique of
James, and it is an important one.245 Realigning contempt for softness or intrepidity with a civic
end, like taming or fighting nature to build infrastructure or the field of policing, does not
constrain the habits or actions to only these arenas. Moreover, although the virtues have been
aligned with worthy domestic causes, they are still tied to war, control, violence, and dominance.
Men who learn to demonstrate or preform all of the martial virtues, which are still tied to a
binary construction of social gender, have no reason to assume these character traits are
undesirable in the public or when engaging in conversation with different others about the
collective shape of our democracy. It is here that Foucault’s analysis of social power is so
helpful. Insofar as we take seriously the working of social power and the way in which social
gender norms produce and discipline individual subjectivities, then we must account for how
these norms guide and shape that individual’s sense of the self. The person who adopts these
martial virtues and with the recognition of the ways in which these particular virtues represent
masculinity is still adopting a binary vision of gender inscribed through social power. Through
the veneration of martial and binary masculine virtues, war and war making have become routine
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ways of acting, and as a routine habit, the study of war has created objective conditions
wherein masculinized subjectivities are codified and disciplined.
An antifoundational approach to democratic education in a post rampage world highlights
the need for egalitarian and ontologically heterogenous social values where an alternative
conception of agency makes evident the ways in which social power in the shape of gender
social norms is accumulated and exercised to construct masculine- warrior subjectivities.
Replacing the study of war with the study of democracy, following Mann’s advice, would be to
take a big step in the right direction. Substituting the veneration of binary masculine virtues,
where students align masculinity with contempt for softness, intrepidity and the like, with gender
fluid, cyborg, and democratic habits is good. There is nothing morally wrong with teaching
students to surrender their private interests or encouraging bold actions, or teaching children to
listen to those who have more experience than oneself. But this is not the entirety of what James’
proposes. His argument is that American democracy and the possibility of peace will be built
upon re-educating the war-like nature of individual men to serve civic ends. James missed
Mann’s point—we cannot educate students in the martial virtues and expect peace to result. War
and the study of its virtues must go if democracy is our aim. Democracy demands education in
the making of shared communities and expansive agency.
It is not by accident that feminist new materialists, like Donna Haraway, make it clear
that we must begin by re-thinking our conception of who and what constitutes an agent.
Throughout history women and those who do not comply with the masculine norm have been
denied the status of being an individual rational agent, despite liberal democracy’s claim to
equality. Following this lead, an antifoundational democratic education, which is situated on
rejection of materialism’s foundational premises, would aim to destabilize the study of war by
destabilizing the assertion that only humans are rational or agentic, and the subsequent notion

that only rational humans have the ability to produce effects in the world.
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By exploring

what it means to be human and who and what produces effects, young people would learn to
contemplate the construction of cyborgs and the ways in which social power produces and
disciplines particular subjects. Each student would be expected to map the causal networks of
which they are a member, and in so doing, to confront the working of social power such as social
gender norms and the ingrained habitual study of war. Whereas the aim of foundational
democratic education is individual autonomous agency, or the ability to locate an ‘I’, the aim of
antifoundational democratic education is shared agency and visible cyborg-like subjectivities.
Hence, the study of shared agency, or locating the ‘we’ and ‘I’ in alternating and evolving
associations is an essential component of displacing the study of war.
The goal of an active shooter drill is to instill martial virtues like surrender to command
and intrepidity and to establish a zero-tolerance society wherein all can be mobilized to protect
the school and fight offenders of the peace.247 Like the war on terrorism, the war on rampage
school gun violence, is a war that requires the near constant reminder that an omnipresent enemy
lurks among us. This is how we achieve peaceful schools, say some. The study war approach
tells students, teachers, and community members that schools are unsafe, that they require
constant protection, and that the democratic aims of schooling ought to be subverted for
security’s sake. In the wake of James’ ideas American society has continued to double down on
martial virtues. That we expect peace or democracy to result is madness.
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Dewey articulated another way in the early decades of the 20 century and Mann
defined the stakes at the outset of the American common school movement.248 If we are to stop
the bloodshed, we must take seriously the idea Mann led with, only peace and democracy will
lead to peace and democracy. And the enactment of democracy on my account demands an
accounting of the ways in which social power and social gender norms have subverted attempts
to create peace. In the next section, I consider pedagogies that would the aims of
antifoundational democratic education.
Democratic Pedagogies
Up to this point, I have focused on the broad role of educational environments in
generating antifoundational democracy. My focus on education writ large and the environment in
which this education ought to happen, and not pedagogies or classroom level teaching strategies,
is intentional and based on two factors. First, the environment in which education happens
matters. In Dewey’s parlance, “We must work on the environment not merely on the hearts of
men.”249 Furthermore, in new materialist language, the environment is an actant that can mitigate
even the best teaching strategies and philosophies. Second, focusing only on the classroom
makes the mistake of placing the ownership for disrupting the study of war on individual
teachers. Although teachers are important people in the lives of students and schools, placing the
entire burden on teachers ignores the fact of shared agency. Hence, what I have to say about
antifoundational pedagogies that are contextual, growth oriented, and that explicitly invoke the
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practice of democracy, is said with the recognition that environments and complex actors that
effect classroom education matter.
Antifoundational democratic education aims to make explicit the associations that link
individuals to one another, nonhuman things, and history. By exploring the context of shared
activity, young people learn about the various actors that operate within complex causal
networks.250 In our contemporary context of post-rampage schooling, one way this might be
done is through a class on the complexity of violence. For example, Ivy Schamis, a teacher at
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida where a school shooter killed 17
on February 14, 2018 spoke about one of the courses her students, many of them in the spotlight
for their roles in March for Our Lives took. Many of these students were currently or previously
enrolled in her History of the Holocaust class, where they made connections between Nazi
Germany and current events, studied the rise of hate groups on college campuses, discussed how
hate and violence are correlated, and learned how to be an upstander rather than a bystander.251
On my view, curricula that encourages students to consider the complex actors that contribute to
the making of hate and acts of violence make an explicit attempt to teach students that agency is
shared and human behavior is associative. In other words, although Hitler as an individual can
and ought to be held responsible for his actions and role in the Holocaust, so to must Nazi culture

David E. Meens, “Democratic Education versus Smithian Efficiency: Prospects for a Deweyan Ideal in
the ‘Neoliberal Age,’” Educational Theory 66, no. 1/2 (April 2016): 211–26,
https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12163.
250

My intent here is the highlight the way Schamis connected the Holocaust to contemporary events. It is
not to endorse the upstander movement. The idea what one ought to walk up to a shooter in the midst of a
rampage and say “I love you” or some other affirmation, sets a dangerous precedent. Mark Keierleber,
“Remembrance Day: Ivy Schamis Was Teaching About the Holocaust When Shots Rang Out at Parkland,
Killing Two of Her Students. Now the Lessons Are Deeply Personal,” accessed December 6, 2018,
https://www.the74million.org/article/remembrance-day-ivy-schamis-was-teaching-about-the-holocaustwhen-shots-rang-out-at-parkland-killing-two-of-her-students-now-the-lessons-are-deeply-personal/.
251

141
and their guns. By exploring the rise of hate and educative effects of negative feelings toward
some member of the human species, students in Schamis’ class were able to explore the nature of
associations along with the values of diversity, pluralism, and difference.
Pedagogies, like Schamis’, which are rooted in creating a context of shared activity, are
pedagogies that entail antifoundational democratic education. Schamis’ teaching is a good
example of Dewey’s vision of democratic schooling, or civic education, which rests on the
participation of and research by children in their school and community so as to benefit and/or
reconstruct the community.252 In other words, what makes Schamis’ teaching noteworthy is not
the subject per se, but that she brought to light connections between how associations and
attitudes that affected a historical event might relate to current events that directly affect her
students. Moreover, Schamis did not create artificial connections in an effort to make her
curriculum interesting, she did so because her aim was to facilitate the growth of her students.
Growth in the capacity to make sense of ever widening associations and in the capacity to
understand how we might participate in the construction of the ends that we can, collectively,
hold in view, is a central tenant of antifoundational democratic education. Growth is directional,
continuous, and it is about the development of a capacity to affect our environments, on Dewey’s
view. He puts it this way, “While the living thing may easily be crushed by superior force, it
none the less tries to turn energies which act upon it into means of its own further existence. If it
cannot do so, it does not just split into smaller pieces (at least in the higher forms of life), but it
loses its identity as a living thing”253 The image of the living thing enmeshed in the continuous
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push and pull of actors, which it must make sense of and bring into association, captures the
critical component of what it means for pedagogy to be oriented toward growth. The aim is not
to gain control over all of the impingements that affect one’s agency, nor is it to cede to the
Foucauldian forces of power. Rather, the goal is to “grow” in our ability and capacity as humans
to affect the environment as we grow in our capacity to make sense of associations. In addition,
for Dewey, growth is a communal endeavor; it is not an individual effort to increase in size or
capacity. It is the ever-expanding ability to make connections and the capacity to “realize our
aims as we are impacted by and exert influence on our environments.”254 Thus, the difference
between Dewey and Foucault is that Dewey’s theory of democracy and education “gives us a
chance to grow up,” to use Richard Rorty’s phrase.255
Orienting pedagogies to Dewey’s notion of growth has the effect of displacing more
traditional developmental outcomes which seek to individualize a student’s ability to do or
demonstrate something. Whereas growth posits a continuously reaching student who is never
final in their development, conceptions of education that aim to measure an individual student’s
particular achievements, such as the achievement of rationality or autonomous agency, posit an
individual agent who becomes complete over the course of their education. This does not mean
an education which aims at growth ought to view growth as a telos. Growth is the objective, but
an individual person’s growth is measured by assessing his or her capacity to engage critically
with his or her environment and to keep on growing. A student who grows in their ability to
make sense of her conjoint experience and who continues to pursue democratic ends is one who
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has constructed a flexible habit to grow. Key for contemporary teachers who are accustomed
to hearing about a building “growth mindsets” in students or adopting one themselves, growth in
the sense that I am using it is more than setting “SMART” goals and adopting a patient attitude
with one’s personal development.256 Growth for Dewey, and me, is about a student’s ability to
connect one experience to another, to understand how those experiences stack up along a
continuum, and to assess the actants that contribute to, affect and co-constitute the student so that
the student can impact, through his or her shared but limited agency, future experiences.257
Education that focuses on growth, therefore, can build a student’s capacity to disrupt and
address social power. One cannot affect one’s environment or experiences with others without
also being able to address the social and political power that acts on the environment and the
various cyborgs therein. The students from Marjory Stoneman Douglas, who learned to read and
interpret the complex causal networks at work in Nazi Germany were, thus, able to make
connections to the rise of college hate groups. This is a good example of the ways in which
curriculum and the aims of growth are interconnected because the students were able to distill
causal networks in their own environment. Evidence of this can be found in the ways in which
these students, following the rampage, have taken on powerful forces, like the National Rifle
Association, through a campaign to reduce the organization’s funding, as well as President
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Their capacity to build an

association of like-minded or similarly-affected young people (to create a small public), to
identify powerful actors that make possible the continued presence of rampage school shootings,
and to decide upon a public course of action corresponds to an education that is oriented toward
growth and not individual agentic outcomes.
Finally, to effectively construct the habits of antifoundational democracy, the explicit
practice of democracy must be invoked in the classroom and through a teacher’s pedagogy. As I
see it, linking education to democracy explicitly, and alongside students, is primary for
antifoundational education wherein student’s personal, not individual, growth in associative
experiences enables them to communicate across personal difference and affect change in the
environment. Democracy and education are twin projects, says Dewey. Insofar as democracy is
agency, it is a way of life that is learned by living alongside different others and carefully
constructing habits that aid growth. Growth orientated habits include, practices that arise in
interaction, such as communication, cooperation, and the formation of purposes.259 A teacher
who teaches the democratic habit to communicate would begin, as this section did, with a survey
of the contexts in which students live and the identification of problems with which they deal.
She would, then, generate opportunities for young people to work together on the problems they
jointly identify as worthwhile. In their conjoint work on projects aimed at solving specific
problems, students practice developing flexible and cooperative habits, such as accommodation,
compromise, and flexibility. Finally, as students practice articulating, listening, and making
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sense of their experiences, they ought to be encouraged to test their solutions among and
alongside their peers. In so doing, they will practice forming purposes and making small publics.
Coming together to create change is in part what makes the young people from Parkland
and Schamis’ teaching a worthy example of an education aimed at building democratic habits of
communication, cooperation, and public building. Following the rampage, these students formed
a public to take on the actants and actors at work in the complex causal network (they did not
merely blame the shooter, although some did this too) and with the support of other interested
parties created a public event in a traditionally public space— a march on the nation’s capital.
Two additional factors are worth mentioning. First, these students reached out to young people in
urban environments who had similar experiences with gun violence and who shared a view of
the ends. Second, these students attend and attended a modern public school that operates within
the neoliberal and liberal democratic logic that I and others decry. Perhaps the lesson is,
therefore, that a single teacher’s pedagogy can make a difference when coupled with an
extraordinary and horrific event. That said, my aim is to make it such that a teacher’s pedagogy
and the classroom environment come together to educate students in antifoundational democracy
thereby removing the necessary catalyst of a horrific event.
On my view, what’s vital is that students see the practice of exploring contexts and
conjoint experience, communicating about these experiences, and forming public purposes, as
democratic. The last piece of the puzzle is the explicit acknowledgment that these habits and
practices make democracy. It is one thing to inculcate these habits in students and it is another
for these students to use the word democracy to describe their actions. Without the reinforced,
verbal acknowledgement that communicating, cooperating, and jointly crafting proposals to
address specific conjoint experiences is democracy, students will identify democracy solely with
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voting or with making a reasonable choice and acting as an autonomous agent. My final
recommendation is, therefore, to teach antifoundational democracy as democracy in social
studies and civics class in K-12 schools. Social studies and civic classes are one dedicated space
in which students are given the space to consider the deep context of their experience. Simplistic
changes, like titling the class “democratic education” or telling the students at various times
during the semester that they are practicing democracy are not sufficient. Alone, these simple
statements will not thicken the thin strands of liberal democracy that pervade current iterations of
social studies classes, but it is a start. Language affects our thoughts, actions, and beliefs; what
we call things affects how we act and what we believe.260 This is especially true for the young
and immature who are building their vocabularies and conceptual imagination alongside one
another during the school day and after. If they learn to name communicative, cooperative, and
public building practices “democracy,” then it will not be a big leap for them to adopt democratic
modes of association as mature members of society. In other words, we need to call
antifoundational democratic habits, democracy, if we hope to update our liberal democratic
habits.
My argument in this section is that, insofar as teachers adopt philosophies of education
and teaching strategies that are situated in an understanding of shared agency, conjoint and
associative experience, and name these practices democracy, they begin to develop in their
students the capacity to be antifoundational democratic citizens. The students of Marjory
Stoneman Douglas are a good example of what can happen when these pedagogical elements
come together. I do not know if Schamis called the habits she taught her students to practice
“democracy,” or that she understood her teaching philosophy in the terms that I have used here.
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 1st edition (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2003).
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What matters, to my mind, is that the practice of antifoundational democratic education
fertilized the ground for her students’ capacities to grow and keep growing in their ability to
affect the environment.
Conclusion
Antifoundational democratic education offers a robust challenge to our gun problem, as
that problem is evidenced in the tradition that locates agency exclusively in the individual.
Insofar as antifoundational democracy generates the capacity to make sense of shared and
limited agency, it teaches individuals how to affect and change the environment for the better.
Situated in a complex causal network of humans and things, antifoundational democratic citizens
know to assess messy contexts, to communicate shared experiences, and to craft actions based on
those experiences. Whereas liberal democracy and liberal democratic education support our gun
problem by locating agency exclusively in the autonomous rational individual, antifoundational
democracy distributes agency across a wide network of actors that make gun violence possible.
Not only does liberal democracy support the person in thinking of himself as an agent; it also
obscures the agency of other key actors, such as gendered norms, guns, gun marketing, and gun
rights advocates. Thus, on my account, an adequate theory of democratic education must educate
humans who are situated, partial, emotional and cyborg like, to reckon with all of the ways in
which nonhuman things, like guns, and social norms, like gender, act in to shape individual
bodies, minds, imaginations and the collective. The danger of continuing to ignore the shared
agency of human and nonhuman actors is grave. Not only will we continue to blame and punish
individual boys for shooting up schools, we will continue to use a kind of civic education that
perpetuates the problem.
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Antifoundational democracy asks us to rethink and reflect on our engagement with
humans and things. It requires a balancing of individual and community needs, and it educates
children to learn about the sociopolitical world by engaging with it as constitutive members.
Dewey spends the first six chapters of Democracy and Education sorting out his method of
education and the next twenty describing, delineating, and defending democratic education. The
seventh chapter, “The Democratic Conception of Education,” marks the turn toward Dewey’s
thinking about democracy. To open chapter seven, Dewey situates his conception of democracy
by equating peaceful change with a particular method of education. He states, “Particularly is it
true that a society which not only changes but-which has the ideal of such change as will
improve it, will have different standards and methods of education from one which aims to
supply at the perpetuation of its own customs.”261 To drive the distinction home, Dewey places
Platonic ideas on the side of perpetuation and opposite his notion of democratic education.
Dewey says that the problem with folks who, like Plato, and in my view liberal democrats like
Callan, lose faith in democracy is that they “[do] not trust to gradual improvements in education
to bring about a better society, which should then improve education.”262 That is,
foundationalists, like Callan, are so worried about creating a stable state and fair political order
that they do not sufficiently trust living together to educate.
On Dewey’s view, Plato’s lost faith in democracy leads him to develop an elaborate
aristocratic vision of an ideal city in which education is determined by philosopher kings who
understand how to perpetuate justice.263 That is, because Plato felt he could no longer trust in the
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human ability to find joint points of reference and shared answers to common problems. His
ideal city privileged force and noble lies instead of persuasion, communication, and cooperation.
Plato’s lost faith in the human enterprise of living together is not only philosophically relevant; it
is generative insofar as contemporary theories of liberal democratic education evince a similar
loss of faith in the human ability to learn from each other and to grow up. Like Dewey’s
interpretation of Plato, my interpretation of Callan and the liberal democratic project argues that
liberal democrats mistakenly locate agency in the rational individual to avoid the messy work of
making democracy from facts of association, complex networks of shared agency and in the
midst of productive social power. Building on Dewey, I’ve argued that the enterprise of learning
to living together requires that we seriously acknowledge the nonhuman actants that coconstitute our sense of what it means to be particular humans. The task is to trust living together
to educate, even if we are cyborgs, and to re-think our conception of agency to better address
violence.
Rampage school gun violence is the infiltration of America’s gun problem into schools.
Insofar as these schools respond to the problem of gun violence by teaching students to see
themselves as individual rational agents, they leave us with a bunch of individuals pointing guns
at each other. But this solution is no solution at all. Thus, if our aim is to construct a better
society where democracy is plentiful and gun violence is sparse, we must not make the same
mistakes foundationalists do. We must endeavor to make antifoundational democratic education
a practicable option by expelling guns from schools, using democratic methods to address social
and thingy power in networks of distributed agency wherein cyborgs/humans/things/powers act,
and set as a standard of civic education the capacity to grow and keep growing.
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